AN ESSAY Concerning the Nature and Guilt OF LYING.

BY

CHARLES BRENT, M. A. Rector of *Chriſt-Church* and St. *Werburge* in *Briſtol.*

EPHESIANS iv. 25.

Wherefore putting away Lying, ſpeak every Man Truth with his Neighbour.

LONDON,

Printed for *John Wyat*, at the *Roſe* in St. *Paul's* Church-Yard, 1702.

TO

Edward Colſton Eſq;

OF

MORCLACK,

IN

SURREY.

SIR,

I AM ſtraitned for two Apologies, which I wiſh I could make handſomly: One for troubling the Publick, which generally is hard enough to come by, and always hardeſt where 'tis moſt needed: Another ſhould, in good Manners, be made, for thruſting under the ſhelter of a

conſiderable Man's Patronage. To the Publick I have no better Pretence ready, than the Requeſt of ſome particular Friends; which, as it is the triteſt, ſo by conſequence the moſt unlikely one to paſs: But however, ſince it is in earneſt the true one, and the trueſt Excuſe is the beſt; I expect, as far as it is wanting, it ſhall ſtand me in ſome ſtead. To you, Sir, I have no ſafer way of defending my ſelf, than by laying the charge of this trouble to the eminence of your own Character. If Men will make it the main buſineſs of their Lives to become Exemplar in Works of Piety and Charity, they muſt thank themſelves if they draw after them particular notice and eſteem. Waving therefore farther Ceremony, I ſhall proceed to render you ſome account of this ſmall Preſent I have took the boldneſs to make you.

The

The main Argument of the following Diſcourſe was deliver'd Occaſionally from the Pulpit, as may be ſeen by the ſtiffneſs of the Method: but when no denial would ſerve, but it muſt go from thence to the Preſs, I reſolv'd to throw it out of the ſet form of Sermons, into one ſingle Eſſay; and becauſe it is of it ſelf a low, and flat, and arrid Controverſie, I took the freedom, when I went over it the ſecond time, to give the Lines a livelier turn and ſpirit, and let more air in upon the Reader to refreſh him, in the confinement of ſo cloſe and dull a Subject. But whether by this Alteration, I may not expect unequal ſucceſs, there may perhaps be more juſt Reaſon to ſuſpect, than I am aware of.

I am alſo duly ſenſible of the difference between ſpeaking to the Ear, and the Eye: The Ear, as Critical, and Humerſome, and Cenſorious as

it is, may eaſily be impos'd upon; He who has the knack of tuning up his Voice to the right pitch and key of his Audience, does the buſineſs. With ignorant and low Capacities it ſufficeth if a Man be loud and vehement, and importune, they love to have the *Goſpel* deliver'd like the *Law*, in Clouds and Thunder; ſo that if he *cry aloud, and ſpare not*, if he *lift up his voice like a Trumpet*; if he *ſmite with his hands, and ſtamp with his feet, and cry alas!* he never fails of paſſing for an able Preacher. Cool Reaſonings, and calm Sence, like the *ſubtile Matter* of *Cartes*, paſſeth thro' them as nothing; it ſhall not ſtir them. With ſuperficial conceited Hearers, ſtrong Lines, pompous Periods, and Sentences ſtalking high upon the ſtreſs of two tall words, as upon Stilts, ſhall carry a Man up to an eminence, even with Perſons of ſome improvement; a good Preſence and Pronunciation, ſhall

ſhall go a great way to make them believe they are all the while entertain'd with ſound ſence and Divinity. But when all the Charms and Arts of a juſt and Muſical Elocution come together upon the Minds of an Audience, it is with a Sovereign uncontroulable Enchantment; tho' the reaſoning ſhould happen, in any reſpect, to be unconcluſive, yet nothing but the warineſs of a very watchful and diſcerning Judgment, would be at leiſure to diſcover the fallacy, according to that reflection of the Son of *Syrach*; *An Eloquent Man is known far and near; but a Man of underſtanding knoweth when he ſlippeth.* Eccluſ. xxi. 7.

But now, a Diſcourſe that has been never ſo plauſibly preſented to the Ear, is ſtrip'd naked of all ſuch external Ornaments, when it comes to appear before the Eye, which can no more be amus'd by the winning modulation of ſounds, than the Ear

can by the delectable intermixture of Colours: Beſides, the Eye is an acute, and curious, and prying Sence; it is not like the Ear, to be put off with one tranſient glance of the Matter; but looks cloſely, ſcans Critically, pores thoughtfully, dwells capriciouſly upon every line; and by going over again, and ſtaring hard upon the faults, is very apt both to multiply and magnifie them. Which minds me of what paſs'd between *Lyſias*, and a certain Criminal who retain'd him: The *Orator* gives his *Client* the Speech he had taken pains to compoſe in his defence, that he might peruſe it before hand, for his own ſatisfaction: having read it ſeveral times over, he brings it back to *Lyſias*, very much dejected; telling him plainly, that upon the firſt reading indeed it ſeem'd an admirable Oration, but, after he had read it narrowly three or four times over, he could ſee nothing in it but what

was

e of was ordinary, dull, inſipid ſtuff; to
n a- whom the *Orator* ſmiling, reply'd,
nce; *What? Is not once ſufficient to ſpeak*
off *it before the Judges?* and yet ſo
Mat- Compleat a Maſter of the Graces and
riti- Arts of Eloquence, was as likely as
s ca- any Man in his time, next to *De-*
by *moſthenes* himſelf, to have Compos'd
nard what ſhould endure frequent peruſal.
n to Whether that ſevere Princi-
hich ple I have maintain'd in the enſuing
een ESSAY, will *look* as well like Truth,
who as it once *ſounded*; and the Impar-
ives tial *Reader* and *Hearer* be perſwaded
ken to be of the ſame Mind, muſt be
hat referr'd to a farther Tryal. As ſe-
for vere as the Principle may ſeem,
l it when I am left free to my own Con-
ack ſcience, I find I have no ſcruple a-
tel- bout it; the only thing which makes
firſt me ſuſpect, if my own thoughts are
mi- true to me, is, the great and num-
ead berleſs Authority that has appear'd
ver, on the other ſide: So that when I
hat take a view of the Forces muſter'd
was up

In Disput. de abusu mendacij.

up by *Albericus Gentilis*; the o
and new Academicks, the Stoicks
Lawyers, Physicians, Rhetoricians
Logicians, Poets, Polititians, Hi
storians, Civilians, Divines, an
even the Holy Scriptures, in the or
der of Battle, as if they would a
fault the main *Tenent* I have engag'
to *defend*; and at the head of all
that Author coming on with a hard
indignation, to revenge the *abuse*
that have been put upon harmle
Lying, I cannot disguise the appre
hensions I am under, how the issu
will be decided: tho' what I hav
to produce in the Seventh Section o
the Second Chapter, may at leas
suffice to make Authority stand neu
ter. But, in good earnest, I hav
found the Controversy difficult; and
that difficulty when come to, pinche
at a very nice Point. I will no
therefore be too confident, tho'
think I am right still; if I am not,
am

ſure an Error on my ſide is likely do the leaſt damage.

Being therefore once come to a reſolution of venturing out this *Attempt* upon the Caſe, it could admit no long debate with me to whom had beſt Dedicate it; for tho' on reſide at a diſtance from us, yet o Man who lives in *Briſtol*, can caſt bout long for the Principal Name nd Family that has continu'd Emient there, but that of *Colſton* muſt nd will come into his Mind firſt. eſides, I have not only had ſpecial narks of your Courteſy and Friendhip, but have the honour to become ſome meaſure related to you, and herefore was not heedleſly determin'd to this Addreſs. I own waved the Ceremony of deſiring our Permiſſion for it; that, I was raid, would be in effect to ask your xpreſs refuſal. I am ſenſible how ittle you affect to be popularly diinguiſh'd; all the good you can do privately,

privately, you are even ſuperſtitio
to contrive in ſuch a manner, th
your left hand ſhall not know wh
your right hand has done: your P
ſions are held utterly unacquaint
with the deeds of your Piety; t
World and your ſelf are both ke
in ignorance, as far as the conce
ment of your good Works is prac
cable. Indeed ſome Inſtances of Ch
rity are too big, and too public
to be ſcreen'd from obſervatio
there is no rearing a great and mu
ficent Hoſpital of your own, n
being liberal upon the Charitab
Foundations of others, but it mu
and will look Exemplary. Here
therefore you are conſtrain'd to t
Practice of that Illuſtrious Precept
Chriſt, to *Let your Light ſo ſhi*
before Men, that they may ſee yo
good Works, and glorifie your Fath
which is in Heaven. I begin no
to be raiſed upon the Subject befo
me, and I could willingly give th
rei

eins to my Imagination, but I now I have already begun to be roubleſome; and ſince my aim hould be to gratifie your Inclinations, nd not my own, I will ſtop abruptly here; intreating you to excuſe the Liberty I have taken, and to believe hat I am, with all the Sincerity the ollowing Argument requires,

Sir,

Your Moſt Obliged

Humble Servant,

CHARLES BRENT.

THE CONTENTS

THE INTRODUCTION. Page

CHAP. I.

Wherein the true Notion and Guilt of Lying Conſiſts. p.

SECT. I.

What a Lye is. p. Ibid.

SECT. II.

Of ſome Expreſſions that may ſeem to be Lyes, but are not. p. 1

SECT. III.

Of ſome Expreſſions as guilty as Lying and yet not thought to be Lyes. p. 3

CHAP. II.

Whether it be lawful in any Caſe, or upon any Pretence whatſoever to tell a Lye. p. 7

SECT

The Contents.

SECT. I.

Some Reflections upon those Authors who have allow'd of Lying in some Cases. p. ibid.

SECT. II.

Lying is intrinsically, simply, and absolutely Evil. p. 83

SECT. III.

Whether there be any Cases to be Excepted. p. 107

CHAP. III.

Of the Causes and Inducements to Lying. p. 126

Particularly of Scripture Examples seeming to give Encouragement it. p. 129, *to* p. 131

CHAP. IV.

Reasons to put away and detest Lying. p. 170

CONCLUSION.

Wherein some Means are advised to avoid Lying. p. 193

ERRATA.

PAge 33, Line 1. read *an.* p. 39. l. 15. r. *his.* p. 52. l. r. *no.* p. 77. l. 5. r. *are.* p. 87. l. 29. r. *silentium.* p. l. 1. r. *then.* p. 96. l. 4. r. *then.* p. 101. l. 9. r. ψευδῆ. 110. l. 19. r. *therefore.* p. 117. l. 1. r. *him.* p. 144. l. περσεποιείτω. p. 120. l. 12. r. ψευσαμενοι. p. 151. l. r. *hæc.* p. 164. l. 16. r. *us.* p. 165. l. 17. r. *bolt.* p. 17 6. r. *within.* p. 172. l. 2. r. *luck.* p. 173. l. 9. r. *extr ting.*

What else is found amiss, the Reader is desir'd to exc by reason of the Author's distance from the Press.

AN ESSAY OF THE Nature and Guilt of LYING.

The Introduction.

I KNOW of no Vice in the whole Liſt of Immorality that is leſs excus'd or ſpar'd throughout the Sacred Pages, than this of *Lying*; we read it generally numbred with the moſt enormous Wickedneſſes, Cenſur'd with the ſevereſt Reflections, and Sentenc'd with the extreameſt Vengeance. And yet, as if the Holy Spirit had been all along too tender and remiſs in beſtowing Diſcouragements upon it, 'tis obſervable that juſt before the Heavenly Book is cloſed, the Divine Indignation breaks out afreſh upon the *Lyar*, and is mindful in repeated Paſſages to *pour out the full Vials of the wrath of God* againſt him, and appoint

him his Society, Place and Portion in th
Rev. 22. 15. Coming World. *Without are Dogs, and Sor cerers, and Whoremongers, and Murtherers and Idolaters, and whoſoever loveth and ma keth a Lye.* They *are without*, that is, the are kept out; no ſuch Men are ſuffer'd t enter into the Holy City before ſpoken of
Rev. 21. 27. for *into the* Heavenly Jeruſalem *ſhall in n wiſe enter any thing that defileth, or tha worketh Abomination, or that maketh a Ly* But for ſuch there is another Place provided
Rev. 21.8. *the Fearful and Unbelieving, and the Abomi nable, and Murtherers, and Whoremongers and Sorcerers, and Idolaters, and* all Lyars *ſhall have their Part in the Lake which burneth with Fire and Brimſtone, which is the ſecond Death.*

By theſe Texts it appears that the *Lya* (for he's particularly named in all three Places, in every one of which ſome of thoſe mentioned in the other two are omitted) i in a true Judgment as bad as the worſt o Men, and the moſt Profligate Wretch upon Earth; for otherwiſe, certainly he would not by the Judgment of God himſelf be link'd with ſuch Company, and Sentenced to the ſame Condemnation.

And yet, how ſurpriz'd and ſtomachfu will a Lyar be at this Obſervation? He has 'tis true, a Failing, but 'tis ſuch a little, tri vial, fooliſh one, that 'tis next to nothing; and it is ſuch a common Practice too, that Men

ſeldom

ſeldom take much notice of it, either in themſelves, or others. Even the Holy Scripture ſays, *all Men are Lyars*; and we find it true by our own daily Experience and Obſervation, that the very beſt Men will now and then ſtretch a little; and ſhould any Man, upon ſome Occaſions that may be offer'd, ſeem to ſcruple a harmleſs and inoffenſive Lye, few would take him to be the more Conſcientious for that, they'd rather think that he affected to appear Nice in little things, only that he might be the leſs miſtruſted in greater, according to that Obſervation we meet with in *Livy*; *Fraus Fidem in parvis ſibi præſtruit, ut, quum operæ pretium ſit, cum mercede magnâ fallat.* And, 'tis indeed an Artifice of ſuch as underſtand the right uſe and worth of a Lye, to be ſtrictly, and even ſuperſtitiouſly true in inſignificant Matters, that their Word may be the more ſecurely depended upon when they can Lye to good advantage. In ſhort, ſo common a Practice is Lying among all ſorts of People, when they can ſerve a turn by it, that whoever takes upon him to Cenſure and Reprobate Men only for Lying, muſt expect to make many Enemies; the effects of whoſe Hatred to himſelf he will have more Cauſe to fear, than he will have ground to hope that by all he can ſay, he ſhall be able to work any conſiderable Reformation in the World.

Pſal. 62.9. 116. 11. Rom. 3.4.

Dec. 3.l.8.

However, I ventur'd once, upon a Par-ticular Occaſion, to declare my own Opi-nion very freely in this Matter, and to ſpeak out two or three bold Things (Truths in-deed I then thought them, and ſo I do ſtill about Lying, and what I ſaid was ſpoken loud enough to be heard by a great many and the Event was ſuch as might be ex-pected: Some awoke ſuddainly, as at an unuſual noiſe, and were ſtartled; *How? What? Lying allowable upon no pretence what-ſoever? Who dares ſay ſo? Pray, let's hear that again.* But others there were, who had better attended to all that had been ſaid that went out fully ſatisfied with the Rea-ſons I had given for my Opinion. The truth is, theſe laſt were Perſons not only of Senſe, but of Probity, who had been us'd to practice all that had been ſpoken; and their ſtrict regard for Truth made them, I fear, rather Partial in favour of what had been ſaid; for, for the Doctrine's ſake, which they heartily approv'd, they were pleas'd to expreſs ſo great a liking of the way and manner wherein it had been Treated of, that I could find no means to pacifie them but what I had ſpoken muſt be made yet more Publick, and lie open to be read.

In pure Compliance therefore with (what they'll allow me to call) their Importunity, I now offer to the Reader (whom I hope I ſhall find as Candid, and as well diſpoſed to recei-

receive Reaſon as thoſe my Friends were) the ſubſtance of what was then ſpoken, keeping to the ſame Method which I there mark'd out. Accordingly,

I. *I ſhall enquire, Wherein the true Nature and Guilt of Lying Conſiſts.*

II. *I ſhall enquire, Whether it may be Lawful in any Caſe, or upon any pretence whatſoever, to tell a Lye?*

III. *I ſhall Conſider ſome of the many Cauſes and Inducements whence Men come to be ſo generally and notoriouſly given to this Sin.*

IV. *I ſhall offer for what good Reaſons we ought ſeriouſly to put away and deteſt this baſe and diſingenuous habit of Lying.*

V. *And Laſtly, I ſhall ſay a few things by way of Concluſion.*

CHAP. I.

Wherein the true Nature and Guilt of Lying *Conſiſts.*

SECT. I.

What a Lye *is.*

I. TO take a true Account of the *Nature* and *Guilt* of *Lying*, we had need be wary and intent upon our Buſineſs: A Lye is ſuch a whiffling, multiform, incoherent thing to lay hands on, that unleſs we look ſteadily upon it, 'twill ſhift and deceive us monſtrouſly; we may fanſie we have got it faſt, when, upon opening our hold, we ſhall find it no ſuch thing; and we may let that go for innocent and harmleſs Speech, which upon ſtricter examination, might have been found an errant Lye. To prevent being miſtaken, let us begin with the ſimpleſt Notion of it, that firſt preſents to our minds; and from that, obſerve what Circumſtances gather about it by way of Complication; and, having once fix'd our eye upon the true Nature of it, let us carry on that ſimple Idea in our view, as we go, that we may not, ever now and then,

then, be to ſeek what the thing is we are ſpeaking of: For want of doing this, I know ſome great Men upon this Subject, who, in a Page or two, have been very apt to forget themſelves.

Now a Lye, at firſt ſight, ſeems to ſtand directly oppoſite to Truth; for the firſt thing he who tells a Lye is Charg'd with, is the telling of a Falſehood: And if it were in our Natures to be always ſure of underſtanding what is true, and what falſe, there could be no great difficulty in this part of the Subject; for then, to tell a Lye, would, without more ado, be the ſame thing as to tell an Untruth. Therefore when it is ſaid, God cannot Lye, it reaches to his abſolute ſecurity that he cannot be miſtaken; for becauſe he cannot, every Untruth in ſuch a perfect Being would be a Lye without need of diſtinction; he who cannot poſſibly be miſtaken, or impos'd upon himſelf, cannot give out a falſehood, but it muſt be knowingly, and wilfully.

But here the Caſe is different, with reſpect to us; to be liable to Error is a Humane Frailty, while our Intellectual Faculties are ſo ſcanty and imperfect, our Senſes ſo unſure, and our means of Underſtanding ſo precarious, we cannot be ſecure of our own Knowledge, nor promiſe for the rectitude of our Judgments. Hence it comes to paſs, that we often ſtand out very confidently

in an Untruth, when it is againſt our wil
which therefore, both in reaſon and merc
ought by ſome diſtinction or other to be he
excus'd.

Upon this account, Truth, as it relates
us, who cannot make ſure of it, is commo
ly diſtinguiſh'd into *Natural*, and *Mora*
Natural Truth is, when there is a right u
derſtanding between our apprehenſions
things, and the things themſelves; when
conceive and take the Nature of them
they are, without being deceiv'd, or miſ
form'd; but Moral Truth is a different thin
this conſiſts in an agreement between wh
we ſay, and what we think; in the form
our Judgments are mainly concern'd, but
the latter our Wills; to have a wrong und
ſtanding of things is injudicious, but it is n
wilfull; and therefore this is not the thi
we are ſo much to blame for; but to ſpe
otherwiſe than we think is a voluntary fal
hood, which we may help if we will, a
therefore for this we are juſtly blameable a
guilty.

And here you ſee clearly, how Ly
comes to be ſomewhat different from ſpe
ing what is untrue: To ſpeak a bare U
truth is, when we ignorantly ſay what i
ſelf is falſe, which is only a natural defe
to tell a Lye is to ſpeak what we *think* to
falſe, and this being done knowingly a
wilfully, is a defect in our Morals: And t
diſtinct

ur wi ſtinction muſt be taken notice of; for it
d mer akes ſo wide a difference, that 'tis very
o be he ſſible, I may tell a Lye, and yet ſpeak
ruth; or I may ſay what is very true in it
relates f, and yet tell a Lye at the ſame time:
comm or inſtance, ſhould I, out of ſome deſign,
d *Mor* ive out a Perſon is dead, who, for any
right u ing I know, may be ſtill living; this
nſions ould be a Lye, becauſe I ſay one thing, and
when ink another; and yet it may fall out to be
them ue, that the Perſon is dead, and I not made
or mi quainted with it. On the other hand,
nt thin ould I in the ſame Caſe, ſay ſuch a Perſon
en wh ſtill living, it being according to the beſt
he form my knowledge true, this would for that
d, but ſon be no Lye, and yet you ſee what I
ng und ought true, may prove utterly falſe for all
it is at.

the thi Here then begins the juſt *Nature* and *No-*
to ſpe *on* of a Lye; the poſition of it is directly
ary fal pposite to *Moral Truth*; and ſo, as Truth,
will, a a moral ſence, conſiſts in an agreement be-
eable a ween what we ſay, and what we think; ſo
f conſequence, the ſimpleſt definition we
v Lyi n give of a Lye, is to call it, *a diſagree-*
m ſpe *ent between what we ſay, and what we think*;
bare the Lye is conceiv'd as ſoon as ever we me-
vhat i itate to be falſe, but 'tis not actually a Lye
l defe ill it be utter'd. It may be truly ſaid of a
ink to var, *Behold he travailleth with Iniquity, and*
ngly a *th conceived miſchief, and brought forth falſe-*
And t *ood*; it is our ſpeech that delivers the Mon-
iſtinct er.

When

When it comes to this, we muſt remember, that Speech is a relative ſort of art, or gift, the way of ſenſibly conveying one mind to another; to talk by ones ſelf is abſurd, and delirious; and what we ſay amiſs in that manner, is hardly to be conſider'd among the Vices of Diſcourſe; ſo that tho' Men may, in a diſtracted mood, pronounce falſehoods to themſelves, as they may Curſes, or Oaths, and if they do they are guilty, becauſe it muſt proceed from a perverſe habit and diſpoſition; yet in the nature of the thing it is ſuppos'd, that he who ſpeaks, intends to be heard; and conſequently, that in a formal Lye ſome one or other is deſign'd to be impos'd upon.

And becauſe the main art and end of Speech, is to beget a right underſtanding between the minds of Men, and help them to impart and interchange their Thoughts to one another; therefore the whole uſefulneſs and benefit of it depends upon a mutual Faith plighted between Man and Man, that he who ſpeaks ſhall utter Truth, and that he who hears, ſhall give credit and regard to what is ſaid: and from hence there ariſes in all Lying a ſort of Injuſtice, a plain breach of Truſt.

Farther, tho' Lying does properly and ſtrictly regard our Speech, yet it does not ſtop here; for we may impart our minds by ſigns, and geſtures, and intimations, as well

as

as words; and therefore, taking the Vice in the largeſt ſence, including Simulation and Hypocriſie, we may call it a Lye, *when we purpoſely write, or expreſs, or intimate one thing, and in our hearts believe the contrary.*

But then here a diſtinction muſt be plac'd, between ſuch voices and motions as have, and ſuch as have not their known and ſtated ſignifications: For as Men have agreed, by conſtant uſe, and a ſort of implicit compact, that ſuch and ſuch expreſſions and geſtures ſhall have in them ſuch diſtinct and certain meanings, that ſo it may be known and underſtood what we ought to import when we uſe them; ſo there are others again that are free and arbitrary, and not being Inſtituted to any particular ſignifications, are variable at our own pleaſure. Now, that mutual Faith which ſtands plighted between Man and Man in the uſe of outward expreſſions, is only ſtaked down upon the former ſort, as far as our words and actions are agreed and known to be ſignificant, and ſo become proper Inſtruments for the communication of our Thoughts to one another, ſo far there is a confidence depending between Man and Man to be ſincere in their overtures; and in deceiving by ſuch kind of words and ſigns it is, that the Sin of Lying is chiefly concern'd; deception being, properly ſpeaking, a miſapplying or falſifying of expreſſions, which are become known and avowed means for

the

the conveyance of our minds. As for ſuch Voices and Motions as are not ordain'd to any certain ſignification, but are often varied, and are many times without any particular meaning at all: as we do not plight any Security or Faith, as to our intent in uſing them, ſo we are not preſently to be charg'd with Lying, if others, by unwarrantably undertaking to gueſs at our Minds by them, do find they have been deceiv'd. If Men will over-rate their own Sagacity ſo far, as to pretend to penetrate into our minds by picking out meanings in our arbitrary ſounds and geſtures, they may thank themſelves if they are miſled, the deception is of their own ſeeking. Thus, for inſtance, when the Beſieged in the *Capitol* toſs'd down their Bread prodigally into the Enemies Camp; this was an Arbitrary Act of no known and certain meaning given to it, either by uſe, or compact. If therefore the *Gauls* would needs underſtand by it, that the *Romans* had yet Proviſion enough, and to ſpare, they were the Authors of their own Error, and could not charge the Beſieged with offering them a Lye: But when the *Tribune* call'd out in intelligible words to *Brennus* and Sounded for a Parly; the Expreſſion and Sign given, being ſuch as conſtant uſe and conſent had made ſignificant to that particular meaning, there was no falſifying of ſuch an overture, without being guilty of a perfidious Lye.

Livy, Dec. 1. l. 5.

On

Once more, becauſe a Man ſeldom tells a Lye, but with an intent to make another believe it; and it is the expectation of impoſing and paſſing the falſehood upon him, that puts the Lyar upon trying what may be ſaid; therefore to give a full account of a round and compleat Lye in the largeſt extent, we may ſay *it conſiſts in our ſpeaking, or ſignifying, or even intimating to another, by any known intelligible words or ſigns, what we our ſelves do not think to be true, with an intention to miſperſuade:* And herein you have the whole Stature and Proportion of a Lye, drawn out to its full length; the Evil is conceiv'd in the firſt imagination of uttering a Falſhood; there moſt other Sins begin their guilt, when once we have intelligibly expreſs'd it, then the Monſter is brought forth, and it is without farther conſideration an actual Lye; the proper, eſſential, intrinſick Evil whereof, conſiſts *in the diſagreement between our expreſſions and our minds*; the intention of miſperſuading and deceiving is a loading Circumſtance, thrown in to fill out the guilt of it with aggravation, and make the Lye look finiſh'd, according as the Schoolmen ſay, *Cupiditas fallendi pertinet ad perfectionem mendacij, non autem ad ſpeciem ejus.* *Aqu. 2 2. 2æ. qu. 110. ad tert.*

Well, but if the proper eſſential intrinſick Evil of a Lye, conſiſts in the diſagreement of our Expreſſions from our Thoughts, this may

may ſeem to have a tendency to bring in many innocent modes of Speech for Lying and alſo to excuſe others, that are juſtly to be condemn'd, from the guilt of it. I Anſwer, no; and for ſatisfaction, let us try ſome Experiments upon the ſtate of the Caſe given; and upon Tryal I believe it will appear, that all innocent expreſſions are thereby juſtified, and all guilty ones Condemn'd.

SECT. II.

Of ſome Expreſſions that may ſeem to be Lyes, *but are not.*

I. ALL innocent and allowable Expreſſions are hereby juſtified, howſoever they may ſeem at firſt glance to partake of Lying: I will mention and reſolve ſome of the moſt Remarkable of this ſort. And,

1. It may be ſaid of all Fables, Romances, Parables, and Poetical Fictions, that the Author who invents them, does not believe them true: Right! neither does he deliver them for true; he both knows them to be Inventions, and he publiſhes them for Inventions; ſo that he delivers them for what he thinks them, and he has no deſign they ſhould be taken for any more, or any otherwiſe than they are; ſo that tho' there be much inventing, there is no Lying in all this;

this; the Author's intention is all the while uſt, and pure; inſtead of aiming to deceive, his main purpoſe is to benefit, both to pleaſe nd inſtruct at the ſame time. Thus while he hearer is held intent with the fine Fiction, he Moral couch'd underneath, ſteals in long with it unawares, and comes upon his nind with a ſort of ſurprize, that ſtrikes a ivelier image and impreſſion: Truth invel-op'd in a Fable, is like the brightneſs of the Sun under an Eclipſe; the ſtrangeneſs of the hing draws after it particular obſervation, nd then of a ſuddain, when the obſcurity is aken of, both the Truth and the Light break out upon us, with ſo much the ſtron-ger force and vehemence.

2. It may be ſaid in many *Figurative* Ex-reſſions, that if our words were to be taken *Literally*, and ſtrip'd of the *Figure*, we ſpeak therwiſe than we think; as in *Ironies*, *Hy-erboles*, *Metaphors*, and the like.——It may e ſo; but to ſtrip a *Figurative* Expreſſion of *igure*, and purpoſely to catch it in a Lye, hard uſage; the mean while, as long as it a Figure, it may be allow'd to ſtand upon s defence; and the vindication of it is very aſie, and obvious; for the ſame arbitrary uſtom which has ſetled certain meanings pon words, has done the ſame upon ſuch ind of Figures; ſo that it is not more agreed nd underſtood, that a plain aſſertion ſhall e taken juſt as the words lie, than it is, that

that ſuch *Tropes* ſhall be taken with that allowance, which their ſpecial *turn* and *emphaſis* is wont to demand. Farther, that ſuch Figures are as fit and neceſſary in their proper places, to expreſs our true meaning, as plain words at other times are without them, is from hence very clear, in that they reſulted originally from *Nature*, not from *Art*; Men took to them firſt *as their Spirits gave them utterance*, and they were ſpoken with ſucceſs, before ever they were defin'd and taught; they were in the *Orations* of *Demoſthenes*, before they were in the *Rhetorick* of *Ariſtotle*; and if at any time they come forced away by *Art*, and do not ſpring from *Nature*, they are *falſe* and *lying* Oratory. And farther yet, as Men took *naturally* to uſe them, for the more effectual ſignification of their Minds, ſo it is altogether as *natural* to apprehend them rightly, when they are fitly us'd and apply'd; and they are ſo far from being a lying abuſe of Speech, that plain Speaking would not anſwer all the ends of it without them. We have often occaſion to make known our Minds with reſentment, with vehemence, and ſurprize, and to ſtrike vigorouſly upon the ſeveral Paſſions of Men; and then, we muſt not only open our mouths, but there muſt be ſomething ſingularly ſignificant, and emphatical in the very mode of our Speech; that is, we muſt and ſhall of courſe be Figurative; and

without

without being ſo, we can hardly make the full ſenſe and moving of our minds ſo truly underſtood: And that no ſuch thing as Lying is intended in the uſe of ſuch Figures, will appear at laſt by this, that Lying is generally deſign'd to impoſe upon the Perſon attending; but in theſe Caſes, if when we ſpeak figuratively, Men will reſolve to take us literally, it is we who are diſappointed and deceiv'd, not they: So then, if our words, taken with regard to the ſpecial *turn* and *emphaſis* we give them, do, according to the known cuſtom and uſe of Speech, ſignifie juſt as we mean, and we have no intent to be otherwiſe apprehended, but rather to have the full ſence of our Minds more effectually underſtood, all this is juſt, and elegant, and far enough from Lying; and if Men will, after all, be ſuch Fools, or ſuch Knaves, as to *take* occaſion to miſapprehend where none is *given*, the falſehood is their own, not ours; *Qui capit ille facit.* To come to inſtances.

1*ſt*, In an *Irony*: 'tis true, the bare words of that Figure are juſt the contrary to a Man's true meaning; as if I ſhould ſay, *yes, you are marvelouſly honeſt!* when, at the ſame time, I think you a very Knave. But what then? The Man to whom I ſpeak will be very apt, by my way of pronouncing, to pick out of thoſe words the true ſence of my Mind; for as in the *Greek* Tongue, a different *Accent*

put upon the ſame word, ſhall give it a quite different ſignification, ſo it is with our Expreſſions; the different manner of ſpeaking, and the particular tone of the Voice, ſhall alter the meaning of them to a perfect contrariety, as in the Example given; in which way of expreſſing my ſelf, I am ſo far from differing from what I think, that I do thereby more effectually give ſuch a Man to underſtand my true thoughts of him, than if I ſhould have queſtion'd his honeſty in ſo many direct words: An Irony *ſtrikes* a Man's Mind with a *back blow*, which, while it ſeems to remove the weapon quite fromward, brings the ſtroak ſuddainly about, with the ſurer and ſeverer execution; accordingly, there is uſually ſomething more than ordinary offer'd that prepares for ſuch a Figure, ſome provocation given to be Sarcaſtical; as in that notable reply of *Galba*, which, tho' it look'd like out-lying another, was in effect but reprehending a Lye, by a monſtrous out-ſtretching *Irony:* One tells him at Table, that he had bought *Lampreys* in *Sicily* above five foot long; pho, ſaid he, that's a Jeſt, they take them in that Country ſo large and long, that they are commonly made uſe of for Cables. Tho' I confeſs freely, I do not like *Ironizing* at that extravagant rate; 'tis making very bold with Truth, and correſponding with a Lye too familiarly.

But

But otherwiſe, where a juſt occaſion is given to be ſevere, and the expreſſion is natural and pure, this way of reprehending with an *Irony* has great force and pungency with it, and is ſo far from being unjuſtifiable, that we find it ſanctified by the unerring word of God: an unhappy inſtance whereof was that, whereby the Almighty upbraided our diſobedient Sires, when diſmiſſing them at the gate of Paradiſe: the Serpent had done their buſineſs, by inveigling them with this plauſible Lye; *God doth know that in the day you eat thereof, then your eyes ſhall be opened, and ye ſhall be as Gods, knowing good and evil.* Upon this, at parting, God takes occaſion to rally them upon the folly of that imagination, after this manner; *Behold the Man is become like one of us, to know good and evil!* in which words he was the fartheſt in the world from ſpeaking plainly as he thought, and yet as far from Lying too; for, by the manner and turn of the expreſſion, 'tis very evident, he intended both to ſpeak, and to be underſtood in a quite contrary ſence; his deſign was to awaken their hearts to a due concernment at their miſtake; and, to do this, a direct and dry aſſertion would not have been ſo effectual: how lifeleſs, and flat, and unaffecting would it have ſounded, to have told them plainly? *ſee now, you are not as Gods knowing good and evil!* they knew this full well already; but, by that Ironical

Invective, God lodged the reflection of it upon their Minds the more ſeverely; and ſent the Wretches out, pondring upon the curſed Cheat and Lye the Serpent put upon them; and left it for a warning to them, how they ever truſted again the falſe inſinuations of the Devil.

2*dly*, Something like this may be ſaid of all *Hyperboles*, whether we ſpeak expreſly more, or leſs than we think. The deſign of this Figure is to raiſe admiration, and then ſomewhat extraordinary muſt be ſaid; and when there is a proper occaſion for it, and the Hyperbole is deliver'd with a ſincere deſign, a Man will naturally word himſelf in ſuch a manner, as it ſhall appear he does not look to be taken ſtrictly, nor purpoſe to perſuade, either to more, or leſs, than what is true; there is therefore ſtill a right and fair underſtanding between his expreſſions, and his mind. For inſtance, in a *Mioſis* or leſſening *Hyperbole*; when our Lord ſays, *a grain of Muſtard is leſs than the leaſt of all Seeds*; this is not literally true, becauſe there are Seeds of things in nature extreamly leſſer; but yet this, in the place and manner as he us'd it, was an expreſſion proper, and ſuitable to his right meaning; namely, that it was a very little Seed, and, for the ſize of it, 'twas an admiration it ſhould produce ſuch a large and over-ſpreading Plant. Again, for an inſtance of enlargement, St. *John* at the conclu

concluſion of his Goſpel, has theſe words: *And there are alſo many other things which Jeſus did, the which if they ſhould be written every one, I ſuppoſe that even the World it ſelf could not contain the Books that ſhould be written.* Now, howſoever theſe words, ſtrictly taken, may look like *amplifying*, yet with the due abatements of this Figure, the ſenſe of them was truly the Apoſtle's mind; which, being more temperately expreſs'd, amounts to no more than this; that *there were a world of things more which Jeſus did, which were not written in that Book.* What *Seneca* obſerv'd of this kind of Figure was very acurate, *Nunquam tantum ſperat Hyperbole quantum audet; ſed incredibilia affirmat, ut ad credibilia perveniat:* "The Hyperbole "does not ſo much as hope for your aſſent, "as far as it pretends to go, but it affirms "things incredible, that it may gain you as "far as they are credible. De Ben. l. 7.

3*dly*, All kinds of *Metaphors* and *Allegories* crave allowance under the ſame Conſideration; they may ſeem to aſſert what is not *real*, but they mean only to expreſs an apt *reſemblance*; the want of taking them in this juſt and obvious ſence, has been the occaſion of breeding a great deal of ill blood in the Chriſtian Church. For inſtance, when our Lord gave the Sacramental Bread to his Diſciples with this expreſſion, *This is my Body*: the *Catholicks*, by taking him too ſtrictly to

his word, ſtruck out from thence that inſupportable Doctrine of *Tranſubſtantiation.* Now 'twas plain, Chriſt neither meant nor look'd to be underſtood literally; for his own bodily preſence, and the very hand which gave the bread, was ready to witneſs againſt him. Indeed, if upon ſaying the words, he had inſtantly vaniſh'd, they might have imagin'd (but God knows how!) that his Body paſs'd the ſame moment into the Manchet; but while it ſtill remain'd obvious both to their ſight, and touch, as before, nothing could be more ſelf-evident than this, that he could not give his *Body* to them in a piece of *Bread*, and yet ſtill have his *Body* to himſelf, in his own proper *Fleſh* and *Blood* at the ſame time; and how could he think the World ſhould ſo groſly miſtake him, againſt all ſence and reaſon, that the Bread he gave them was his real Body, which they ſaw he did not give them? the Error therefore was their own, and it looks too much like a wilfull one; his Expreſſion had no appearance of ſuch an Untruth ſignified in it, but was a chaſt and myſtical *Allegory.*

If you meet with theſe kind of *Figures* often in Scripture, and find them ſometimes pretty bold and hardy, you muſt not be ſurpriz'd; for the Revelations of God not only condeſcended to the Capacities of Men, but had alſo a ſpecial regard to the way and manner of Speech which was moſt in uſe in thoſe

thoſe Countries where they were given; now they tell us that the way of Speaking and Writing in thoſe Eaſtern parts of the World, ran mightily upon ſuch Figurative Strains: and this hint, with the Examples given, may be of ſome uſe to unlearned Readers of the Bible; keeping always this Note in their Minds as they go, that where the literal ſence will not do, there, in all likelihood, they have ſome ſuch Figure as has been mention'd; and they are far from Lying; they are fit and ſignificant ways of Speaking, to be underſtood in a borrow'd ſence, and when the Author intends ſincerely, he will of courſe frame them ſo, that it ſhall not be natural to miſtake him.

3*dly*, As *Figures* are wont to alter the plain and ordinary ſence of *words*, and give them a different meaning; ſo the Laws, and ſome ſtanding *Cuſtoms* which are inſtead of *Laws*, do, in ſome ſpecial Caſes, impoſe the uſe of certain *forms* of words, in quite another ſignification from what they would have, if we were to expreſs the ſame as the free conceit of our own minds. Now words being in themſelves arbitrary, and to be taken in all Caſes, according as the Cuſtoms and Inſtitutions of Men have provided they ſhall ſignifie; it follows, that when we come to uſe ſuch certain forms of words upon occaſion, in pure compliance with the Cuſtomary and legal practice, we are underſtood

ſtood to mean juſt as much by them, and no more than as they are intended from the Nature of the Inſtitution to mean; and conſequently, that we are not preſently to be charg'd for Lying, tho' the words we ſpeak in ſuch occaſional and ſpecial forms, would in their plain and ordinary ſence, be quite different from what we intend and think.

Thus, for inſtance; ſince by a conſtant practice, drawn down from the Primitive times of the Church, it has been Cuſtomary for Nominated Biſhops, upon due notice of their being choſen, to decline the Dignity once, and twice, by a direct refuſal, before they accept it; in which form it is only intended they ſhould mean, and accordingly they are underſtood to mean, no more than to declare a modeſt ſence of their inability for ſo great a Charge; and ſince the not uſing the ſaid Form, ſo conſtantly practiſed, would look very ſingular and arrogant, therefore it is far from being of the nature of a Lye, for a Biſhop, upon notice of his Election, to ſay once and again, *nolo Epiſcopari*, according to form, tho' at the ſame time he intends to be Conſecrated: For tho' in common Caſes, to ſay you will not take a thing, which all the while you do intend to take, is a Lye; yet ſince in that formal refuſing it is agreed, and known, that no more is to be meant or underſtood by it, ſave only that the Perſon does expreſs a modeſt and humble ſence of his inability,

ability, this you know a Man deſign'd to ſo weighty a Truſt and Office, may and ſhould do, tho' it be not his intention to decline accepting it; there is nothing odd or inconſiſtent in all this; for a Man may declare an humble diſtruſt of his own ſufficiency for a Place, and yet, upon being urg'd again, accept the ſame, without the guilt of a Lye; in this Caſe the formal ſence of his words, and the real ſence of his mind, are by no means oppoſite or diſagreeable.

Again, ſince by the conſtant Practice of our *Courts*, a Criminal muſt plead, *not Guilty*, to his Indictment, before he can have the benefit of a legal Tryal, and the Law does intend and expect he ſhould mean no more by ſaying ſo, than that it does not yet appear to the Court he is guilty; therefore tho' in common ſpeaking, for a Man to ſay he is not guilty, when he knows in his own heart he is guilty, be a direct and palpable Lye, yet when the ſame words, *not Guilty*, being anſwer'd in *form* at the *Bar*, are, in the ſence of Cuſtom and the Law, underſtood to mean no more than *not evidently Guilty*; a Man who is conſcious enough to himſelf, may notwithſtanding uſe that form in ſuch a ſence, without the Crime of Lying, when it is before the Fact has been *witneſs'd* and *found* againſt him: For certainly, for a Man to ſignifie, by a ſet form of words provided for that occaſion, that his guilt

guilt is not yet made evident to the Court, when in truth it is not, is no Lye; there is yet a good agreement between his expreſſion and his mind; for that Rule of the very Learned and Judicious *Puffendorf*, is I think unqueſtionable; *Vocabula publici uſus, vim ſuam habere ex impoſitione publicâ*; words that are inſtituted for publick uſe and form, ought to be taken in the ſence and force of the Impoſers; which is ſometimes different, from what the ſame words do ſignifie in common acceptation. It being therefore a *Maxim* among us, that *no Man is bound to accuſe himſelf*; I conceive it reaſonable to underſtand the Queſtion put by the Court, *How ſayeſt thou? Guilty, or not Guilty?* in no other ſence than as if it had been ſaid, is thy guilt ſo evident and undeniable, that thou art willing to ſave the Court the trouble of a Tryal, and by a frank Confeſſion to beſpeak our mercy, as appearing by ſuch a Confeſſion to be a true Penitent; or wilt thou rather ſtand upon thy Innocence, and conſequently abide by the Juſtice of the Court? and if this be the legal import of that formal Queſtion upon an Indictment, then the words *not Guilty*, return'd in anſwer by the Priſoner, muſt be underſtood in a like ſence as if he had ſaid, whether I have committed the Crime whereof I am accus'd or not, ſeeing I am not bound to accuſe myſelf, and it does not yet appear that I have done

De Jur. Nat. &c. l. 5. c. 1. §. 4.

done it, I chuſe to abide my Trial, having more hope of being acquitted by the Juſtice of the Court, for want of Evidence, than of obtaining Pardon for my Offence, if I ſhould own my ſelf Guilty. Indeed, if when the Queſtion is put to the Criminal, *Guilty, or not Guilty?* he were at his own liberty to return the Court an anſwer in what words he pleas'd, he would be a down right Lyar, and inexcuſable, if he ſhould ſay *not Guilty*, when he was conſcious of his Crime, becauſe then he ought to be underſtood, as meaning the words in their natural and common acceptation: But when the Law puts words into his mouth, and will take no other anſwer from him but *Guilty, or not Guilty*, and yet means not to force any Man to be his own *Accuſer*, I think they ought to be underſtood in ſome ſuch ſence as before expreſs'd; and then, when the Priſoner anſwers, *not Guilty*, he ought not to be taken as affirming his innocence, but as denying the notoriety of the Fact to the Court, and craving a legal Trial, whether it can be made appear he is guilty, or not. A good Old Engliſh Author, who is otherwiſe of Opinion that all Lying is utterly and abſolutely ſinful, is yet for *giving* ſome ſuch allowance as I have been *craving* for the Priſoner's Plea. *For*, ſays he, *when men plead not Guilty, it is not much unlike in ſence, tho' different in words, as if they ſhould ſay, I will not diſcover my Faults, by acknowledging my* J. Down-him.

my ſelf guilty, and accuſe my ſelf, ſeeing th Law does not require it: But I will, for m purgation, put my ſelf upon Trial, and ſtan (upon the Examining of Witneſſes) to th Verdict of the Jury, to be Acquitted, or Con demn'd, according to their Evidence, directin their Conſcience. In fine, I cannot ſee wh it ſhould be any more a Lye in the *Crimina* to anſwer, *not Guilty*, than it is in the *Cou* to alledge poſitively in the Indictment, he i Guilty, before the certainty of the thing ha appear'd either way: Nay, the Indictmen Charges the matter home with ſo many ſpe cial, aggravating, grievous Circumſtances that tho' the Man be conſcious of having don the Fact, he may generally anſwer ſafely as his own ſence, *not Guilty* in the form an manner as Charg'd, and at the ſame tim not utter a falſe enuntiation, nor ſay mor than he does really think.

4. It may be ſaid that in the way of *Diſ putation* it is a common practice to affirm one thing, and think another; and if th proper intrinſick evil of Lying conſiſts i that, then there is no diſputing for Argu ment's ſake, but on one ſide or the othe there muſt be Lying. To this I anſwer that to affirm and argue on the falſe ſide with intent to perſuade the Reſpondent int an Error, is no doubt of the nature of deli berate Lying; but to affirm and argue th wrong, when it is with conſent, only fo

Argumen

Argument sake, to try what may be said on both sides; this hath nothing of the Lye in it, because, by a special agreement beforehand, we consent and resolve, that in affirming or denying contrary to the Truth, we are not to be taken as expressing the real sence of our Minds, but only as signifying our intention to offer in the way of Argument, what may be objected against the Truth; and when our words are agreed and known before to be significant only of such an intent, then they are no enuntiation of a falsehood, but of our real mind and meaning. *Authors* are wont, so far as this, to make bold with themselves; and if *Aquinas* were answerable for a Lye, in his every *videtur quod non*, his *Summa totius*, &c. would be pretty much for one Man to give an account for.

5. Well, but after all, what *Salvo* can be found in the fore-stated account of a Lye, for talking false things to Madmen and Ideots? I answer, some are of Opinion, that such Enuntiations, tho' false, are not, strictly speaking, Lyes, but rather Figurative Expressions accommodated to the weak Capacities of the Persons spoken to. And if they are so, 'tis well; I have already, I hope, said enough to excuse Figures in Speech: But after all I must needs say, that this, if it be a Figure, is a very bold one; 'tis such a Figure as we are not used to meet with in our

our Books of *Rhetorick*, and therefore I can't heartily plead for it, I can't but in my own Judgment rather condemn it.

I confeſs indeed, it has not in it all the aggravating Circumſtances that uſually attend Lying; for it is not intended to do wrong to the Perſons we uſe it to; neither can it be ſaid to be a Breach of their right to Truth for that they have forfeited by their incapacity; neither has it the finiſhing Conſideration, which compleats the guilt of Lying to wit an intent to deceive, and impoſe upon their Underſtandings; to offer an Untruth to ſuch, is no more a wrong or deceit done them, than it would be to put out a Candle to a Blind Man. In ſhort, the right uſe of Speech, in the relation it has upon Credit between Speaker and Hearer, is at an end on their ſide; and therefore as far as the guilt of Lying is relative, reſpecting the injuſtice done, it is in this Caſe free and innocent enough. But however, there is ſtill in ſuch kind of officious Untruths, the proper, eſſential, and abſolute evil of Lying, on the Speaker's part, when he wilfully and deſignedly ſays to another, what he does not believe himſelf; the Charitable intention, nor the hearers incapacity, cannot abſolutely juſtifie this; there is in all falſe Enuntiations a Natural inherent ſtain of guilt, that cannot be waſh'd clean out, no *Fuller on Earth can whiten it*: Much leſs is the Nurſe to be held abſolutely

abſolutely guiltleſs of Lying, when ſhe keeps charming into an Infant's ear ſo many falſe and fooliſh Tales, or when, to deter a Child from an ill thing, ſhe tells a Bugbear Story: for tho' this may be deſign'd for their better management, and cannot properly be call'd a deceit or impoſition put upon them, becauſe they are not apprehenſive enough to be ſenſible of the right uſe of Speech; nevertheleſs ſhe is guilty of the prime eſſential evil of this Sin ſtill, in wilfully expreſſing things which ſhe knows to be falſe; and tho' it be an empty, yet it is commonly a loud and noiſy ſort of Lying: Beſides, I think it ill management, an indiſcreet and fooliſh way of treating them; I am ſatisfied they are to be diſciplin'd much better without it: *Plato* would not endure ſuch a practice in his Commonwealth: He forbids *that Matrons ſhould terrifie their Children, with Fabulous Tales of Spirits, and Dæmons, and hideous Apparitions, walking about the Neighbourhood in the dead of Night*; and for two very good Reaſons, *for it ſerves to bely and blaſpheme the Divine Powers, and to render the Spirits of Youth timorous and daſtardly.* De Rep. l. 2. Εις θεὸς βλασφημῶσιν.

6. But further then, ſuppoſe, when I am walking alone, and ruminating, I ſhould break out by my ſelf a Propoſition, which I know to be falſe. I anſwer, the moſt natural thing to be ſuppoſed and ſaid in this caſe is, that I am beſide my ſelf; to talk alone,

alone, we have obſerv'd, is abſurd and de-
lirious, miſapplying the uſe of Speech out
of all ſence and reaſon, inſomuch that what
we ſay amiſs in that manner, is hardly to be
conſider'd among the Vices of Diſcourſe.
Well, but this is a Caſe put by a very Judi-
cious and ſevere Caſuiſt, and brought off not
Guilty. 'Tis true, and the ſame has been com-
monly ſaid by Writers on this Subject; but
the only reaſon why they are not for making
it Lying, is, I ſuppoſe, becauſe they do not
reckon ſuch kind of Speech as any thing; it
is not Diſcourſing. But I would ask on the
other hand, whether he who wilfully ſays to
himſelf ſuch falſehoods, as if ſaid to any
other, would be notorious Lyes, muſt not
be ſuppos'd to do this, purpoſely for the
ſake of ſpeaking falſly? and he that does, is
ſo far I think, from being innocent of this
Sin, that he muſt have a ſtrange propenſion,
rather a perfect *impetus* upon him to Lye;
and altho' Soliloquies are, in effect but meer
ruminations, no more than a ſort of *expreſs*
thinking, yet when it comes into a Man's
heart, to put his Tongue a going in oppoſi-
tion to his Mind, this can look no better than
trying Practices by himſelf upon the gift of
Lying; and if we muſt not call it actually
and compleatly a Sin of that ſort, yet at leaſt
it partakes of the ῥῆμα ἀργὸν, and the μωρο-
λογία, and muſt be Condemn'd for *Idle*
words, and *Fooliſh talking*.

Placete ſur des Mat. de Conſc. p. 3.

If it should be said, that 'tis innocent sort of Lying, because there is no intention of deceiving in it; I say it is enough, and too much, that there is an intention to speak a Falsehood: You will reply, perhaps, that it is not come to a finish'd and compleat Lye, 'till it appear to be told with design to make another believe it; but that has been otherwise asserted already; and for proof, I would only put the following Case. What think you of two Men sitting down against one another, and Lying for a Wager? such a Case, if it has not been put, no doubt it has been practis'd: Now here, there can be no design of deceiving or misperswading on either side, they understand better what they are a doing; and yet no stander by will, I suppose, after they have strain'd hard on both sides, determine that neither of them has told a compleat Lye; they would think it hard usage to be forc'd at last to draw Stakes; by such a decision, I should think, the *Umpire* himself would carry it from them both.

I the rather mention this Case, because I think it shews the insufficiency of that supposition, upon which *Grotius* undertakes to determine when a Lye may be lawful, and when not; he makes all depend upon the *right* the hearer has to the truth of what we say; which right, he says, may be given up, or suspended, or forfeited by the Party, De Jur. Bel. & P. l. 3. §. 11. &c.

and then my obligation to speak truth to him ceases. So that for instance, if he gives me leave to tell him a Lye, or if I give him notice that I will; or if his right to Truth be suspended by his present incapacity; or if I can be sure he will forgive me afterward, when he shall know I Ly'd for his good; or if he be only a stander by, a third Person, and not the Man I speak to directly; or if I have a Supereminent Authority over all his rights, and consequently over this his right to the truth of what I say; or if otherwise he has forfeited that right by becoming mine Enemy; in all such Cases where this right is suppos'd to cease, he fansies we may lawfully Lye to one another. Now I own Men have such a right as this, to be sincerely dealt with in what is said to them, and to tell them a Lye is to injure them in that right, by which means it becomes true, according as *Grotius* has observ'd from *Plato* and *Tully*, that there is in Lying a manifest injustice; but then, it must be remembred, that this is not the only, no nor yet the prime evil of a Lye; for that consists simply in speaking otherwise than we think. Now tho' the Party I speak to, may forgive or forfeit his right to my sincerity, yet he cannot forgive me the prime intrinsick evil of a Lye, for that is an Article between God and my own Conscience alone. By this time you perceive I am stollen off unawares to the other side of the main Question.

SECT.

SECT. III.

Of ſome Expreſſions as guilty as Lying, and yet by ſome not thought to be Lyes.

II. I Shall therefore proceed to ſhew that by the account and ſtate I have given of Lying, all deceitful and guilty expreſſions of this kind are condemn'd; accordingly I ſhall note a few Caſes, wherein Men are wont to Lye, even while they would fain make us believe that their words and their Minds agree exactly. We blame the Church of *Rome* (indeed too juſtly) for teaching and defending large allowances of this kind: 'tis true, as Profeſſors of Chriſtianity, their Caſuiſts declare ſtrenuouſly againſt the Sin of Lying in general, but then they are not ſo rigid and ſtrait laced, but they let the People out looſe enough to it in other forms and diſguiſes, in having double minds to the ſame expreſſion, in quibling and ſhifting, in equivocations, reſerves, and dumb ſigns, they may falſify by ſuch kind of evaſions, if they do it with a good grace, pretty freely: Nor are we ſo clean reform'd from the Romiſh errors, but that blemiſhes of this kind are notorious enough in Perſons who call themſelves ſound Proteſtants; they will equivocate and diſſemble, and ſhift from the truth, without much ſcruple, when their

Conſciences would not endure them in tel-
ling a direct Lye. Now my buſineſs is not
to turn aſide here, and argue diſtinctly the
unlawfulneſs of ſuch practices; I am now
proceeding to ſhew that in reality they are
no otherwiſe than Lyes, only out of tender-
neſs expreſs'd under a fairer appearance and
diſguiſe; and being once prov'd to be Lyes,
the guilt and wickedneſs of them will come
to be conſider'd, under that notion after-
ward.

1. Firſt then I ſay, tho' a Man may make
a ſhift, by a lucky *turn* or *quibble*, to be
pretty true to his *expreſs* words, yet if he be
not true to what he really *meant* by them, he
is guilty; for it is the diſagreement betwee
our real meaning, and our words or ſigns
that makes the Lye. For inſtance, ſhould
affirm, upon occaſion, that I have not bee
abſent from my home for three *Days* paſt
and one ſhould truly alledge on the contrary
that he ſaw me abroad but a Night agoe,
is in vain for me to reply, that I only a
firmed as to the *Days*, and not the *Nights*; fo
if it were my intent to make believe I wa
not forth during the full ſpace of three *Day*
including the *Nights*, that pitiful *Quibb*
will not bring me off, I am guilty of th
Lye.

It may be ſaid, that ſometimes it woul
be expedient Men ſhould have ſuch plauſibl
pretences to content themſelves, in fulfillin
rathe

rather the letter, than the prime and ſtrict meaning of what they ſay, eſpecially in all threats and declarations of vengeance, in which Men would often, in cool blood, be much better ſatisfied their words could be made good without execution, than with it; for Example, when *Aurelian* Swore he would utterly deſtroy all, even the very *Dogs* of *Thyan*, if they did not ſurrender before the Storm; yet tho' they ſtood it out obſtinately, 'till he carried the Place Sword in hand, he was rather diſpos'd to do the bare letter, than the full intent of what his Oath bound him to; and ſo he ſlew indeed all the *Dogs* of the place, but ſav'd the Men. Take another Example in *Alexander*; in a deſperate rage he reſolv'd, that he would make an utter end of *Lampſacus* by Fire and Sword; and apprehending he ſhould be powerfully ſet upon by the acute Orator *Anaximenes*, to ſhew mercy, and ſpare the Town, becauſe he would tye up his Bowels effectually from being touch'd by the force of his words, he Swore beforehand, that he would not be prevail'd upon to do what *Anaximenes* was coming to requeſt of him: the Orator being inform'd what ſort of Oath he had bound himſelf by, took meaſures with him accordingly, and inſtead of intreating him to lay aſide his Vengeance, he requeſted that he would by all means execute Deſolation upon the Place. Now having ſo fair an Opportunity as this

given him, to lay aſide the Vengeance, he was ſet upon, and at the ſame time, to keep the expreſs words of his Oath, who can blame *Alexander*, or who would accuſe *Aurelian*, for chuſing in mercy, to ſtand to the ſaving letter, rather than the devouring intention of what their words bound them to?

Now to this I would anſwer a few things diſtinctly: For, in the firſt place, this Caſe does not properly come under the Conſideration of Lying; *mendacium non eſt de futuro*, a Lye does not reſpect what is future, but is a falſehood about ſomething paſt, or preſent: Indeed if at the very inſtant we promiſe, we are conſcious we ſhall not be able, or do not intend to perform; this is properly a Lye, becauſe we ſay one thing, and think another at the ſame time: But if by changing our minds afterwards, we fail of making good our words in any thing to come, it lies chargeable under the breach of promiſe. But becauſe I have undertook to conſider the nature of Lying in the largeſt extent, wherein ſoever we may fail of being true in our words, I would anſwer farther, in the ſecond place, that as far as the Breach of our words may be called Lying, the Emperors were both guilty: For tho' they had the luck to come off from the intention, by being true to the bare letter of what they ſwore; yet our ſincerity, or moral truth, is not ſo much concern'd with what ſence the Letter of our words may bear,

bear, as with what was the real and inward ſence of our own Minds in uſing them; if that be not true, which we really meant and intended by our words, it avails us very little that, by good luck, in the litteral ſence of them, we are true enough: So that the beſt that can be ſaid is, that they were contented to *be* Lyars, and pleas'd themſelves to think they did not *ſeem* Lyars. Again, it muſt be remembred, in the third place, that the main guilt and blame of ſuch raſh denunciations lies in making them; he who Swears he will do, what he knows, at the ſame time, it will be ſinful for him to do, does *ipſo facto*, make an unrighteous breach in his word; for he depoſes it upon a thing, in which he knows it is his Duty to break it. Had *Herod* Swore expreſly that, to pleaſe *Herodias*, he would cut off the *Baptiſt*'s head, he would have been forſworn in the very pronunciation of his Oath, becauſe he knew he paſs'd it upon a wicked and illegal purpoſe; he had ſhew'd himſelf more penitent indeed, but not more perjur'd, if he had refus'd to perform his Oath. And therefore I add farther, fourthly; That when Men paſs their Promiſes for illegal and wicked purpoſes, it is their duty to repent, and forbear, without more ado, without ſeeking little *fetches* and ſhifts, to ſave them harmleſs of their words, which when they are never ſo luckily thought on, will never ſerve them in the leaſt to mend the

matter: For the Reaſon they are to go upon in this Caſe is, That when Men have ſo raſhly and unrighteouſly bound themſelves, that, to ſave their word, they muſt do a much greater wickedneſs than the breach of it would be, they ought to chuſe the leaſt ſin of the two; and rather be content to Lye, than to Oppreſs, and Murther: In the mean while, their chooſing it as the leaſt of two evils, muſt not preſently be ſuppos'd to make it no evil at all. I know a Learned and Judicious Author has advanced a very colourable Notion, to bring all thoſe off, even God himſelf, in all reſpects innocent of their words, who forbear at laſt the execution of Vengeance, tho' they have never ſo ſolemnly threatned and vow'd to do it. He goes upon this Suppoſition, which I am ſure I cannot give you in better than his own words; ſays he,——*He that threatens, keeps the right of puniſhing in his own hand, and is not oblig'd to execute what he hath threatned any further than the Reaſons and ends of Government do require; and he may, without any injury to the Party threatned, remit and abate as much as he pleaſeth of the Puniſhment that he hath threatned: and becauſe, in ſo doing, he is not worſe, but better than his word, no body can find fault, or complain of any wrong or injuſtice thereby done to him.* Now to all this it is readily granted, that there is no injuſtice done to the Party threatned with Vengeance

Arch Biſhop Tillotſon's *Sermon on* Mat. XXV. *v.* 46.

but

but what he will freely releaſe if it be not executed; yet, whether in reſpect to the Party ſo poſitively and ſolemnly threatning, there be not ſome unſteadineſs, obliquity and untruth chargeable from the diſagreement between his words and his deeds? whether (as he afterward affirms) it would not be *any impeachment of God's truth and faithfulneſs, any more than it is eſteem'd among Men a piece of falſehood, not to do what they have threatned?* may after all be a queſtion: And tho' I could not forgive my ſelf the irreverence and inſolence of pretending to oppoſe what was the genuine ſence of that great Man, yet I muſt confeſs this Hypotheſis, eſpecially in the place and argument where he uſed it, is almoſt the only thing I ſtick at in all his Writings. But I muſt remember I have been all this while in a digreſſion.—— Ibid.

2. To miſlead and deceive any one by an Equivocation, is to all intents and purpoſes to Lye: By an Equivocation is meant ſuch an ambiguous and doubtful kind of expreſſion as is contriv'd that it may be taken two ways, in one of which it may be true, but in the other it will be falſe. As if, for Example, a perfidious States-Man, who meditated the ruine of his Maſter, ſhould ſecretly inveigle him with this Advice, That ſuch a certain ſet of Miniſtry would infallibly *do the King's Buſineſs:* This we know will bear

two

two very different meanings, for to *do another's buſineſs*, may ſignifie to ſerve him with skill and diligence and ſucceſs; or *to do a Man's buſineſs for him*, as we have turn'd the Phraſe, may ſignifie to undo him: In the former ſence the States-Man is conſcious his Propoſal muſt needs prove falſe, but in the latter in all likelihood too true. This is the nature of an *Equivocation*: Now all that can be ſaid to juſtifie it from Lying is this, that take it one way and it is truly what the *Equivocator* means, and if he pleaſe he can ſay he intended to be ſo underſtood.

Now I confeſs it is all in this Caſe according as a Man intends: If therefore any one ſhall happen to drop an equivocal Expreſſion unawares, and without deſign, and another ſhall take him wrong, this is abſolutely clear of Lying; it has neither the prime, nor circumſtantial guilt of that Sin in it; for what he ſaid, howſoever doubtful by accident was as he intended it, his true ſence and meaning, and he had no deſign that any one ſhould be deceiv'd by it: Nay farther, a Man may, upon ſome ſpecial occaſions, purpoſely make uſe of an Equivocation, and yet be innocent: I mean when he ſhall be ſo far from intending to deceive another by it, that it ſhall appear before he leaves off, his deſign was to inculcate ſome good inſtruction deliver'd in the ambiguity; and then if he immediately explain the right ſence and truth

of his words, ſo that the Perſon go not away with the miſtake, there is no prevarication or harm in all this; and that there is not I ſhall evidently ſhew from an inſtance in our Saviour himſelf, in *John* xi. *v.* 11. he has this expreſſion to his Diſciples——*Our Friend Lazarus* ſleepeth, *but I go that I may* awake *him out of* ſleep: By this it ſeems *they thought he had ſpoken of taking of reſt in ſleep*; and 'tis like he intended that for the preſent inſtant they ſhould ſo miſtake him; accordingly they anſwer him, *Lord if he* ſleep *he ſhall do well*: they could ſee no ſuch neceſſity of his going to awake him out of ſleep, if that were all; *howbeit Jeſus ſpake* all the while *of his death*; but by expreſſing it at firſt by the word ſleep, he meant to inſinuate that the Dead are not actually deſtroy'd quite out of being, but only in the condition of Men that are gone to reſt; and *to the intent that they might believe* this, he would go with them and awake him out of his Grave, with the ſame eaſe, and in the ſame manner, as if he were awaking a Man that lay ſleeping upon his Bed: and having for the preſent amus'd them with that great and ſtupendious Doctrine, from the uſe of this *equivocation*, or rather this known and proper *allegory* of expreſſing death by ſleep, to clear his ſincerity at laſt in the uſe of ſuch ambiguous ſpeech, he takes care before he left off ſpeaking upon that Subject, to give them a

right

right and true information in what ſtate their Friend was; *then ſaid Jeſus unto them plainly Lazarus is dead.* Much the ſame account might here be given of another equivocal Expreſſion our Lord took occaſion to uſe *John* ii. 19. *Deſtroy this Temple, and in three days I will raiſe it up:* which tho' it look'd and for the preſent they underſtood as if he had ſpoke of the *Great Temple* of *Jeruſalem* whoſe ſtatelineſs and beauty they were then viewing, yet he meant it in reality of the *Temple* of his Body: and he took that opportunity to give them a Prophecy which they ſhould hereafter call to mind, that three days after the *Jews* ſhould deſtroy his Body, he himſelf would raiſe it again from the dead: And it ſeems when, after the whole was fulfill'd, the Diſciples came to reflect upon it, it gave them great ſatisfaction, of which the Text makes immediate mention; *when therefore he was riſen from the dead, his Diſciples remembred that he had ſaid this unto them, and they believed the Scripture, and the word which Jeſus had ſaid.* But I ſhall have occaſion to mention this inſtance over again hereafter. In the mean time ſuch equivocating, or more properly allegorizing as this, which is not intended to deceive, but rather to inſtruct, and to Prophefy, is far enough from partaking of the nature of Lying; and herein that Rule of

Serm. 28. St. *Auſtin* is very juſt and applicable, *Rea linguam non facit niſi rea mens,* it muſt be guilt in the Mind that makes a guilty Tongue.

That

That ſort of *Equivocation* therefore which I would bring in for Lying, is when Men project and contrive to be doubtful and double tongu'd on purpoſe to miſguide and deceive the Perſon they ſpeak to; deſiring and watching that he ſhould take their wrong ſence, and be impos'd upon by it, which is therefore wilfully ſet foremoſt, and given under the moſt natural and obvious ſignification of their words, ſo that if he underſtand them in the meaning that will be ſure to come readieſt and firſt into his mind, then he is deluded and enſnar'd, and if he be not they are diſappointed. Take an inſtance of this kind of dealing in the *Locrians* mention'd by *Polybius*; they privately put the *heads* of Onions upon their ſhoulders, and *earth* within their ſhooes, and then ſtruck a League with the *Sicilians*, and ſwore they would continue faſt Friends with them, as long as ever their *heads* remain'd on their ſhoulders, and while the *earth* they ſtood upon bore them: Now thoſe *heads* they had put upon their ſhoulders, and that *earth* they ſtood upon in their ſhooes, they caſt away immediately; and then the firſt favourable opportunity they fell upon the Men of *Sicily* barbarouſly; and being upbraided with breach of of Faith, they proteſted they had obſerv'd the tenour of their League very ſacredly. L. 12.

F. *Labeo* miſtook wretched Equivocation for good Conduct, when he valued himſelf upon Val. Max. *l.* 7. *c.* 3.

dividing

dividing the Fleet; he ratified with *Antiochus*, that one half ſhould ſtill remain to the *Romans*; but in order to render the Ships abſolutely uſeleſs to them, he caus'd them to be all Sawn aſunder, and then very gravely deſir'd them to chooſe which *moiety* they pleas'd. The ſame puts me in mind of a more modern inſtance; one might Swear 'twas modern from the oddneſs of the Barbarity: When *Sultan Mahomet* took *Chalcis* the Metropolis of *Negropont*, he Capitulated to the Governour, the Valiant *Erizzo*, that upon Condition he Surrender'd he ſhould ſave his *Head*; and yet he no ſooner had him in his power, but he order'd him to be Sawn off directly in the *middle*; alledging that in ſo doing he had nicely kept his Faith; for, ſaid he, tho' I gave him his *Head* by Articles, yet it does not follow from thence, that I gave him downward to the *waſt*. The *Turks* ſeem to have had a conſciencious regard for a round Equivocation, eſpecially at a *dead lift*: for tho' *Sultan Solyman* Swore he would never be the death of *Vizier Ibraim* as long as he *liv'd*, yet for all that he made no ſcruple to diſpatch him ſoon after; only for his Oath ſake he gave Orders to have him ſtrangled at a time when he himſelf ſhould be faſt *aſleep*: Now, ſaid he, when I am once faſt *aſleep*, I am in effect no longer *living*, *ſleep* being indeed a ſort of *death*. It was by juſt ſuch another Pun upon the ſame word,

ord, that ſome *Romans* pretended to ju-
ſie their Murthering the King of *Perſia*,
ter they had engag'd their Faith to the
ods of *Samothrace* not to take away his
ife, they ſlew him while he was *aſleep*;
ow, ſay they, a Man that's *dead aſleep* is
t in the Condition of a *living Man*, and
from one in that State we can hardly be
id to take away *Life*; of this barbarous
nſincerity *Mithridates* complains, in a Let-
r of his among the Fragments of *Saluſt*,
l Hiſtories ſwarm with paſſages of this
nd; all Humane Societies are quite Can-
r'd with Equivocations, the Converſe of
e World is little elſe. Now I do not ſo
uch wonder that degenerate Men ſhould
diſpos'd to break faith and bounds, and
l foul on one another; all I wonder at is,
at they ſhould think it worth while to
ſt about for ſaving themſelves by ſuch idle
d vain Evaſions. Surely they cannot think
can be any ſtay at all to their Faith and
nour; who is there that does not ſee thro'
e Cheat and the Lye of Equivocating? it
s the firſt and the laſt property of that Sin
it: for whatever Reſerve or Salvo we may
ve under a remote and blind ſignification
our Minds, which we keep to our ſelves,
in that ſence we ſpeak and wiſh to be
derſtood, we expreſs quite another thing
m what we think, which is truly and pro-
ly Lying; and we ſpeak with deſign to
deceive

deceive the Perſon who hears us, and tha brings us in for the perfection of the Sin What a ſneaking eſcape from the Lye wa that contrivance of St. *Francis?* who whe the Purſuers after a Murtherer ask'd him i the Man came that way? no, ſaid the Fryar thruſting his hand into the Sleeve of his Ha bit, he came not *here!* An enſnaring Equivo cation ſeems to be like an Iron heated hiſſin hot at the foremoſt end, the Man who take it from us is ſure to be burnt, and yet if h complains of the Trick, and in indignatio ſhews us the Bliſter, we look ſurpriz'd, an cry out *it can never be! 'tis impoſſible! th Iron is quite cold:* and for proof, to appeas him, we preſently put it into his hand at th other end.

3. Of the ſame kind are what we cal *Mental Reſervations*; they are Lyes too, bu in the manner of deceiving incomparabl more abſurd and ſcandalous: ſo ſcandalous that the Church of *Rome* at laſt grew a ſham'd of them: inſomuch that Pope *Inno cent* XIth publiſh'd a *Bull* to cry them dow from *paſſing currently* any longer; whic prov'd ſuch an inſupportable diſappointmen to many on that ſide, who before had *deal* largely in expreſſions of that *Coin*, that the almoſt became *Bankrupt* in the *demands* o Speech; and their Caſuiſts had work enoug to anſwer all the difficulties and ſcruples th People were under, how they ſhould for th futur

future ſerve their juſt occaſions in the concealment of their Minds.

Now the manner of a *Mental Reſervation* is this; when a Man has no mind to ſpeak out ſincerely, and yet is oblig'd to ſay ſomething, he minces the truth in pieces, ſome part of it he throws out, the reſt he keeps to himſelf; that which he ſpeaks out ſhall either be falſe, or at leaſt quite remote and foreign to what he thinks: that which he *reſerves* in his Mind, from whence it is call'd a *Mental Reſervation*, is kept back on purpoſe to bring him off harmleſs, in caſe his own Conſcience, or any one elſe, ſhould charge him for Lying. For Example, ſuppoſe a Perſon ſhould be taken up on ſuſpicion of being a Prieſt, and upon the Queſtion put, ſhould anſwer aloud thus much, *I am no Prieſt*; and in his *Mind* have this *reſerve*, *I mean to ſpeak of*; this is the way of a *Mental Reſervation*: in which the Clauſe ſpoken out is deſign'd to deceive, and the Clauſe reſerv'd to ſave the Lye. So again, when *Abraham* ſaid of *Sarah* to *Abimelech*, *ſhe is my Siſter*, and refrain'd to ſay, *ſhe is alſo my Wife*: this was a deceitful reſervation, on purpoſe to keep the Perſon from a true account of that which it mainly concern'd him to know; and tho' the *Prieſt* and the *Patriarch* might hope to come off clear of Lying, by ſaving themſelves under ſuch ſtratagems of Speech, yet in truth they were both guilty

Du Cheſne Tome 2. P. 35.

of it. When *Charlemaigne* had over-ran the Territories of *Bavaria*, he demanded of the Conquer'd People an Oath of Fealty: the Duke indulg'd his Subjects to Swear to him, but Commanded them to do it with this reſerve in their Minds, *that they meant the Oath in a quite contrary ſence from what the words expreſs'd: Jubebat ut aliter in mente retinerent, & ſub dolo juravent.* Juſt as if the late King had ſent a private Indulgence to his Friends in *England*, to Swear Allegiance to his preſent Majeſty, to Sign the Aſſociation; and, if it ſhould come to that, to take an Oath of Abjuration for their own ſecurity; and yet had exhorted them that while they did all this, they ſhould mean no more by it, than juſt to keep themſelves in a capacity ro ſerve their old Maſter upon the firſt favourable occaſion. Now I know not what Authority ſuch an Inſtrument might have, if iſſued out from the *See* of *Rome* to a Set of Zealous *Catholicks*, but I am perſuaded no one who profeſſes and retains the true Principles of the Church of *England*, would think it of any force at all to ſecure and abſolve his Conſcience, tho' it came from a Prince of never ſo undoubted a right to his Allegiance. It is a Rule that holds in all kind of Converſe, but much more in all our ſolemn and religious pledges, that if we are knowingly falſe and faithleſs in the words we ſpeak out to be heard, we are nevertheleſs ſo, nor is our

our caſe one jot the better, for our moſt deliberate reſervations to the contrary; for what is any one concern'd with the ſecrets that are with-held in anothers Mind? by the words we ſpeak out to be heard, by thoſe our ſincerity muſt ſtand or fall; and therefore if what we expreſs be either directly falſe, or at leaſt ſuch an indirect Truth, as is contriv'd and utter'd on purpoſe to keep Men from that part of our right mind and meaning, which is the chief thing in demand, this is ſpeaking out fallaciouſly, and with a deliberate intent to deceive, and conſequently 'tis compleat and round Lying, and we are not one jot the honeſter or better Men for our inward reſervations; *for by thy words thou ſhalt be juſtified, and by thy words thou ſhalt be condemned.*

4. Tho' we refrain to ſpeak out any thing, and think by *dumb ſigns* to deceive and be innocent, this ſtill partakes as much of the guilt of Lying, as if we ſaid the ſame falſehood in ſo many expreſs words; for words are not more known and ſure means to ſignifie our Minds than ſome bodily ſigns and geſtures are, and therefore with a deceitful intent we may equally miſperſwade with both. *Quintilian*, who was a true Judge of Expreſſion, allows that *Solæciſms* and *Lyes* may as well be told by ſign and by token, as by word of mouth: and *Aquinas* ingenuouſly reſolves, that in effect and guilt it amounts

to the ſelf ſame thing; but when I ſpeak here of deceiving by ſigns, it muſt be remembred that I mean chiefly ſuch as are by cuſtom and inſtitution agreed and known to have their certain ſignifications: ſigns that are inſignificant and arbitrary, having not Faith plighted or imply'd as to what we mean by them, are much in our own power and liberty; not but that by often and wilful practices of deceiving and prevaricating by them, we ſhall make a breach upon our ſincerity, and treſpaſs too nearly upon the borders of Lying. I would be clearly underſtood in this Notion, and therefore I will give you a plain familiar inſtance of it: If a Man ſhould chance to keep a Candle burning by him late, for a Night or two together, and ſome from thence ſhould take occaſion to conclude that he is a Perſon who plyes his lucubrations, and ſtudies hard at night; he may let the miſtake paſs ſo far if he pleaſe, without contradicting it, and yet not be guilty of any Lye, or unſincere dealing, becauſe the light of his Candle was no certain ſign of what they infer'd from it; he had no profeſs'd ſignification under it; and they might as well have ſuppos'd he did it upon ſuſpicion of Thieves, or for relief againſt the dark horrors of the Night: if others therefore will needs officiouſly lead themſelves into a miſtake, by reading falſely ſuch actions and geſtures in the Man which are purely arbitrary

without

without any intent on his part of ſpecial meaning in them, it is an error of their own ſeeking: But yet, if upon apprehending what interpretation Men put upon his unſeaſonable light, he ſhould for the future ſet it up burning on purpoſe to confirm them in their error, and to procure the undeſerved name of a hard Student, this would be ſo very unſincere and hypocritical, that I do not know if I may not venture to call it Lying; and the rather, becauſe, tho' the ſign be unſignificant in it ſelf, yet if upon knowledge of the Peoples fixing that ſignification to it, he does not contradict, but rather encourage them to continue of that opinion, and ſets up his light almoſt every night with that very deſign, the ſignal is then no longer arbitrary; thoſe who obſerve it, and he who ſets it up, are tacitly agreed what it is to mean; there is now a mutual underſtanding begun, and a ſort of Faith depending upon it, and to make uſe of it any longer for ſuch an artifice is in effect to proclaim a Lye; that the Man ſtudies hard, when at the ſame time 'tis probable he is faſt aſleep.

But however, there is no doubt to be made but all kind of ſigns and geſtures and innuendoes which are uſed and practiſed on purpoſe for ſignification, and it is generally well agreed and known what they ought to mean, do require equal ſincerity and honour with our expreſs words; and to deceive

wilfully by them, is to all intent and effect to Lye: for inſtance, if in a place where two ways meet, I ask a Perſon which of them I muſt take to bring me to ſuch a Town, and he points me directly to the wrong; I take his pointing for as plain and poſitive an anſwer, as if he ſpoke out, because cuſtom has made it in that caſe equally ſignificant, and therefore if he knowingly miſguides me thereby, he tells me as flat and perfidious a Lye, as if he directed me out of my way in ſo many ſignificant words. To miſinform by any ſuch falſe ſigns, is to expreſs our ſelves differently from what we think, and on purpoſe to deceive: and ſo tho' not one word be ſaid, it is deliberate and compleat Lying. If this were not admitted, it would be impoſſible a dumb Man ſhould ever be concern'd in the guilt of this Sin. But as he who cannot Write is as ſtrongly bound by the teſtimony of his *Mark*, ſo he who either cannot or will not ſpeak, ought to be no leſs ſincere if he pretends to be underſtood by *Signs*, and to prevaricate this way, is in effect and truth to Lye.

And if there be any odds in the manner of the Sin, this way of Lying under ſuch wretched ſhifts and evaſions, is far enough from being the moſt excuſable; there is baſeneſs and treachery in all Lying, but ſomewhat more peculiarly ſo in Lying under pretence of being tender all the while of Truth

the

the friendly *kiſs* of *Judas* in the very act of Treaſon againſt his Maſter, was juſt like the ſincerity of ſuch Salvo's in round Lying: we are not fond of being deceived upon any terms; but when Mens deceits come upon us in ſuch an odd diſguiſe and medly, that we catch them in being falſe, and yet they are not falſe, and their palpable Lying is yet no Lying, it raiſes our indignation, we cannot endure that Knaves ſhould pretend to treat us as Fools. The truth of all is this, direct and obſtinate Lying is the Vice of the meaner and baſer ſort; but ſuch Caſes as I have been laſt conſidering, being of a more nice, and ſtudied, and elaborate Lying, are commonly found to be the meaſures of deep cunning and hypocriſie, the practices of ſuch as are deſigning and dangerous in their Converſation, the wiles of the deceitfulleſt and worſt of Men.

5. Laſtly, I would fain venture to charge the guilty of Lying one ſtep farther within the guards of our Minds; for we may not only commit the Sin by dumb ſigns and intimations, without opening our mouths, but there are Caſes wherein we may be concern'd and partake in the guilt of Lying, even without ſo much as a ſign or a word given; and this not only when by an abſolute ſilence we ſeem conſenting to one thing while we mean another; but even when we wilfully keep a Perſon in ignorance and a wrong un-

derſtanding of things, when he has equity in point of intereſt on his ſide to be better informʼd and ſet right. For inſtance, if I Sell a thing which I perceive the Buyer purchaſeth for good, and I know it to be faulty; thoʼ I uſe not one word or geſture to make him believe ʼtis good, yet if I do not tell him expreſly how far I know it to be amiſs, I am guilty; if I purpoſely keep him deceived to his damage, it is in effect as if I actually led him into the deception; his being ignorant is but juſt as I would have it; I treat with him for that reaſon to chooſe; I make the ſame advantage of it as if I had uſed indirect ſignifications to blind him; and what others bring about by Lying, I am pleasʼd to find prepar'd to my hands already. Now if to perſwade a Man by falſe vouching to take off a ſorry Bargain be avowʼd Lying, why not to let a Man do it throʼ his own ignorance? For we ought no more in point of ſincerity to connive at a Man in an error than to lead him into it: No one queſtions but to put a Man purpoſely out of his way by falſe directions is a pernicious Lye; now if I apprehend a Man to be out of his way, thoʼ he does not ask my directions, I am next door as guilty if I do not begin with him to ſet him right: this I ought to do as an indifferent Perſon, but much more if I am a Party concernʼd, and intereſted in his error. I chooſe to be underſtood by this illuſtration,

becauſe

because I find it apply'd to this very Case by a great Author; for thus *Tully* makes his Disputant argue, *To let alone a Buyer to be abominably gull'd and ruin'd by his ignorance, what is it else but to suffer a Traveller to put on in a wrong Road, 'till he has run himself quite out of knowledge, a Crime which the* Athenians *execrated by publick and solemn Curses.* In short, there is little odds in point of guilt, between him that leads a Man into the dark, and him that rejoyces to find him in the dark, when both design alike to take that for an opportunity to pick his Pocket. I am sensible how deeply this Notion will strike at the Secrets and Intrigues of Commerce: I know Men that are pretty nice and touchy of their Honour, do make no scruple to act by contrary measures: *Caveat Emptor* is the word, and to turn such opportunities to account, passes for principal ingenuities in the way of dealing: Nor will I undertake for my own Integrity so far, but that 'tis very possible had I been bred up to Business, Ignorance, Custom and lust of gain might have blinded my Reason to a fond imagination, that such kind of Dealing was consistent enough with Religion and Honour: therefore I am prepar'd to expect with how much difficulty this Doctrine will go down in Trade: however now as a disinterested Man between the Vender and the Buyer, I do from my Soul believe, that barely to be

De Off. l. 3.

silent

ſilent at anothers ignorance, in order to make an overvaluable advantage of it, is deceitful, unſincere, and very much of the nature of an injurious Lye.

And here I take comfort to think that I can immediately ſhelter my ſelf under the Sence and Judgment of *Tully*, the Greateſt *Philoſopher* and *Caſuiſt* the Heathen World ever bred: to gain countenance therefore in the Argument, I ſhall inſiſt a little not only upon his Doctrine, but the very Caſes about it which he himſelf has put. For inſtance

De Off. l. 3. "An honeſt Trader of *Alexandria* brings in
"a lading of Corn to *Rhodes*, in hopes, thro'
"a preſent ſcarcity there, to come to a very
"conſiderable Market: Now in caſe the ſaid
"Trader knows that ſeveral other Veſſels
"bound from *Alexandria* to *Rhodes* with Corn
"goes of the ſame Proviſion are under Sail
"after him, and likely to come within a few
"days into the ſame Port, the Queſtion is
"whether he be bound in Conſcience to give
"the People of *Rhodes* notice of it, or by
"being ſilent to make the moſt of his advan-
"tage? *Another Caſe of his.* A Man ex-
"poſes to Sale a certain Houſe, on the ſcore
"of ſome defects and inconveniencies in it
"known only to himſelf; it is ſituate in
"peſtilent Air, which others at the ſame
"time take to be healthy; Vermine breed in
"every corner of it, the Timber is decay'd
"and the Tenement juſt tottering, but all
"this

" this is ſtill in the Owners boſom only:
" Now the Query is, if he keep the Purcha-
" ſer in ignorance, and by that mean s put
" it off for a great deal more than otherwiſe
" he could have made of it, whether this be
" fairly, or elſe deceitfully and unjuſtly
" done. Theſe Caſes thus intelligibly ſta-
ed, he cauſes to be diſputed out by two
Stoicks, a Maſter and his Diſciple, and they
ay I think the ſum of all that can be ſaid on
oth ſides; but in concluſion this is *Tully*'s
udgment; That in both Caſes the Vender
eals unfairly to keep the Buyer in ignorance,
or tho' every thing you keep to your ſelf is
ot unjuſtifiable *Concealment*, yet when you
willingly ſuffer others to continue ignorant
f thoſe things, which it concerns them in
oint of intereſt to know, on purpoſe that
ou may make a Market of them; 'tis eaſie
o ſee what kind of *concealment* this is, and
what ſort of Men they are who deal after
hat manner: *Certe non Aperti, non ſimplicis,* Ibid.
*on ingenui, non juſti, non viri boni; ver-
ſuti potius, obſcuri, Aſtuti, Fallacis, Malitioſi,
allidi, Veteratoris, Vafri.* I am almoſt a-
raid to venture at rendring this in Engliſh,
or fear of wanting words; let me ſee ——
*Surely this is not the part of an open, ſincere,
ingenuous, juſt, nor good Man; but rather of
a ſhuffling, dark, crafty, deceitful, ſly, ſubtile,
inveterate Knave.* After he gives us the Pre-
cedent of a Caſe much like thoſe before,
wherein

wherein *Cato* the Elder was Arbitrator; a
he tells us the ſubſtance of his Award w
this, *Cum in venundando rem eam ſciſſet,*
non pronuntiaſſet, Emptori damnum præſt
oportere: "That ſince the Vender kne
"the inconvenience that attended what
"Sold, and did not tell the Purchaſer of
"he ſhould make good his damage. And
general, the *Cenſor* Eſtabliſh'd this to be
ſtanding Rule for fair and upright Dealin
Notum eſſe emptori vitium quod noſcet ven
tor; "That the Buyer ought to be ma
"acquainted with every thing the Vend
"knows amiſs in what is dealt for.
theſe are falſe Doctrines, let that great R
man be reſponſible for them; nevertheleſs
ſhould be ſorry to think that Chriſtians ſhou
come ſhort of Heathens in their Notions
Morality.

Well, but granting it to be a ſort of I
juſtice to keep Men in ignorance for our ow
unreaſonable gain, yet after all, how do
this come in for Lying? I anſwer, for Re
ſons like theſe: For in the firſt place, if I
not expreſly tell another the thing I Sell
damnified or defective, and I am ſatisfied
does not know it is, I do, even tho' I am
lent, imply, and make believe I think
good; my expoſing it to Sale without e
ception amounts to ſuch an intimation
Now if by any means, tho' it be by ſayin
and doing juſt nothing, I would fain hav

believ'd a thing is good, when I know it not, I entice another to be miſperſwaded nd deceiv'd, to contribute towards which, always the proper buſineſs and work of a ye. Again, by taking a good and ſuitable rice, I confirm him in his error; the de-anding of that is ſomething more than are ſilence or concealment: this is a ſignifi-ant ſign made, and ſomething actually done n my ſide, to deceive and abuſe him: to ke a good price for a bad bargain, is in-ead of an expreſs Warrant or Declaration at I think it good; and if I do any thing ilfully, that ſhall ſerve for a proper intima-on, to make another believe a thing is, hat I know it is not, I come up toward e guilt of compleat Lying. Farther, the omplaints and Remonſtrances of the Buyer, hen he has found me out, will ſoon come on me, and upbraid me to my face, that have dealt unſincerely and falſely, and in fect like a Lyar; and all Men who are in-fferently concern'd will ſtand by and ſe-nd him. Again, Courts of Equity will lieve a Man in ſuch Caſes, as much as if preſs Overtures had been made to lead him to the Cheat. It was not for nothing erefore that *Demoſthenes* takes notice, that e *Law* againſt Lying was publickly ſpread en in the *Athenian* Market-place: [Κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν ἀψευδεῖν νόμον γεγράφθαι,] and if y Man offer'd any thing diſhonourable in dealing, Orat. adv. Lept.

dealing, he was Convicted by the tenor of that Statute; intimating that all ſuch deceitful and unfair Trading did very much border upon Lying: upon which *Grotius* Critically Remarks, that *there* a Lye is of that large extent and acceptation, [*ut etiam obſcuram locutionem includat*] that it includes all *obſcure* or *unaudible* ſpeaking; and therefore alſo all fraudulent ſilence and concealment: and in the ſence of the Civil Law it amounts to a Lye, for a Man to take upon him that Character and Credit, which in his way of dealing he does not act up to; it is call'd by *Gregory*, *a Lye in Fact*: and *Tully obſerves*, that tho' the Civil Law cannot pretend to provide expreſly againſt all Concealments and Frauds of this kind, yet as many as it can provide againſt it does; and then he fetches about this vehement ſtroke, as ſuch as actually make uſe of vain and Lying words to deceive: *Quod ſi vituperandi ſunt qui reticuerunt, quid de ijs exiſtimandum eſt qui orationis vanitatem adhibuerunt?* "they are ſo much to blame, who deceive by "being only ſilent, what ſhall we think of "thoſe Men, who make uſe of a world of "ſmooth and wheedling Lyes in order to "it?

De Jur. B. & P. l. 3. c. 10.

Syntag. Jur. l. 39. c. 15.

De Off. l. 3.

Thus I have endeavour'd to unravel the Sin of Lying out of all its intricate Mazes and Intanglements: but after all, I muſt confeſs the Temptations and Inducements, the way

and

d means and ends for it are ſo various and mberleſs, that it is beyond the meaſures of ſcourſe to comprehend it within certain unds; and tho' I have attempted to mark t ſome diſtinctions to ſhew when we are t and when we are guilty; yet after all, were to direct to one ſingle Principle by ich we ſhould Judge for our ſelves, I ould referr every Man to the impartial ctates of his own Conſcience; for tho' we y lay ſtreſs upon Equivocating and Shift-g, to ſupport our Credit from ſinking un- the Cenſures of the World, yet it cannot a ſufficient ſtay to defend us againſt the uſations of our own Breaſt: We are often ſible enough of our guilt within, when will not yield it manifeſt to the Judg-nts of other Men; and if we would but w our Conſciences due animadverſion, a fair hearing, it ſhould ſcarcely be ever ible for us to be guilty of a Lye, tho' un- never ſo plauſible a diſguize or form, but would give us a very juſt and punctual ice of it, and privately tell us, *that's a* . But for a Man to think of laying down llible Rules, that ſhall determine every g that may be made Caſuiſtical upon this ject, would be a very vain and endleſs dertaking indeed. A Lye is ſuch an in-nite, and mutable, and verſatile turn of ech, convertible and plyant to ſo many poſes, transformable into ſo many ſhapes,

flexible

flexible to ſo many ends, ſo ready and w
ling and apt for all buſineſs, comes on un
ſo many different diſguiſes, and is brou
off again by ſo many cunning fetches a
evaſions, ſo diligent and daring to do m
chief, and ſo ſlippery and flitting a thing
catch hold of, that it will not endure
ſtand ſtated and fix'd to any juſt diſtinctio
you may as well pretend to graſp the S
dity of the Air, to faſten Chains upon a Fai
or to deſcribe one certain Figure to an emp
and whiſling Cloud.

Sometimes it will confidently ſtare a M
in the face, by and by 'tis whiſpering
hind his back, and one while it ſhall ſeem
look and ſpeak to one Man, but intend
be overheard and miſtaken by anoth
Sometimes it comes away in plain and po
tive terms, and is a Lye in ſo many word
at other times 'tis ambiguous and dark as
Oracle: Often it has the impudence to co
front you in bold and direct aſſertions, a
ther while it ſteals about in ſneaking circu
locutions, in equivocations, and quibble
and broken Sentences, and is ſo minc
and chop'd between the teeth, that it ſh
hang half out of the mouth, and half wit
in: Sometimes it ſhall deceive by a ſigni
cant ſign, by a ſlye intimation, by
falſe nod of the head, or the twinkle of
deceitful eye: now and then you ſhall ha
it ſo nicely ſpun that it ſhall perfectly eſca
obſe

obſervation; at other times ſo groſs and clumſie that you may feel it; ſometimes it is full and overflowing with ſmooth and fair words, offers it ſelf upon Credit, and comes uſher'd out with high and ſolemn adjurations, ; *upon my Honour! By the Sacred Name! and as I hope for mercy!* at other times it makes leſs adoe, but does more buſineſs; eſpecially when it affects to keep ſullenly couch'd and ſtifned under thoſe two ſtarch'd Monoſyllables, *Yea*, and *Nay:* but upon ſome occaſions it will not be at the trouble of one breath or ſign, but ſhall ſilently conſent you into a falſehood of your own accord: generally ſpeaking it will contrive to have ſome foundation to work upon, and then it ſallies out with great heart and aſſurance; amplifying is wondrous eaſie and delightful, but then very often it brings all out of nothing, and this is drudgery; creating is laborious, 'tis Egyptian Slavery; 'tis the painful and exquiſite work of a Spider, to ſpin the whole Web out of its own bowels: but even this will be nothing after we are us'd to it.

Various and infinite are the uſes and ends of this faculty; 'tis a managable and handy Craft for every purpoſe under the Sun: It compleatly qualifies for high Ceremony and Gallantry, for flattering and inveigling with the weak and vain, for over-reaching the wiſe and wary, for ſhuffling and cutting

from the Mighty, for knowing Men, and Converſing in the World, and in the faſhionable *way of the World.* 'Tis the principal ſlight and artifice of a Cunning Man, the tongue and head and heart of a Politician; 'tis that ſtrong byaſs upon the Pen of an Hiſtorian, that bears him always on one ſide; hence it gets throughly converſant and read in all the accounts of times; it had in effect the compoſing of all the *Grecian* Memoirs, *Et quicquid Græcia mendax audit in Hiſtoria*: Geography has been no leſs beholding to it, eſpecially in deſcribing Places and Kingdoms that were never ſeen, in decyphering unknown Worlds, and all the *Terra incognita*: 'Tis the Compleat Journal of an accompliſh'd Traveller, and often helps him out where his Memory quite fails. In Philoſophy 'tis all Hypotheſis and Paradox; in Religion 'tis nothing but free Critiſciſm and Hypocriſie: 'Tis both Nature and Art in the Muſes, the Pen of a Poet, and the Pencil of a Painter; 'tis the gilt and counterfeit of baſe Coin, and that affected red and white that often blooms out freſh upon a withred Beauty. 'Tis a very ready thing to enter into Obligation, to plight by way of Promiſe, and to Miniſter and Negotiate in all Leagues and Contracts: No Solemn Treaty can well be made, much leſs broken without it: 'tis the genuine ſence and meaning of a States-Man, the familiar Speech of the higheſt Quality, and that which

which Men of a ſhort reach and a long Purſe are ſure to meet with for their Friend at Court. Take it from Quality downward, thro' all degrees of Buſineſs, and it is officious as a Mans right hand; it hangs like a perfect Enchantment upon all Weights, and Marks, and Meaſures, and is become almoſt neceſſary to oblige, and to diſpatch to content. Not that it is altogether retain'd and engroſs'd by the Seller neither, the Buyer makes bold with it with equal ingenuity and aſſurance; inſomuch that 'tis a Moot Point whether this buſie Talent be more confidently exercis'd within the Counter or without. For my part, I am of Opinion with the Son of *Syrach* [Ecclus. xxvii. 2.] *That as a Nail ſticketh faſt between the joynings of the Stones, ſo doth this Sin ſtick cloſe between Buying and Selling*: they preſs hard towards it, and with the ſame intent of advantage on both ſides; inſomuch that without ſtricter Care and Conſcience in their words, there's too much reaſon to fear that as the Prophet has forewarned, *Iſa.* xxiv. 2. *It ſhall be as with the Buyer, ſo with the Seller.* Even with the Idleſt People it finds a full imployment; it takes a more than ordinary freedom in Converſation; 'tis the banter and humour of the Gay, the Cenſures of the Preciſe and Proud, and the Scandal of the Envious: with Melancholick Men it plays the Tyrant in ten thouſand terrifying Dreams and

Images; and ever now and then, to impoſe upon the Credulous, it ſhall go haunting about by Night in doleful Groans and ſtartling Noiſes, in dark Spectres, gliding Shapes, monſtrous Forms, in Solitary and Cloudy Apparitions; and to carry on the Frolick to the laſt, ſhall afterwards come abroad in Volumes of Surprizing Narratives, unqueſtionably certified and atteſted.

The part it acts is unnatural, and therefore difficult; but then it has a thouſand ſhifts and eſcapes to ſave it ſelf: ſo that tho' it be very liable to ſuſpicion, 'tis found a very ſtubborn and obſtinate thing to be Convicted: As a Priſoner at the Bar it Pleads for a Rule, *Not Guilty*; Let it be heard out by Councel, and it ſhall immediately ſplit aſunder, and divide, and be loudly concern'd on both ſides; the Lye ſhall rally too and fro, and lay about, and make ſo many probable offers and returns, that Juſtice, in order to be ſet right, ſhall be quite maz'd and bewilder'd. The fatalleſt Circumſtance that a Lye can fall under, is to be ſurpriz'd and caught upon the ſpot; in this ſtreight, the firſt moment, it ſhall ſtand aſtoniſh'd, and ſhock'd, and in a manner nail'd faſt; and then if follow'd up and daunted, it will make an end at once, and in an odd unnatural way of ſelf preſervation, eat it ſelf. But if it can perceive there is only violent ſuſpicion, and no direct proof,

proof, it ſhall recover a little breath and heart, and being urg'd on to confeſs, it ſhall inſtantly fall big in Labour with a world of falſe Conceptions, in order to be deliver'd; and under ſeveral pangs and throes, Truth and Falſehood, like the two Sons of *Rebecca*, ſhall keep ſtrugling in the Womb of the Mind, which ſhall come out firſt; but commonly the *Cunning Hunter* gets foremoſt, and the *Plain Man* comes drag'd out after at the others heel; Truth is the laſt and foreſt Expedient. Lying is a Faculty that will ſtand by it ſelf, as long as one Lye can be made to ſtand by another; tho' it be faithful to nothing elſe, it will be true and conſtant in its own defence. And as in a foul Sea the leading Wave no ſooner breaks away in froth, but immediately there comes up another to make head againſt the Rock; ſo when the Spirit of Lying is once provok'd and ruffled, it ſhall come driving againſt a firm Charge, in a ſullen unrelenting Fluctuation, one audaciouſly rowling onward to make good the baulk of the other: It has a ſtrange readineſs and alacrity, not only to bring its own ſelf off, but to deny or colour over all other wickedneſſes.

To be brief, 'twill deal with all Men, Miniſter to all purpoſes, transform to all ſhapes, and change to all complexions:

And yet come near, and examine what it is that makes all this buſtle and confuſion in the World, you will find 'tis all a Jeſt; meer Nonſence, indeed nothing; this endleſs, privative, unaccountable thing is a Lye.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Whether it be Lawful in any Caſe, or upon any Occaſion or Pretence whatſoever to Lye.

SECT. I.

Some Reflections upon thoſe Authors who have allow'd of Lying in ſome Caſes.

II. *I Come now to Enquire whether it may be Lawful in any Caſe or upon any Pretence whatſoeve to tell a Lye? And I ſhall ſhew for what good Reaſons I am of Opinion it is not.*

Nevertheleſs this muſt be allow'd a Queſtion: many Learned Men, both Ancient and Modern, have taken the contrary ſide; and therefore we may be ſure not without conſiderable difficulties objected, great appearance of Reaſon given, and very much argued and ſaid againſt the part I have taken: my Reſolution is to make my way thro' as directly as I can; and in order to it I ſhall turn as little aſide as poſſible after the different Sentiments and Oppoſitions of other Men; my Deſign being not to hold you

amus'd with a confutation of ſuch of them as may be falſe, but to give the plaineſt and cleareſt Evidence I can of that Opinion which I conceive to be true; however 'twill be neceſſary to premiſe a juſt ſtate of the Controverſie, that it may be known wherein and upon what grounds Men have been divided, and how far they have been all agreed; and by this means we ſhall be the more diſtinct and certain what 'tis we pretend to maintain, when we come to a determination in our own Judgments.

I have ſhew'd already that the Nature and Guilt of compleat and finiſh'd Lying conſiſts in expreſſing our ſelves differently from what we think on purpoſe to deceive. Now the common method of Learned Men is to reduce all ſorts of Lying under theſe three Heads, *Jocular*, *Officious*, and *Pernicious*; the Jocular or Ludicrous Lye is told only in Jeſt, and for Merriment, an Officious Lye is what we tell with a good and charitable deſign, a pernicious Lye is what we make uſe of for Knavery and miſchief; but there is yet a fourth ſort of Lying which I find mentioned by *Ariſtotle*, and I doubt there is too much room for it; and it is when, from an inveterate habit, Men Lye out of meer luſt to the Sin; having not ſo much as a jeſt, much leſs any good or evil end to ſerve in it; but a conſtant itching and inclination to make other men believe the Lord knows what:

ſuch

ſuch a one the Philoſopher calls ὁ μὲν Ψεύδει αὐτῷ χαίρων, *one who finds pleaſure and enjoyment in the very Lye it ſelf.* Now I believe I may venture to ſet aſide the two laſt ſorts of Lying, namely when it is to do wrong, or out of pure Luſt to the Sin, by conſent of all Parties; for I do not remember any Caſuiſt that was ever ſo much addicted to controvert, as to juſtifie that 'twas allowable to Lye out of miſchief, or out of pure luſt to the Lye it ſelf, and only for Lying ſake. Ariſt. Eth. l. 4. c. 13.

What allowances ſome have made have been to the two former Caſes, to wit when we lye only to make mirth, or elſe to do good, and are careful at the ſame time to do no Man any wrong; and the main reaſon they ſeem to go by is this, that where no harm or inconvenience ariſes, but rather good is done, what neceſſity is there to impute evil? as if the guilt of Lying did not conſiſt ſo much in the bare expreſſing our ſelves in oppoſition to our own minds, as in the accidental ends and conſequences we may drive at in ſo doing; the contrary whereof I hope to make appear, at leaſt, very probable, by and by: In the mean while, I ſhall not detain my ſelf upon a particular examination of every thing which Learned Men have offer'd on that ſide, but ſhall content my ſelf with making two or three general reflections how the Caſe ſtands with them. And,

1ſt. I

1*st*. I obſerve they are not agreed among themſelves in their account and notion of a Lye; one making it to conſiſt in the bare telling of a wilful Untruth; another in the Untruth, and the intent of deceiving joyn'd together: Others will have it conſiſt only in deceiving Men about thoſe Truths which they have a right to in point of equity. Others will have the notion of Lying extend only to Perſons Civiliz'd, and under the Laws of Society and Government; and ſo when the *Spaniards* forc'd their way upon *America*, they were not engaged to act toward the Natives with any regard to ſincerity, they might tell them as many *Untruths* as they pleas'd, but they could not tell them *Lyes*. And there are thoſe who will not allow an Untruth to be properly a Lye, unleſs it be told for ſome unrighteous end and purpoſe: now by this confus'd and uncertain account of the nature of a Lye, it is impoſſible they ſhould be clearly and diſtinctly agreed in their judgments about the lawfulneſs or unlawfulneſs of it. So far from it, that by this means thoſe who allow the largeſt latitude to it, ſeem to be the moſt peremptory Men in condemning it. And for inſtance, I would only mention *Puffendorf*; no Writer that I know of, gives freer ſcope and indulgence to this Talent; and yet if you ask his reſolution of the Queſtion in hand, he ſhall anſwer you in theſe abſolute and deciſive words;

Quo

Quod autem omne mendacium, proprie dictum, turpe ſit, manifeſtum eſt: i. e. "It is very "clear and evident that every Lye, properly "ſo call'd, is ſinful. This is indeed my opi-"nion; and the very utmoſt I would contend "for; but then look back, and ſee what he "means by a Lye *properly ſo call'd*, and this "puts all in confuſion again; *proprie mentiri non dicitur, niſi qui dolo malo & deſtinatâ ex malitiâ, alteri diverſa ab animi ſui ſententiâ profert, eo fine, ut iſti noceat, aut vanâ ſpe eidem illudat:* It ſeems a Man is not pro-perly ſpeaking, guilty of a Lye, but when he utters expreſſions to another quite different from the ſenſe of his own mind, with *a deceitful intent*, with *propenſe malice*, and in order to *injure* the Man he ſpeaks to, or at leaſt to cheat him with a *vain hope and expectation*. Now to do any thing with deceitful intent, propenſe malice, and in order to injure or impoſe upon another, is ſufficiently Sinful without more ado; ſo that put thoſe two paſſages together, and the Lye is very little diſoblig'd by that Author's Pen; for by this account the jocular and the officious Lying, the only two ſorts of it that admit of diſpute, have perfectly eſcaped his diſpleaſure: indeed in his Opinion they are not Lying. Now when Men diſagree and vary about the Nature of that upon which they would ſpend their Judgment, 'tis an odd thing when they are like to determine at ſome uncertainty,

De Jur. l. 4. p. 318.

p. 317.

certainty, when they are not of the sa
mind what a thing is, they are unlikely
be well resolv'd about the lawfulness of
being different in their *Principle*, their Re
sons must be different and precarious, th
bring them to one common Conclusion.

2. I observe they are very much divid
among themselves, as to those particular C
ses wherein they would connive at Lyin
some have thought Men may innocen
vary from the truth but only in the way
merriment; others who allow we may L
in good earnest to serve the ends of Righ
ousness and Charity, are yet far enough fr
being agreed upon the same respects and co
ditions; for some scruple at it still, unless
good we propose by it, be of extraordina
emergency; and there are those who speci
it must be a pub ick, and not a private goo
others who indulge it in private Cases, th
say they must be very weighty and pressin
some not under the saving a Man's li
others not unless you can propose to do go
to a Man's Soul. But some great Men ha
thought it foolish to stand mincing and scr
pling out their Minds into such nice d
stinctions, and have roundly affirm'd up
the general, that in every respect, tho' it
never so inconsiderable, where you may
good by a Lye, and do no mischief, the
you may safely venture; and if any Hyp
thesis on that side would stand, in my O
nio

on, this is the likelieſt, and moſt conſi-
ent. But now, where Men are ſo miſera-
y divided, and ſingular in explaining them-
lves about the ſame Point, 'tis a ſign they
ere got on the wrong ſide of the Queſtion,
nce they cannot agree among themſelves in
hat particular Caſes to indulge it; 'tis na-
ral enough to ſuſpect from thence that it
ught to be indulg'd in none.

3. 'Tis farther obſervable, that when they
venture out for ſome allowances, their
pinions come from them with great tender-
eſs and caution; one ſaith it muſt be very
ldom, if ever, that you let a Lye eſcape
om you, tho' out of a good intent, for fear
drawing it into Cuſtom: another ſays you
e bound in Conſcience to think of all other
xpedients firſt, Lying muſt be your laſt re-
ge; which is much the ſame thing as to
y, 'tis adviſeable to try all fair means, be-
re you make uſe of foul: Another confeſſes
genuouſly that after all, he does not
e how we can venture *to do evil that good*
ay come: I confeſs nor I neither. But why
very loath, and mealy-mouth'd? there is
o fear of ſpeaking out plainly where a thing
lawful and honourable: but when Men
raw back thus from an Opinion which they
would fain advance, and provide for it with
much warineſs and conditioning, it ſeems
if they miſtruſted what they were doing;
nd therefore ſome, the Schoolmen, who
found

found it a vain thing to ſtrive thus againſt Nature, have craved indulgence for prevaricating a little, on innocent and good occaſions, under this pretence, that it is at moſt if at all, but a very light and venial Sin: But when once we come to be conſcious a thing is at all ſinful, our wilful and deliberate committing it, will alter the ſize of a Sin ſtrangely.

4. Laſtly, one thing is farther obſervable in the Men on that ſide: they cannot forbear dropping Sentences ever now and then, by which we are left to judge how much more they thought it would become our Religion and our Honour, that we keep conſtantly ſteady and ſincere to truth; and for this I ſhall pitch upon one or two of the Chiefeſt. *Crellius* is pretty favourable in his allowance of Lying, as in caſe of neceſſity, to ſerve a Friend, or now and then to ſerve our ſelves; and yet he confeſſes to have recourſe to it more than ſeldom is vicious: Nay when, according to his conſtant method of ſtating Vertue in the middle between two extreams of Vice, he places Truth between Lying on the one hand, and exceſſive ſimplicity on the other; he readily ſets the mark of Vice upon all Treſpaſſes on the ſide of Lying, but Errors on the contrary extream, which in other Caſes he ſeldom ſpares, he ſpeaks of here with great tenderneſs and charity. *Nimia in dicendo ſimplicitas, ſive ſinceritas, imprudentiam potius*

Eth. Ariſt. par. 2. c. 21.

tius quam improbitatem arguit; extream ſin-
rity in ſpeaking, argues imprudence rather
an improbity; which is as much as to ſay,
at a Man of that Character, if he be not
ſubtle as another, he will be ſure to be ho-
ſter. *Grotius* gives a larger latitude to the
ice than *Crellius*; and yet methinks when De Jur. l. 3. c. 20.
ſays it is [*ob eximiam quandam animi celſi-
dinem*] owing to a *ſingular greatneſs or ma-
ſty of mind*, that ſome have declar'd abſo-
tely even againſt the lighteſt kind of Lying;
at expreſſion gives no diſadvantage to ſuch a
inciple; a Principle which he farther favours
ith this conceſſion, that it ought to be ſo much
more eſpecially regarded and maintain'd
Chriſtians, becauſe they are not only com-
anded in the Goſpel to be endued with a
ove-like ſimplicity, but to avoid every fooliſh
d *idle word*, and have that true *Iſraelite*
inted out to them for Example, *in whom is
guile*. And *Puffendorf*, who has contri-
d as much indulgence for Lying, as any
thor of Note that I know of, does yet,
en he comes to meaſure what ſort of Men
ought to be according to the ſimplicity
the Goſpel, take up and dictate after ano-
r manner; for (ſaith he) As no Man
uld be ſo impudent to blame the gravity
n *Epaminondas*, who maintain'd that we De Jur. nat. p. 318.
never to tell a Lye, no not in jeſt, ſo it
very natural to believe that ſome *atone-* Piacula ſemper obſtringi.
nts are ſtill due, when a Man's word offi-
ciouſly

ciouſly vary from his mind, for his own
anothers good, tho' no one at the ſame ti
be injur'd: and therefore it were to be wiſh
that, according to *Cicero*, *all Lying and Di*
ſembling were abſolutely baniſh'd out of Hu
mane Society; and for that purpoſe, that
"Men had ſo much ingenuity as not to en
"the Poſſeſſions of others, nor lay ſnares f
"them, nor fraudulently abuſe their ſimpl
"city, nor make uſe of any meaſures th
"are contrary to the dictates of ſound Re
"ſon; this indeed is ſaid like a Chriſtian
"like an Apoſtle. Now when Learne
Men will ſtrain their ſtrength one way, an
yet permit their inclinations and good wiſh
to break looſe another, when their reaſo
ſhall keep labouring and tugging for indu
gence, and yet their Praiſes and Encomium
are all beſtow'd upon the contrary Princi
ple, this ſhews which part their Judgment
would determine for, if they were abſolutel
free: truth is a very ſtubborn and inflexibl
thing, and will not endure to be kept un
der.

Now after ſuch Reflections as theſe, upo
the Authors who have craved permiſſion fo
Lying in particular Caſes, it is reaſonable t
allow, that it is not out of ſtiffneſs, or hu
mour, or ſingularity, that ſome have now
and then been of the contrary opinion: an
it muſt be ſufficient I ſhould think, to pre
pare you to hear at leaſt what may be o
fer

fer'd to maintain it. I ſhall therefore now repreſent for what good reaſons I am of this Perſwaſion, *that it is lawful in no Caſe, and upon no pretence whatſoever to tell a Lye*; and I go in general upon this Suppoſition for my Principle, *That Lying is intrinſically, and ſimply, and abſolutely evil in its own nature*; and if it be ſo, as I ſhall endeavour by and by to ſhew it is, then the Caſe is very plain and clear; for then we may be ſure that no pretence whatſoever can make that allowable, which in the nature of the thing is ſinful; no Circumſtances or Accidents can alter the eſſential property of a thing; there is no qualifying or cleanſing out defilement, when it is in the very ſubſtance of the thing to be foul: inherent blackneſs can never be ſcoured out; 'tis in vain to attempt to fetch it away when it runs quite thro' the grain; that which in its ſelf is wicked, will be wicked in ſpight of any outward Conſideration whatſoever. Is Lying ſimply ſinful in the nature of it? that's enough, we can ſay no worſe of any other Sin whatſoever; and it may as well be ſuppos'd that Circumſtances may, in ſome ſpecial Caſes, make Adultery, Blaſphemy, or the hatred of God allowable. 'Tis very vulgarly known and quoted, what a great Caſuiſt, no leſs than St. *Paul*, has taught to this purpoſe; when he reſented it as a *ſlanderous Report* caſt upon him, that he ſhould ſay, *Let us do evil that good may come*;

which was the fartheſt in the World from being his own ſence and Doctrine: and *Tully* has ſomething very parallel to that; *relinquendane ſit honeſtas, propter utilitatis magnitudinem? id quidem improbum eſt.* "To ſwerve "from what is honeſt, under pretence of the "great good we can do by it, is wicked; And in general, the main Principle that runs thro' his Treatiſe of *Humane Duties*, and is as it were the *burthen* of the whole Book, is this, "That nothing can be good and profi- "table, but what is juſt and honourable: *Eadem utilitatis quæ honeſtatis eſt regula:* then again, he calls them *res à natura copulatæ*; which being admitted, as it ſeems it is the ſence not only of Revelation, but of Natural Reaſon; then I have only this to make out, *That Lying is in its own Nature intrinſically, ſimply, and abſolutely evil*; for then you ſee it muſt of courſe be utterly diſallowable; and perhaps when the following Reaſons are impartially conſider'd, this will not ſeem ſuch a ſtrange and unlikely Propoſition. I do not promiſe they ſhall all bear down directly upon it at the very point of demonſtration; there is room but for one at a time to do that; and if one does it, 'tis as good as if a thouſand did, but they will I think all contribute their ſhare of ſtreſs to make the Principle ſtand firm.

De Off. l. 3.

SECT.

SECT. II.

Lying prov'd to be intrinſically, ſimply and abſolutely Evil.

Iſt, THEN, *Lying ſeems to be intrinſically, ſimply, and abſolutely Evil*, becauſe there is in it a ſort of *Natural* Vice and Obliquity; the two principal parts of a Man are divided and oppos'd; they are two indeed, in the very worſt ſence; the Law in the Members declares againſt the Law in the Mind; and the diſtinction between the *outward* and the *inward* Man is become neceſſary; the Man *without* and the Man *within* being in two different Tales; *mentiri eſt contra mentem ire.* Now when a Man is *beſides* his right Mind, he is reckon'd Mad; therefore when he goes wilfully and deliberately in a direct oppoſition *againſt* his right Mind, methinks it is ſomething worſe. One of the Ancients call'd Humane Voice the *Meſſenger* of the Mind, the *Angel* of the Underſtanding; but when it is purpoſely diſpatch'd to give a falſe *Annunciation*, the Soul ſends out her *good Angel* upon the *Devil*'s Errand. The Tongue and the Heart were at firſt exactly fitted to one another, and they are made to hang together as it were in one piece, that ſo according as we conceive, ſo we ſhould pronounce; but Lying cuts off

their Communication, ſets them at odds, at a miſunderſtanding, a perfect disjunction; the *ſtring* of the Tongue and the *ſtring* of the Heart ought, if they are well in *tune*, to be juſt in *uniſon*; if they ſtrike a *diſcord* Nature is quite out of *harmony*, and we muſt make very ſorry *muſick*. If our expreſſion does not point directly to our mind, our Syſtem does not go right, ſome foul thing muſt have fallen in, and diſturb'd the movement: and it is the ſame fundamental error and defect, as it would be in a Watch to keep moving on to the wrong hour, or for the ſhadow to point contrary to the true time of the Sun. Lying was ſo inconſiſtent with the firſt and perfect ſtate of Man, that when the Devil had occaſion to have recourſe to it, he could not undertake the Cheat in any Humane ſhape, but was forc'd to chop down into a Serpent, a lurking, low, degenerate, ſlippery wrigling Animal, the moſt invenom'd and rancorous thing to Man in the World. There can be no reaſon why Men are ſo notoriouſly given to Lying now, but becauſe our Natures by the Fall have been ever ſince jog'd out of due frame: ſo long as we kept going on in a ſtate of innocence, we were out of a Condition to tell a Lye.

2. Lying ſeems to be *ſimply* and *eſſentially* evil, becauſe of that *moral* obliquity and vice in it, as it ſtands directly oppoſite to the Nature

Nature of ſincerity and truth; there all Moraliſts place it, and there it ought to ſtand: the Apoſtle has repreſented them incompatible, *no Lye is of the Truth*: and the Philoſopher does from this utter and abſolute contrariety between them, impute evil and guilt as ſimply and eſſentially to the one, as he does Commendation and Virtue to the other; καθ' ἄυτὸ τὸ μὲν ψεῦδος φαῦλον καὶ ψεκτὸν, τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς καλὸν καὶ ἐπαινετόν *Lying is of it ſelf ſinful and abominable, juſt as on the contrary, Truth is righteous and praiſe-worthy.* Now it is not doubted but ſincerity or moral Truth is intrinſically and ſimply good, eſſentially and abſolutely Virtuous, inſomuch that it is impoſſible for any one to act with regard to ſincerity and truth, and not at the ſame time to act with Vertue and Honour; and if ſo, the reaſon of Contraries is much the ſame; for then it will be altogether as impoſſible to deal unſincerely and tell a Lye, without the guilt of vice and diſhonour, that is, without doing evil: if the one be eſſentially and ſimply good, the other, which ſtands directly oppoſite againſt it, muſt for equal reaſon be ſimply and eſſentially evil. Ariſt. Et. l. 4. c. 1.

3. Lying miſapplies and abuſes one of the moſt uſeful and peculiar gifts that God has beſtow'd upon Humane Nature; and it is I think impoſſible to do that and not do evil. Now the uſe of Speech was certainly ſuch a

kind of gift; for let us but imagine what a ſort of Creature Man muſt have made without it; we have no way to look into one anothers minds by intuition, and if every one muſt have kept his thoughts lock'd up within his own Breaſt, we ſhould all have ſhifted up and down for our ſelves like other Salvages; we might have met in Woods and ranges, and look'd wiſe and wiſt upon one another, and ſo do Apes and Monkeys; but we ſhould have had a pretty hard matter to have made it out to demonſtration, that we were more rational than ſome other Animals. I call Speech therefore a moſt peculiar and ſpecial gift to Man; for howſoever Brutes may conceive rationally, we meet with none of them that can talk ſo; they have not that command of their tongues to diſpute this Privilege with us. 'Tis alſo a moſt uſeful and neceſſary gift, for being hereby enabled to impart our thoughts freely and eaſily to one another, we have come to make the moſt of what we are, to form our ſelves into Civil Societies, to unite in one common intereſt and welfare, to combine to live in Peace and Friendſhip, to improve alſo the condition of our Souls as well as our Bodies, to open our intellectual Faculties, to enlarge them in knowledge and wiſdom, to make our minds more liberal and intelligent, by Education; to enrich them in the Treaſures of Human Underſtanding, by a free commerce

commerce and interchange of one anothers notions and diſcoveries. In fine, to brighten and poliſh out our whole Natures to admiration; for *as Iron ſharpneth Iron, ſo doth a Man the countenance of his Friend.*

Now as Speech was ſuch a peculiar and invaluable gift of God, it is reaſonable to think the perverting and abuſing of it muſt be proportionably ſinful; and we cannot more perverſely abuſe it than by Lying; for this is to make it ſerve for juſt the contrary end from that for which it was given: and as it holds generally true, *that the beſt things corrupted become the worſt*, ſo it is in the *corruption* of Speech; it becomes an inconvenience, a very Curſe and Plague; the occaſion of more miſchief and confuſion than any one corrupt thing in the world beſide: and we had much better of the two be without this expedient of conveying our Minds abroad, than to take an advantage by it of doing juſt the contrary, and inſtead of conveying our Minds nearer to other People, to convey them much farther off from our true Minds, than they could have been without it. 'Twas *Puffendorf*'s own reflection, and I think a very judicious one, *per abuſum linguæ homo minus fieret ſociabilis quam per ſilentium*: "By making an ill uſe of Speech, "Men may become much leſs fit for Human "Society, than if they were altogether dumb. In this reſpect the advantage rather lies on P. 308.

the ſide of Brutes, for being uncapable of diſcourſe, they cannot ſo conveniently miſperſuade and cheat; *mentiri non didicëre feræ*, they may be truſted, they are mute, and cannot Lye.

Martial.

Lying in Communication is worſe than an *unknown* Tongue in *Prophecying*; an *unknown* Tongue can only keep us in ignorance, but a *Lying* Tongue deceives and injures us: He who ſpeaks to me in a Speech which I know not is a *Barbarian*; but he who craftily miſguides and betrays me, by a Speech which I am ſuppos'd to know, reſembles a Being much blacker than a *Barbarian*. It is unskilfully and diſorderly manag'd, when *Inſtruments* are not made to give diſtinct and proper ſignifications; *for if the Trumpet give an uncertain ſound, who ſhall prepare himſelf to Battle?* But ſtill it is far more diſorderly and miſchievous, when the Inſtruments of conveying ſignifications ſhall give croſs and contrary ſigns on purpoſe to perſwade Men to the wrong; for if when the Trumpets ought to keep ſounding on a Charge, they ſhould on a ſuddain ſound a Retreat, 'tis enough to throw back an Army into confuſion, and the rout. Lying is of this latter kind, and therefore is worſe than no Speech at all, it is a perverſe and ungrateful abuſe of that moſt excellent gift of God, and therefore ſimply ſinful.

4. Lying muſt needs be ſo, becauſe it is abſolutely inconſiſtent with the Divine Perfections;

fections; and is an inherent quality of the Devil; 'tis abſolutely inconſiſtent with the divine perfections, for God can do all things that are poſſible for a perfect Being to do, and yet he cannot poſſibly Lye: *God is not a Man that he ſhould Lye. The ſtrength of Iſrael will not Lye, it is God that cannot Lye.* God's Promiſe and his Oath, are ſaid to be *two immutable things, in which it was impoſſible for God to Lye; yea let God be True, tho' every Man a Lyar.* Surely there muſt be ſomething moſt eſſentially good and perfect in Truth, from which it is not in the Nature and Power of God himſelf to depart. And this can be no Secret, for Truth is of that ſignificancy and importance, that it is concern'd in the reality and ſincerity of all Beings: we muſt firſt be ſuppos'd at ſome certainty about that, or elſe there is nothing in Nature that we can certainly depend upon; we cannot be ſure of our own being and meditations; for ought we know it may all be meer illuſion; nay without admitting the reality of Truth firſt, we cannot be poſitive there is a God; wherefore it is remarkable, *He* and his *Son* have choſen to be called by that Name, and will have *God* and *Truth* to be thought as it were the ſame thing. It was upon this ſuppoſition that *Zorobabel* carried it, in that notable Tryal of Wit before the *Perſian* Monarch: He made *Women ſtronger than all things*, and yet *Truth ſtronger than* 35. 1 Eſd. 4.

than Women: and no wonder, ſince in his way of Reaſoning he makes the great Creator of all things and *Truth*, to be in effect the ſame: *Is he not great that maketh theſe things? therefore great is* the Truth, *and ſtronger than all things.* And *Polybius* is of Opinion, that Truth ought to be adored as a Mighty Deity, who will be acknowledged always to be that which ſhe really is, above all: the Divine *Plato* repreſents *Truth* as the very next neceſſary Idea we can have of God, he is eſſentially *good* firſt, and then eſſentially *true*: and upon this he dictates with ſuch a Sacred warmth and inſpiration, that methinks I cannot chuſe but rehearſe him. Πάντη ἄρα Ἀψευδὲς τὸ δαιμόνιοντε καὶ τὸ Θεῖον. Κομιδῇ ἄρα ὁ Θεὸς ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἀληθὲς ἔντε ἔργῳ καὶ ἐν λόγῳ. καὶ ὅτε αὐτὸς μεθίσταται, ὅτε ἄλλους ἐξαπατᾷ, ὅτε κατὰ φαντασίας, ὅτε κατὰ λόγους, ὅτε κατὰ σημείων πομπὰς ὅτ' ὕπαρ, ὅτ' ὄναρ. "Therefore the Godhead "and whatever we may call the Divine Na- "ture, muſt be abſolutely free from all Ly- "ing; therefore God is the ſimpleſt and pu- "reſt of Beings, the very Truth it ſelf, both "in deed and word; ſubject to no mutability "or deception on his own part, nor ever diſ- "pos'd to *put* upon other beings, neither "thro' the imagination, nor by diſcourſe "nor by giving of ſigns, neither by a rea- "viſion, nor in a dream? God has indeed been always ſuppos'd to have that ſacred re-

gard

gard for ſincerity and veracity, that it was ſaid by ſome of the Ancients, the *Pythagoreans* in particular, that if God were diſpos'd to have his Nature conſiſt of two diſtinct parts, as ours does, he would undoubtedly aſſume *light* for his *Body*, and *truth* for his *Soul*: and *Pythagoras* was heard to ſay, that he had it from ſome of the *Magi* in *Egypt*, that their Great *Oromaſdes* was in reality of that very conſtitution: on which account that Philoſopher took occaſion to recommend to his Scholars, that above all things they would keep ſtrict and immutable in truth, becauſe that was the principal way to reſemble God.

On the contrary, 'tis expreſly ſaid that the Devil was from the beginning, one *who abode not in the truth*; as if he fell from *truth* and the *perfection* of his Nature both at once; and no ſooner was a Lyar, but he was a Devil: again, that *there is no truth in him*; as if never to tell truth, and to be a Devil, were the ſame thing: and *when he ſpeaketh a Lye, he ſpeaketh of his own*, he does not appear in a borrow'd Character, but is truly himſelf; and alſo, that *he is the Father of Lying*, it being the moſt natural thing to him in the world, not only to bring forth Lyes, but to beget and procreate Lyars. In a word, that he is *the Prince of Darkneſs*; that is, of a ſort of Kingdom, utterly oppoſite to light, and truth, and open dealing.

Now

Now what greater proof can we nee
that Lying is eſſentially and ſimply ſinfu
than what ariſes from theſe two reflectio
put together? for if it be inconſiſtent wi
the Divine Perfections, we may be ſure it
not for its goodneſs; if God cannot poſſibl
Lye, there can be no imaginable reaſon g
ven for it, but becauſe it is impoſſible
Lye, and be perfectly innocent: if it we
allowable in any caſe, or upon any preten
whatſoever, the *Higheſt* would have the fir
right and liberty of it in his own power
but what God can upon no terms permi
himſelf to do, becauſe of his abſolute pe
fection, we may not preſume to venture o
without impeachment of our imperfectio
and our guilt. But further, conſider Gr
under the attribute of his veracity, and as h
is the very truth it ſelf, ſupream and un
verſal; and in this reſpect we muſt remem
ber, that every time we Lye, we vary fro
the great Exemplar and Original of Vertu
we diſunite from the great Principle of good
neſs, we break with God himſelf, we be
come disfigur'd in our reſemblance of him
we are no longer one with him. The grea
Philoſopher and Emperor *Antoninus* fell i
with this reflection, for near the beginnin
of his Ninth Book of Meditations, ſpeakin
of *God* under the notion of *Univerſal Natur*
he goes on thus: "Which ſame *Nature* (ſa
"he) is alſo call'd *Truth*; and is the fir
"cau

" cauſe of all things which really and truly
" are; and therefore every one who tells a
" Lye, muſt of neceſſity be guilty of Un-
" Godlineſs, if *wilfully* be ſure; for there is
" no being deceitful and falſe, without being
" unjuſt; but even tho' he do it *unwittingly*,
" becauſe he becomes diſſonant from *Univer-*
" *ſal Nature*, and breaks the right order and
" harmony of things, running oppoſite to
" that Spirit which informs and governs the
" World. The plain ſence of all is, a Man
an upon no terms differ from the Truth,
t he muſt differ from God himſelf, becauſe
od is truth. On the other hand, if Lying
e an inherent quality of the Devil, can it
oſſibly be ſo, and not be ſimply evil? Is
here any thing imply'd in the notion and
uality of the Devil that can be juſtifiable
nd innocent? nothing certainly can dwell
him, as a fallen Spirit, but what muſt be
icked and degenerate. Briefly, let us judge
the Nature of Lying, by bringing both
des of this oppoſition to bear againſt it at a
oint. Is it not ſurprizing it ſhould ever be
rought into Controverſie, whether that
ay not be lawful in ſome Caſes, which up-
n no pretence whatſoever is to be ſuppos'd
the *perfect Being*, and is the conſtant pra-
ice of the *malicious Spirits*? The ſum is,
here is the ſame abſolute contrariety between
ruth and *Lying*, as there is between *God*
nd *Devil*; ſo that if *God* and *Truth* be
ſimply

ſimply and eſſentially *Good*, than the *Devil* and *Lying* muſt be ſimply and eſſentially *Evil.*

5. Lying muſt of neceſſity be ſo, becauſe it is unavoidably attended with injuſtice and breach of truſt: compleat and wilful Lying is a violation of that mutual faith and compact, which is of courſe agreed on and eſtabliſh'd between Man and Man in the uſe of Speech. When ever any one pretends to expreſs his Mind to another, with a ſhew of being regarded in what he offers, and accordingly that other Perſon conſents to lend him attention, there is in ſuch a caſe a plain Bargain or Treaty concluded; the Condition of which is, that the one ſhall be ſincere and true in what he expreſſes, and that the other who attends ſhall give him Credit. This I ſay is virtually, tho' not always actually the agreement made, upon which both words and ſigns become ſignificant: for it is certain no one would be ſo vain and fooliſh as to offer them, nor would any Man be ſo ſenceleſs and bewitch'd as to regard them, but upon this ſuppoſition: and therefore in all Caſes where Men conceive ſuſpicions of one another, they do expreſly inſiſt upon this obligation, ſo naturally and conſtantly ſuppos'd in the uſe of Speech; the Perſon ſpeaking will poſitively deſire and demand to be believ'd, and if the miſtruſt lie on the other ſide, the Perſon attending will require and urg

urge the other to be ſincere and true in what he ſays: and that this is always the known vow'd obligation between them, is from hence farther evident, becauſe Men who ſpeak are ever as forward to reſent the injuſtice of not being Credited, as they who give ear are that of being deceitfully and falſely inform'd. Now this being the natural and neceſſary compact eſtabliſh'd in Speech, upon which the right uſe of it is founded; it follows, that he who miſleads another by a Lye, does *ipſo Facto* break Faith and Covenant with his hearer; a Covenant mutually ſuppos'd and concluded, being always virtually, if not expreſly, executed by the one Party in the attention he craves, and by the other in the attention he gives. Lying therefore does perfidiouſly break this mutual truſt and obligation, and by the injuſtice and breach of truſt, tend to leſſen and defeat that joint reliance between Man and Man, upon which the true uſe of Speech depends; and I know not how we can well think bad enough of an evil, which we ſee daily tends to enfeeble both and truſt, and to looſen and crumble away that cement which holds the frame and conſtitution of Human Society together. But,

6. If Lying be not ſimply ſinful, in it ſelf, then it muſt be ſo, if at all, but by accident: obſerve then whither we are like to be by this conſequence; for what is not ſinful in it ſelf, but only by accident, muſt be

in

in its own Nature indifferent; and ſo, a being attended with evil Circumſtances i thereby becomes evil; ſo if we ſuppoſe i attended with good Circumſtances, than fo the ſame reaſon it becomes good; and the by this account there is no more harm i Lying, than there is in the ſimple uſe o Speech, which is neither good nor evil in i ſelf, but juſt according as we apply it: th next conſequence to this is, that provided Man does not Lye to do miſchief, he ma Lye as long as he pleaſes; it may then be a often requiſite for him to tell a Lye as th Truth, and he may propoſe to do as muc good by it as hurt; becauſe a Man may fu as often be ſerviceable to his Neighbour, b *Lying* for him, as by being True: Nay whe ever a probability preſents of doing a goo turn by it, 'twill be a Man's incumbent Du to Lye: for any thing that is indifferent in ſelf, ceaſes to be ſo, and becomes bindi upon our Conſciences, when we can turn to a good end and purpoſe: and if all th be once admitted, I do not ſee why a com mon Lyar, who is not maliciouſly and inj riouſly given, ſhould be eſteem'd ſo dirty an ſcandalous a Character. Such bleſſed infere ces as theſe muſt follow, upon our admittin a Lye to be upon any pretence innocent: it be allow'd and juſtified at all, there will b no end of it. As the train is laid, I do n ſee how we can ſafely venture to touch at

Ly

Lye in any point, but we muſt blow up the guilt of it to nothing; for what is indifferent in it ſelf, may be allow'd in harmleſs jeſting and diverſion; what may be permitted for our innocent diverſion, may alſo be allow'd for our juſt Conveniencies; and what we may do for our Conveniency, we may much more be admitted to do when we can propoſe any kind and good Office by it; and if it be *lawful* to Lye for the ſake of doing good, I am ſure in all ſuch Caſes it will be our incumbent *duty* to do it, and in conſcientiouſly ſcrupling at a Lye, we ſhall ſin againſt the Laws of Love and Charity. And now methinks the ſuppoſition of an innocent Lye begins to look dangerous; the conſequences of it are inſupportable; and there is no poſſibility to avoid them that I know of, but by turning about, and ſuppoſing a Lye to be ſimply and eſſentially evil, and then there is but this one certain and neceſſary concluſion to follow, which determines the whole Controverſie at a word, namely, *That it is upon no pretence or occaſion whatſoever allowable.*

7. It may ſerve to confirm this, and give countenance and authority, if we conſider, that ſome of the beſt Heathens did utterly deteſt Lying, as if by natural reaſon they had ſeen ſomething in it abſolutely and eſſentially evil. I do not ſay they were generally of this Opinion, no more than Chriſtians are; nor do I vouch that thoſe who were ſome-

times expreſly of this mind, were always conſiſtent and exact to the ſame; all I pretend to is, that there is an appearance of ſuch a Principle as this running thro' all their beſt Theology and Morals, from their very ancienteſt times; and ever now and then, ſhewing it ſelf in plain and open profeſſion: and I think it conſiderable enough for notice upon this argument, that right reaſon would often bolt out thro' all the corruption and darkneſs of its Natural State, and declare abſolutely againſt Lying. The Heathens in their earlieſt account, were wont to Sacrifice to old *Saturn* as the Tutelar God of *Truth*, with their heads quite bare; in token that they would at all times religiouſly and devoutly ſtand to the naked truth, without any covering or diſguiſe. And ſome of the beſt of their oldeſt Fables, ſhew what a ſacred regard they had for it, when they would chuſe rather to do the ſoreſt and deſperateſt things againſt their own inclinations, than refuſe to make good their words: *Agamemnon* would ſacrifice his fair and dear *Iphigenia*, *Neptune* the chaſt and innocent *Hypolitus*; and *Phœbus* would give up the Reins to *Phaeton*, and hazard firing and conſuming the whole World, rather than be guilty of receding from what they had ſaid.——But to come forward to more expreſs Authorities——I mention old *Homer* firſt; not that I build much upon the caſual ſtrains of a Poet;

a Poet; but however, this I think has been pretty juſtly obſerv'd of them, that if they have any ſentiments of morality correcter and better than ordinary, they commonly put them in the mouth of their Hero: thus then he raiſes the reſentment of *Achilles* againſt the deceits and wiles of *Ulyſſes*.

Ἐχθρὸς γάρ μοὶ κεῖνος ὁμῶς Ἀΐδαο πύλῃσιν, Iliad 8.
Ὅς ἕτερον μὲν κεύθει ἐνὶ φρεσίν, ἄλλο δὲ βάζει.

i. e. *That Man's mouth is as odious to me as the mouth of Hell, who is one thing in his heart, and another thing at his tongues end.* Among the Laws of *Solon*, this they ſay was one, *Do not Lye.* Even among the *Indians* it was look'd upon ſo deteſtable a thing, that *Philoſtratus* obſerves it was enough to deprive a Magiſtrate from being ever after capable of bearing Office, not only to be caught in a Lye himſelf, but to be groſly impos'd upon by another's Lye, becauſe they thought it deprav'd the Life of Man, and tended to the deſtruction of human Society. The *Egyptians* were ſo rigorouſly ſtrict in their Laws for Truth, that *Diodorus Siculus* ſays they would puniſh a Solemn Lye with death. The *Perſians* did not come ſhort of them in their ſeverity; they thought a Lye baſe and villanous enough to be anſwer'd for by the blood of him who told it. Thoſe People have been always fam'd for the diſcipline of

Diog. Laer. in Vit. Sol. In Vit. Ap. l. 2. c. 12.

l. 1.

their Youth; among other Points they conſtantly inculcated theſe three, as the Principal
Herod. Clio. things they were to learn: *To draw their Bow dexterouſly: To mount their Horſe gracefully*; and *Never to tell a Lye*. *Herodotus* adds, there were two things which they thought moſt ſhameful and abominable, but in effect they both ran into one: the ſhamefulleſt thing in the World was Lying; and the ſhamefulleſt next to that was to run in debt: and why? not that they thought it ſimply an Evil to owe Money, no; but he ſays
Ibid. their main reaſon for that was, becauſe *Debtors are under often and violent Temptations to be Lyars*. For the beſt Authors all agree they had an utter hatred and reſentment against Lying, beyond all other Vices: in this Hiſtorian's language it was eſteemed
De Inſt. Cyr. l. 3. τὸ ἄισχιστον, and by *Xenophon*'s account, τὸ ἐυμισητότατον; *the only thing which in their Opinion was out of all compariſon ſcandalous and deteſtable*. *Epaminondas* that Noble and Gallant *Theban*, will be famous to the World's end for being of this abſolute Principle againſt Lying, that he would never endure it, no not in jeſt. *Plutarch* re-
Vit. Ariſt. lates the like of *Ariſtides*, who, he ſays, was a Man of that fix'd and ſteady Vertue from Youth, that he would not admit of the leaſt falſhood or deceit, no not at his Play. And
Vit. Att. *Nepos* ſays of the Renowned *Atticus*, *Mendacium neque dicebat, neque pati poterat*

The

That he could not endure neither to tell a Lye, nor to hear one. And tho', as I ſaid, I lay no great ſtreſs upon the ſtrains of a Poet, and leaſt of all upon ſuch as are ſtruck out in the Dialogue of a Dramatick, yet that of *Sophocles* in *Cruſa* was ſo very remarkable, that moſt Writers on this Subject have thought it worthy their notice.

Καλὸν μὲν ἔν γε ἔξι τὰ ψευδῆ λέγειν·
Ὅταν δ' ὄλεθρον δεινὸν ἡ ἀλήθεια ἄγει,
Συγγνωστὸν εἰπεῖν ἔξι, ἢ τὸ μὴ καλόν.

It is by no means juſt and commendable to tell Lyes, when Truth brings with it the moſt inſupportable miſchief, then it can be but pardonable to Lye; but it can never be juſt and commendable——This I think was ſaid like a nice Caſuiſt: 'tis a very wiſe and judicious deciſion, it is that, and all that I am contending for. I confeſs *Plato* does upon ſome extream exigencies connive at Lying; and I believe his Authority has miſled many a good Author after him; becauſe they talk ſo often in his ſpecial phraſe and ſence; for it is remarkable enough, that he allows of Lying only in the nature of a *medicament*, to be uſed with Sick Men, and ſickly States; Phyſicians and Miniſters may now and then have recourſe to it, but none elſe.

Ἰατροῖς δοτέον, Ἰδιώταις δὲ οὐκ ἀπτέον. De Rep. l. 3.

Private Men muſt upon no account be allow'd

to take that liberty: it would in his Opinion be the very bane and deſtruction of the Commonwealth if they did. Such a dangerous thing he conceived a Lye was to be medled with, notwithſtanding that little toleration he gave it; and he grounds his reaſon upon the neceſſary uſe of Speech for the diſpatch of all buſineſs, which muſt be utterly defeated by Lying. Now when that great Author admits of Lying but juſt in the nature of a deſperate Medicine, he ſuppoſes the Caſe extream, and the application unnatural; if all things were ſound, and in order, as they ſhould be, it were to be utterly rejected; and therefore no great advantage can accrue from hence to the lawfulneſs of Lying. *Ariſtotle* the Diſciple of *Plato*, who us'd to keep cloſer to his Point than his Maſter, who waved all affectation of what might be prettily and probably offer'd, and preſs'd directly towards truth, and is ſeldom found to have more than one mind about the ſame thing; he is ſo nicely and patly deciſive to our purpoſe, that his very words are juſt the ſame thing I am contending for: I have cited the place already: καθ' ἀυτὸ τὸ μὲν ψεῦδος φαῦλον καὶ ψεκτόν. *A Lye is ſimply in it ſelf both evil and damnable.* And tho' *Tully*, when he harangues for the life of *Ligarius*, would inſinuate, that to ſave a Man by a Lye was to do it *honeſto & miſericordi mendacio*, yet this was only as Councel pleading

pleading for his Client, in which the general practice hath been, to try all things that may be ſaid for the Cauſe right or wrong; inſomuch that he himſelf, in his Oration for *Cluentius*, frankly gives us caution, *that we are vehemently miſtaken to think that all thoſe things are to be taken for his avowed underwritten Authorities, which are deliver'd in his Orations at the Bar.* But when he reaſons as a Philoſopher, a Caſuiſt in natural Religion, he talks after his judicious Friend *Aquilius*, and ſays, *ex omni vitâ ſimulatio & diſſimulatio tollenda eſt:* "Let all hypocriſie and diſ- "ſimulation be baniſh'd utterly out of Hu- "mane Society; which notwithſtanding the critical *crudè nimis* which *Grotius* reflected on it, was I think a very juſt and upright wiſh: and in general no Man more ſtrictly inculcated Truth and Sincerity than *Cicero.* As for *Seneca*, the main that I can learn from him is this, that he ſpeaks of *lighter* Lyes which deſerv'd a *ſlap on the mouth*, and of the greater ſort for which the Lyars *eyes were to be pluck'd out*, [*mendacia leviora in quibus os precidi non oculi erui ſolent*] but I do not remember any kind of Lying he would reckon wholly innocent. Indeed the doctrine of the *Stoicks* in general (if *Laertius*, *Stobæus*, and others who have wrote of them, may be credited) ran ſo high and abſolute againſt all Lying, that they reckon'd it unbecoming a wiſe Man to have ever the leaſt falſhood, deceit,

De Off. l. 3. De Jur. l. 3. c. 7.

Nat. Queſt. l. 4.

ceit or miſtake found in his words; nay the very utmoſt that *Plato* could ſay in this reſpect of *God*, they would have to be ſaid of *Wiſe Men*. *Plato*'s account of God I have already ſhewn was this, Ὅτε αὐτὸς μεθίσταται, Ὅτε ἄλλους ἐξαπατᾷ; and that which *Stobæus* ſays the *Stoicks* maintain'd of a *Wiſe Man* is exactly the ſame, Ὅτε ἐξαπατᾶται, Ὅτε ἐξαπατᾷ ἄλλον; the plain Engliſh of which paſſages put together is this, that herein a *Wiſe Man* ought to act up to the purity and perfection of *God*, and not endure either to be deceiv'd himſelf, or to deceive others on any pretence whatſoever.

Vid. *Gatak.* annot. in lib. 4. *M. Anton.* p. 178.

After this manner ran the correcteſt ſence of the wiſeſt Men among the Heathens, before Chriſtianity came to overſpread; and ſince that, the very worſt of Tyrants have now and then been wrought up to a ſtrange admiration of firm and immoveable Fidelity. Witneſs for one inſtance, that memorable relation concerning *Firmus Biſhop of Tagaſta*: who having undertaken to conceal a Perſon under proſecution; when the Officers came to demand of him where he was, he return'd them this anſwer, *That he could not tell a Lye to deny the Man, and that he would not be ſo baſe as to betray him.* They try'd to extort it from him upon the Rack, but he bore all with a mute and ſturdy conſtancy: at length they brought him to the Emperor, who, as ſevere a Pagan as he was,

could

could not but ſtand amaz'd at the virtue and firmneſs of the holy Prelate: inſomuch that he acquitted him with honour, and ſent liberty to the Man whom he had ſo generouſly protected. And now, if natural reaſon would ſo frequently take occaſion to break out, and ſhine thro' all the corruptions of Heatheniſm, with ſo propitious an eye upon abſolute Sincerity and Truth, and give ſo many ſevere looks, and ſhew ſuch utter indignation againſt the Sin of Lying, this muſt help confirm us that there is evil inherent and eſſential in it, which no excuſe whatever can intirely do away.

8. My laſt Argument for this is, That Lying is ſimply and utterly forbidden by God; which after all muſt be our ſure and determining Rule of Conſcience. Theſe and ſuch like are the expreſſions of the Old Teſtament: *Lying Lips are an abomination to the Lord. The Lord ſhall deſtroy them that ſpeak Lyes; and all falſe ways he utterly abhors.* And when *Solomon* bids us *buy the Truth*, he means it may now and then perhaps coſt us pretty dear, nevertheleſs he would have no conſideration of that kind, part us from ſo precious a bargain; and again, *ſell it not.* We may often fancy our intereſt vaſtly concern'd to recede a little from the Truth, but it is his Opinion that we miſtake our true intereſt if ever we do; his meaning is, that for no advantage in the world, tho' never ſo

conſider-

conſiderable, ſhould we allow our ſelves to tell a Lye: it is utterly againſt his Mind that Truth ſhould ever become mercenary. In the New Teſtament the *Lyar* is joyned with the *Devil*: *he is a Lyar, and the Father of it.* In the ſame place *Lyars* are repreſented the very Spawn of the Devil: *Ye are of your Father the Devil, and the Luſts of your Father ye will do: he was a murtherer from the beginning, and abode not in the Truth, becauſe there is no Truth in him.* In the *Revelations* it is ſaid, that *all Lyars have their part in the Lake which burneth with Brimſtone, which is the ſecond death.* Beſides ſeveral plain and poſitive Precepts againſt the Sin by way of Exhortation: and in all the Cenſures and Condemnations iſſued out againſt it in Scripture, this one thing is to be obſerv'd, that they are peremptory, and abſolute, without Condition, if Circumſtances were allow'd to alter the Caſe, methinks 'tis ſtrange that none of thoſe Texts ſhould be deliver'd with any expreſs proviſion for that purpoſe: 'tis much the Divine Spirit ſhould no where ſay, *thou ſhalt not Lye but upon a very innocent and good occaſion*; but if the word of God does no where give of it ſelf, I am ſure we cannot venture to *ſtretch*, but we muſt *break* it. From all theſe Conſiderations taken together, I am firmly perſuaded, *that evil and guilt is ſo eſſentially and ſimply inherent in the very nature of a Lye,*

John 8. 44.

that

that it is in no caſe and upon no pretence whatſoever allowable and ſafe in point of Conſcience, to have recourſe to it.

SECT. III.

Whether there be any Caſes to be excepted.

NEvertheleſs there are one or two Caſes which partly from Cuſtom, and partly from Expediency, may be thought exempt from this general Notion; and therefore it may not be amiſs to ſay ſomething particularly upon them.

1. It may be queſtion'd whether, notwithſtanding the ſimple eſſential evil of Lying, an *Advocate* may not be allow'd to offer things in the way of Pleading, which he believes are falſe? In anſwer to this, we muſt ſuppoſe he does it with a deſign to have them paſs for true, becauſe as far as any thing ſhall *appear* to be fallaciouſly ſaid, ſo far the Cauſe ſuffers, and is foil'd, inſtead of being defended: weak and wrong proofs are back friends in an Argument, under pretence of aſſiſting they utterly defeat and ruine it. If then they are offer'd, as it muſt be ſuppos'd, with a deſign and proſpect to have them credited, they come up to the nature and guilt of compleat and finiſh'd Lying, which conſiſts in uttering things which we believe to be falſe on purpoſe to deceive; and

and I cannot think there is any thing in the manner of doing this, as Councel at the Bar, ſave Cuſtom only, that can give it any favourable gloſs. What is offer'd there, ought to be ſaid with more ſolemnity than our ordinary Diſcourſe, and therefore with the more ſincerity; and it being ſaid in matters relating to the deciſion of Juſtice, either Civil or Criminal; therefore if it take any effect at all, it muſt have the effect and end of a *pernicious* or injurious Lye; it muſt be in defence of the offending Party, the juſt and innocent cannot need it; and to defend the unjuſt or guilty, is, to ſay no worſe, to be a little unfortunate in our retainment. *Solomon* ſays ſomething more, *He that juſtifieth the Wicked, and he that condemneth the Juſt, are both alike abomination to the Lord*; but he who ſtands up heartily to carry a bad Cauſe, does both at once; ſo that the very Undertaking it ſelf is doubly abominable; and when falſe and deceitful meaſures muſt be made uſe of in order to it, there is no end of the abomination; to put a lying flouriſh upon a lame title, is to make the Cauſe and the Pleading of a piece; it is *drawing Iniquity with Cords of Vanity*; and like *David*'s bringing off Adultery by Murther. To ſet up for Councel in the Laws is a very honourable Profeſſion, but to manage it without honour, is a pretty odd way of proving it ſo. It perverts and overthrows the

the right end and uſe of it; for the conſtant inveſtigation of Juſtice is after Truth; but falſehoods and fallacies are very unlikely things to ſet the Court right, as I ſaid, if they are offer'd with any intent at all, in all likelihood it muſt be an unjuſt one, and therefore to ſignifie any thing they muſt prove pernicious and injurious, and conſequently partake of the very worſt ſort of Lying; which is what we ſhould not have recourſe to for the ſake of God himſelf, much leſs for a Client; evil meaſures muſt not be taken for a good Cauſe, but leaſt of all for that which is moſt likely to need them.

2. Quere, Whether Kings and Supream Rulers are bound up to the ſame ſtrict ſincerity in their words and ſignifications, as private Men? In a thing eſſentially and ſimply ſinful, I cannot ſee how any juſtification can be made for their being otherwiſe, unleſs God will judge Princes by a different Rule and Law, from that which every private Chriſtian expects to be try'd by: *Grotius*, one would think, imagin'd ſome ſuch thing, when he admits *that Supream Rulers* [*Qui jus habent ſupereminens in omnia jura alterius*,] *may lawfully Lye to their Inferiors.* Indeed Kings, as ſuch, are not to be conſider'd as particular and private Men, but as whole Nations; and ſo, what they do in their Political or Regal Capacity, may poſſibly

ſibly be judg'd hereafter by the Law of Nations; and this may ſerve to acquit them of a great many State devices, from which they could not be ſo eaſily acquitted by the Law of Chriſt. But Superiority after all, is no juſt privilege for Lying. The Supream himſelf does not pretend to it: and therefore it muſt be a very prophane preſumption for any Ru'er on Earth to claim it under him: his Vicegerents muſt not think to uſurp that for a Prerogative, which he cannot diſpence with or endure in himſelf. There can be no colour for juſtifying them in ſuch ignoble Arts, when they make them the means of incroaching and invading upon the Dominions of other Princes, for to break out of bounds is of it ſelf inhumane, unleſs we meaſure humanity by *Hobs* his ſtate of Nature; Therefore Lying and Perfidiouſneſs, when made ſubſervient to that end, can admit of no poſſible defence, unleſs we go again from the *Bible* to the *Leviathan*, and ſay, *that Power irreſiſtible will juſtifie any thing*. Luſt of Dominion had need work *exorbitantly* upon the paſſions of a Prince to carry him on, when he conſiders how much diſhonourable, dirty, and ſcandalous work muſt be daſtard thro' to enlarge it; 'twould quite confound one to think, how one Man (for a Monarch is but a Man) can be made capable of enduring miſery enough to ſatisfie Divine Juſtice for a Reign of fifty Years, devoted altogether to falſehood,

falſehood, treachery, rapine, perſecution, and blood. Surely there can be ſcarce any middle Condition hereafter in the lot of Princes; they muſt be *Chiefs*, whether in Heaven or Hell. And as the very Angels will make way above for a King, who has taken all the meaſures of his Government by the Rules of Juſtice and Religion, and acquitted himſelf a wiſe and watchful Guardian of his People; ſo *Lucifer* himſelf will ſtand ready beneath, to embrace and welcome a deſcending Power, who has kept contending, and ſtrugling, and vexing away a whole Age in fruitleſs contrivances and attempts to inſult and over-run the World. If ambition for *Univerſal Empire* on high, made *him* fall ſupream in damnation, methinks a like ambition and thirſt for *Univerſal Monarchy* on Earth, muſt give ſuch a Prince a pretty good claim to be near him: the Arch-Fiend muſt needs be raviſh'd in horrour, at the approach of ſo conſiderable an image and reſemblance of himſelf. But then, how far other Princes may practice in the crooked arts of diſſimulation and Lying, to traverſe and defeat the purpoſes of ſuch a power, whether they may obſtruct by the ſame falſe meaſures wherewith they are invaded, and uſe the ſame unfair tools to countermine, by which they are undermin'd, is a nicer point; and perhaps the unfitteſt in the world to be determin'd in this diſcourſe, wherein

wherein I have put my ſelf under the abſo-
lute government of this ſtiff and inflexible
Principle, that *Lying is intrinſically, ſimply and*
eſſentially Sinful.

3. Quere, Whether it be lawful to make
uſe of Lying and unſincerity againſt an
Enemy in time of War? Now tho' this were
too ſtubborn and unruly a queſtion to take a
fair anſwer, yet it could give no countenance
at all to the practice of it, among Men in a
ſtate of Society and Peace; it is ſufficient to
tye up our tongues from one another, in
that 'tis ſimply unlawful as long as we live
in friendſhip and union, until we come to
profeſs'd and open hoſtility, it is not made the
queſtion.

Again, War is ſuch a lawleſs and inhu-
mane State, that many have diſputed whe-
ther it be lawful in it ſelf; and there is but
one caſe that I know of, wherein we can be
certain, without a revelation, that it is: and
that is in our own neceſſary defence and ſe-
rity. And this will ſerve to reſolve the
Quere before us, beyond all doubt, as far as
it regards at leaſt the one half of all the Bat-
tles and Hoſtilities in which the World ei-
ther has been, or can be embroil'd; for what-
ſoever is unlawful in time of Peace, we may
be ſure will be no leſs ſo in an unrighteous
War: wicked Ends, and unjuſt Cauſes, can
never ſanctifie unlawful meaſures.

But take the difficulty where it bears hardeſt; ſuppoſe we are confident, paſt ſcruple, that the War we are engag'd in is juſt and unavoidable; yet ſtill I believe I ſtand upon a firm Principle; and therefore am the more forward to aſſert, that Lying is utterly diſallowable in a righteous War; nay farther, that we ought not to break Faith even with Pyrates and Robbers: if we once conſent to Treat and Capitulate with them, and there are terms agreed on by both Parties, it is unjuſt on either ſide to recede: in ſuch a Caſe there is alſo a ſort of confidence renew'd between them and us, and then we cannot Lye, but we muſt be guilty of breach of truſt: It may be pleaded, that we are violently threatned and urg'd to ſpeak againſt our minds; but if to ſay one thing, and think another, be ſimply ſinful, we ought to endure the worſt rather than be guilty. If to ſave our ſelves from ſufferings were a juſt excuſe for evil doings, there would be little or nothing in all the paſſive Vertues of Religion. Beſides, what ſuch deſperate Villains make us ſay, they commonly make us ſwear; and then we muſt remember that we become bound not only to Man, but to God himſelf; and ſo, tho' we could ſuppoſe our ſelves *ipſo facto* loos'd from the former bond, yet the latter muſt hold us faſt.

After this there can be no room for queſtioning, if we muſt keep Faith with Enemies

in a fair War: for we know there are Laws depending even in Arms; and there are *rights of War as well as Peace.* And the principal end of a righteous War ought to be for bringing about a Peace that may be ſecure and laſting. In order to this, the ſtricteſt regard imaginable ought to be had to that, which alone can be the proper and effectul means for that end, which is the preſervation of a mutual Faith and Honour; without which nothing but miſtruſt, and diſtance, and defiance ſhall paſs between the hoſtile Parties; and they can never come to treat, becauſe they have no foundation for confiding in one another. Generous Enemies are ſtill to remember, that they are dealing with Men; and that the accidents of War ought not to take away all the common rights and relations of Nature. The Vertuous Heathens had always a due reſpect to this reflection; inſomuch that when *Camillus* went out againſt the *Faliſci*, he declar'd he would ſtill maintain that Society and Friendſhip with them, which was inbred in Humane Nature: the firſt and fundamental Principle of which is, To be true and faithful to the confidence we repoſe in one another; which confidence even profeſs'd Enemies do crave and give, as often as they have any intercourſe by any known ſignificant words or ſigns; and conſequently to make them inſtrumental of any falſe and deceitful dealing

Livy.

dealing, is ſinful and injurious, and done in breach of that eſtabliſh'd compact, which is always ſuppos'd depending in the right uſe of Speech. Indeed ſuch great and weighty Conſequences attend the fidelity of our expreſſions in War, that Military Overtures require the ſtricteſt and ſevereſt honour, and there ſhould be ſomething more ſolemn in our *Parole*, than our bare *word*.

All the buſineſs and work of a Caſuiſt here, is to diſtinguiſh between ſuch words and ſigns as have their certain and ſtated ſignifications known and agreed on by all, and ſuch arbitrary voices and geſtures whoſe ſignification is not determin'd to any thing certain and ſpecial whereon we are to depend, but is variable at the diſcretion of him who uſes them. For,

Of theſe latter ſort, which are in our own power and breaſt, and upon which there is no mutual underſtanding or agreement, nor conſequently any certain truſt depending as to their ſignification, we may for that reaſon make the beſt uſe we can, there being no fix'd and proper meanings imply'd in them, but being precarious and diſcretionary, we do not deal perfidiouſly to turn them in the diſpute to what account we may; and this will give *Generals* ſufficient ſcope for all the fair Arts and Conducts of War. For as it is no foul play in *Wreſtlers* to make ſham trips, and deluding offers, in order to

come in upon the Antagoniſt; nor in *Sword-Men*, after they are aware, to make falſifies, and dazles, and deceitful throws, to draw one another from their guard, becauſe all ſuch are arbitrary kinds of offers, whereby no truſt is intended, but juſt the contrary; ſo neither is it diſallowable by the Laws of Arms, but the Wiſdom and Conduct of Commanders, to make uſe of feints and ſtratagems, ſemblances and amuſements, intrigues and ambuſcades, ſimulation and diſſimulation, or any Arts of ſurprize or force to get the day; provided they do not miſapply any ſuch words or ſigns to deceive, which have their certain and avowed ſignifications; and which by cuſtom and common uſage beſpeak truſt and confidence on both ſides. For, as for thoſe other arbitrary voices or motions, which are not determin'd to a meaning, we are ſo far from breaking faith or truſt by turning them to an account, that the Enemy is aware he is not to rely upon them, he knows they are intended to enſnare him, and that they carry no other certain meaning with them; ſuch diſcretionary Crafts are only the facilitation of force, and force is the main thing declar'd and look'd for: and if the Foe will take an occaſion to decypher the Characters, and unfold the doublings of an Adverſaries Mind, out of ſuch crafty amuſements, when he knows at the ſame time they are ſo far from being in-

tended

tended to ſerve him in it, that it is juſt the contrary; it is his own fault, we are in no caſe bound to explain to all the world, what we mean by every arbitrary ſound or geſture we uſe; and therefore much leſs are we bound to do it in War, becauſe the obligations of Civility, Friendſhip, and Charity, which in a State of Peace would with-hold us from taking any diſcretionary freedom to a Neighbours diſappointment or defeat, have no ſuch force or tye upon us in a ſtate of Hoſtility.

But then for the former ſort of words and ſigns, we were ſpeaking of, which have their certain and ſtated ſignifications, known and agreed on by all, and which, by conſtant uſe and cuſtom, are become the proper means of conveying ſuch and ſuch particular thoughts from us, and conſequently by which we are mainly capable of being concern'd in Lying:; theſe are in all caſes, and I may ſay eſpecially in War to be made uſe of with the niceſt Faith and Honour. Lying is a provoking injuſtice among Friends, but it may be barbarouſly unjuſt between Enemies. When therefore you call out by any *expreſs words*, that crave for credit, or when you make *overtures* to be truſted by any known ſigns or tokens, which either by compact, inſtitution, or conſtant uſage, are made ſignificant inſtruments for conveying your minds; in all ſuch caſes you are bound

by all the Sacred Laws of God, of Nature, and of Nations, to let them ſignifie your true ſence and intent, and to let your actions be conformable to your pretences. For Inſtance, when you ſend your *Herauld*, or *Trumpeter*; when you beat a *Chamade*, or ſound a *Parly*, or ſhew out your *White Flag*, or make any known intelligent ſign to be truſted, who queſtions whether you ought to be true and punctual to your propoſal, and to treat with ſincerity and honour? all Acts of falſehood and perfidiouſneſs take up their wonted name and guilt, and every deceitful untruth offer'd, is the very baſeſt and worſt of Lying.

This is ſuch a known avowed Doctrine, *that Faith, as far as we profeſs it, is to be kept ſacred with our Enemies*; that general conſent and the neceſſity of the thing have left no room to draw it into diſpute; and therefore brave Enemies have as much ſignaliz'd their Honour in War, by inſtances of their Faith and Sincerity, as of their Courage. When *Regulus* was ſurpriz'd and taken by the *Carthaginians*, in the firſt Punick War, and ſent to the *Roman* Senate to treat about exchanges, tho' in the Senate he gave his own Advice and Vote againſt the Propoſal he brought, yet having left his Parole with the Enemy to return, he came back and ſurrender'd himſelf at *Carthage*, with a peremptory refuſal of what they ſent him to

Negotiate,

Negotiate, tho' he knew he had nothing but a barbarous end to look for; and it is ſaid they cut off his Eye-lids, and roll'd him to death in a Cask ſtruck full of Nails; yet this was more eligible to the gallant Conſul, than the diſgrace of breaking his word. *Tully* tells us, that when *Themiſtocles* made an offer to the *Athenian* Senate, of burning the Enemie's Fleet by Stratagem, while they were in the Port of *Gytheum*, they ſent the Philoſopher *Ariſtides*, to examine him by what device he would do it; he came back, and told them, that the Expedient look'd feaſible enough, but it would not look upright and honourable; upon this they were ſo far from approving it, that they would not have the patience to hear what it was: ſaying, *Quod honeſtum non eſſet, id ne utile quidem putaverunt*; "That could be "no advantage at all, which was not an ho"nourable one. The *Romans* would, ever now and then, give aſtoniſhing proofs of their faithfulneſs in War; they dealt all along upon honour, even with the inſidious, falſe *Carthaginian*; inſomuch that when a Priſoner eſcap'd him but by an Equivocation, they took care to ſend him back again with diſgrace; and in the opinion of all brave Men, *Hannibal* loſt more honour by his perfidious faithleſs dealing, than he ever won by the ſucceſſes of his Conduct. 'Twas a ſmart reflection of *Valerius*, *Bellum adverſus Italiam* De Off. l. 3.

liam profeſſus, adverſus ipſam fidem acriu
geſſit; "He declared War againſt *Italy*, bu
"he waged it with all his fury againſt Faith
"and Honour. For which reaſon we may
remark, the *Lord of Hoſts* would not let him
go off in Triumph, his end was inglorious.
And when *Homer* undertakes to ſtrike the
Trojans with a conſcious ſence of their mi
fortunes, it is obſervable he does not forget
to make them reflect remorſefully upon their
violations of Military Faith and Honour;
Νῦν δ' ὅρκια πιϛὰ ϕευσάμενοι μαχόμεσθα——
We have fought like Lyars, perjur'd Lyars;
hinc illæ lacrymæ!——*Troy* was extinguiſh'd
by the *Græcian*, and *Carthage* by the *Roma*
Powers: Not ſo much I believe by being
out-done by the arts and diligences of War,
but by depending too much upon the de
vices of falſehood and treachery, which
may take now and then for the preſent, bu
never hold out to be crown'd with comple
ſucceſs. And if I had no other light to di
vine by, methinks I could venture from thi
one Omen, to make a pretty confident pre
ſage, that the prevailing exorbitant Powe
which now troubles *Europe*, muſt and wi
down; it fetches large and heavy ſtride
upon unſound and hollow ground, upon th
foundations of deceit and perfidiouſnes
which may bear to be trod lightly over, fo
a ſtep or two, but when it comes to be in
ſiſted on, and preſs'd with great ſtreſs an
oppo

oppoſition, it will be apt to give way. Providence, as indifferent as it may ſeem to ſit over the ordinary Affairs of this World, ſeldom fails to ſtep in between contending Powers, and give it againſt thoſe who make uſe of treachery and foul play, by a deciſion that ſhall be remarkable enough to ſtand for a warning; and perhaps the greateſt ſingle blow the Chriſtian Cauſe ever receiv'd, may be mention'd as one inſtance of this; I mean the Battle of *Varnes*, which *Ladiſlaus* King of *Hungary* loſt to the Grand Seignior *Amurat*: He was of himſelf a very proſperous and hopeful young Prince, but having made a ſolemn League of Peace with the Sultan, he was by too much eaſineſs prevail'd upon, at the inſtance of Cardinal *Julien*, to take the Field againſt him again, without the leaſt freſh provocation; and becauſe he ſcrupled at the obligation of his League and Oath to the contrary, that was all made void by the authority of the *Holy See*. The injur'd *Turk*, in the heat of the Battle, loudly exclaim'd againſt the violation of a Treaty ſo ſolemnly and religiouſly made: he call'd Heaven and Earth to witneſs, and conjur'd the Higheſt to judge between them: In the paſſion of his remonſtrance, he appeal'd to *Jeſus Chriſt* himſelf, and vow'd he could not be ſuch a God-like Being as the *Chriſtians* believ'd and repreſented him, if he did not revenge the contempt and blaſphemy

that

that was offer'd to his Sacred Name, to be vok'd upon Oaths and Treaties, to which his Votaries had ſo little regard. In concluſion, the total overthrow of the Chriſtians, and the death of the King, and of the Cardinal Legate, upon the ſpot the ruine of the *Hungarian* Kingdom, and of the *Græcian* Empire which follow'd; and, as the conſequence of this, the vaſt progreſs that was made after that by the *Ottoman* Arms, may be allow'd to make a pretty exemplary admonition, *That Faith out to be kept with the worſt of Enemies*; and that Heaven will have Truth and Juſtice done, tho' the cauſe of Heaven ſink under it; and let the moral of that unfortunate Prince his Epitaph, plain as it is, be read with a ſerious regard, *Diſcite mortales non temerare fidem.* To conclude, Faith and Honour ſhould bind and determine us at all times, but in War more eſpecially; not only becauſe the injuries of falſehood in ſuch caſes are likely to be the moſt fatal and irretrievable, but becauſe if Enemies once entred upon hoſtilities, are to abandon all truth and truſt to one another, it is unconceivable how they ſhould ever come to capitulate for Peace; no end can be put to the diſpute, but on one ſide or other it muſt be an utter end.

We muſt then, you ſee, have a devout reſpect to Truth and Sincerity in War; and therefore there can be no imaginable caſe of

pretence

pretence, wherein we may be allow'd to Lye. 'Twill be ſaid that at this rate, an upright Man has a hard Chapter on't, and Knaves will very often have him at mercy; but to this I ſhall only reply at preſent, that when Lying is made appear to be ſimply and abſolutely evil, it ſuppoſes that all alike are bound to forbear it. This Principle of it ſelf gives no advantages at all to one Man more than another; it directs how humane Society ought to be diſpos'd, without making any allowance for the condition in which it is; and if Knaves will break off all the ties of Vertue and Honour, and Lye, they ſhall one time or other ſmart for it; and Men of Integrity muſt ſit down contented with this comfort, That if juſt and fair dealing lays them under ſome preſent inconveniencies; beſides the recompence of a quiet Conſcience, and very probably larger advantages in long run here, they are ſure it will turn to their account with infinite amends hereafter. If they are righteous upon Conſcience they muſt believe this; and if they do, there is no need of urging them to be ſatisfied.

To finiſh this Head——As I do from my ſoul believe the Principle I have been eſtabliſhing, to be founded upon the ſoundeſt and cleareſt reaſon, ſo I am perſuaded it has the beſt claim to that, which can be the only prevalent pretence, that has retain'd the

the generality on the other ſide; I mean the benefit and relief of Mankind; for tho' a kind and charitable Office may now and then be done by Lying, yet infinitely more advantages would accrue from our reſolutions never to Lye at all: ſo that if we compounded to give up the pretended ſervices that may be brought about for our friends and ſelves by the unmalicious ſorts of Lying, for the ſake of the many real and inexpreſſible good conſequences that would follow from our ſtrict and inviolable adherence to the truth, humane Society would be no loſer by the ratification of ſuch an exchange. Whereas, on the other hand, I have yet this main prudential exception to make againſt giving any allowances to Lying, That by admitting it lawful in ſome Caſes, we open ſuch a wide gap for the ſallies of a deceitful Mind, that there will be no knowing where to reſtrain them. The greateſt part of Men want no inclination to deceive, if they can but find pretence; and what pretence can they want, if they may lawfully Lye in all caſes, but ſuch as it would be actionable to appear in? which many will eaſily perſwade themſelves they may, if once they are allow'd the liberty in all, but injurious Caſes. How many ſecret Frauds and Extortions will this connivence encourage them to bring about by Lying? how much Sycophantiſm,

phantiſm, and Flattery? how much Calumny, Tale-bearing, and Detraction? there will be no end of the ſubtile encroaching Evil, if we once let it looſe with ſo ample a Commiſſion in the beginning.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Of the Cauſes and Inducements to Lying.

SInce it has appear'd, I hope, by the reſult of what has paſt, that 'tis ſimply and utterly unlawful to tell a Lye; I will ſet my ſelf now to enquire,

III. *How this Sin comes notwithſtanding to be ſo notoriouſly practiſed? and to eſcape from us ſo lightly and unregretfully as it does?* which is the ſubſtance of my third Propoſal, *viz. To conſider ſome of the many Cauſes and Inducements, whence Men come to be ſo generally and notoriouſly given up to Lying.* And herein I am in the right courſe to my main aim and end; for it is one very neceſſary ſtep toward the reducing any evil, to take notice from what temptations it ariſes: Juſt as a Phyſician, in order to deal effectually with a Diſeaſe, not only obſerves the Symptoms, for they are obvious, but endeavours to follow and trace it up to the faulty cauſe in the conſtitution from which it ſprings: or as he who undertakes to divert and drain an overflowing inundation (to which Lying as it now prevails, may more fitly be compared) muſt caſt about and diſcover all the

Springs

Springs and Rivulets, and falls of Water, that are confluent to the ſwelling evil. Now ſeveral things are remarkable for cauſes and inducements to the general practice of this Sin, which I ſhall conſider and reflect on in ſuch a manner as may be moſt uſeful to give you caution againſt them. And,

1*ſt*, 'Tis to be fear'd the Sin of Lying was by the ſpecial inſinuation of the Devil, carefully and deeply leaven'd into our Natures, when firſt deprav'd at the Fall; 'twas by a Lye the Serpent brought that matter to bear; and finding it upon trial ſuch an apt invention for miſchief, no doubt he took effectual meaſures to impart the talent among us, that we might upon occaſion try the like practices with it upon one another: and ſo as Mankind increas'd, the Lye went about, and no Sin perhaps has more univerſally gain'd upon the Minds of Men, and is a ſurer ſign and proof that we are fallen, than this. God made our Underſtandings ſtreight, direct, and true, but Lying ſhews how miſerably they have ſince been bent, and warp'd, and crooked. *God made Man upright*, but this is one of the many wicked *inventions he has ſought out*, from the example of the Devil. To this purpoſe I have often took notice of a certain paſſage which St. *Paul* wrote to the *Epheſians*, [c. iv. *v.* 17. 22, 23, 24.] where counſelling them *that they henceforth walk not as other Gentiles walk, in*

in the vanity of their mind,——but *that th*
put off, concerning the former converſatio
the old man, which is corrupt, according to t
deceitful luſts; and be renewed in the ſpir
of their mind, and that they put on t
new man, which after God is created in right
ouſneſs, and true holineſs; when he comes t
put them into the ready method how the
ſhould begin and compaſs this great chang
of life, the firſt and principal thing he min
them of is this, *v.* 25. *Wherefore putting aw*
Lying, ſpeak every man truth with his Neighbou
Which being put together, is as much as if h
had ſaid, there is not a truer token of th
degeneracy and corruption of our fallen N
tures, after the example of old *Adam*, tha
our being ſo wretchedly given up to chea
and to be cheated by Lying; nor on th
other hand, is there a ſurer and nearer wa
to recover that divine and pure principle
underſtanding, and likewiſe that new an
upright frame of heart, in which Man w
originally form'd after the image of Go
and by which the divine reſemblance and
militude is to be reſtor'd, than by an abſ
lute adherence to Truth. And either *An*
ninus muſt have met with ſome Chriſti
account of the great lapſe of Man, or elſe
was ſtrangely lucky in his notion, how w
came originally to be ſo propenſe and pro
to Lying, as to do it not only wilfully, b
often againſt our wills; and eſpecially in i

puti

puting the guilt of our involuntary Lying ſo much like a Divine, when he ſays, Ἀφορμὰς γὰρ προσειλήφει παρὰ τῆς φύσεως, ὧν ἀμελήσας, οὐχ οἷός τέ ἐστι νῦν διακρίνειν τὰ ψευδῆ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀληθῶν. L. 9. i. e. *For Man was at firſt endow'd by God, with preventing grace, ſufficient to have kept him right; but by neglecting thoſe aids and advantages which Heaven inform'd him with, he has now brought himſelf to that paſs, that he has quite loſt the teſt of Truth, and can hardly tell when he is right and when wrong.* Now all that needs be ſaid in the way of a reflection upon this is, That if we think 'twill be for the dignity of our Natures, to ſhift off the depraved habits of Sin which we have taken up after the faſhion of fallen *Adam*, and be reform'd again after the pattern of that primitive and perfect Man, which God drew for an image of himſelf, a copy of his own Original; we muſt reſolve to begin the renovation, and the change, by putting away this degenerate and deviliſh habit of Lying. But primitive corruption is a remote Cauſe to look back upon——To touch us therefore a little nearer,——

2. I am apt to think many take heart and encouragement, that Lying cannot be ſuch an eſſential and egregious an evil, from the conſideration that there are ſeveral inſtances of it in Scripture, which ſeem to be countenanced and approv'd. I ſhall not pretend to

mention every particular caſe, but only the moſt remarkable and notorious, and if I can get you to be ſatisfied about them, the leſs liable ones can be no let to your integrity. 'Tis confeſs'd then that we find an inſtance or two of Lying in the three great *Patriarchs* of the old Teſtament; it was practis'd by the *Hebrew Midwives*, and the commendable Harlot *Rahab*. Some have ſtuck at a place or two in the Goſpel; and many have taken offence at St. *Paul*'s odd reply before the Jewiſh Council. Let us now Animadvert upon theſe Exceptions.

The Caſes of the *Patriarchs* were theſe; *Abraham* being juſt entring into *Egypt* with the lovely *Sarai*, and not knowing what inconvenience her Beauty might bring upon him, he put this deceitful Tale into her mouth; *Say I pray thee that thou art my Siſter, that it may be well with me for thy ſake.* *Iſaac* told juſt ſuch another Story, when he came with his fair *Rebekah* to dwell in *Gerar*, and *Rebekah* drew *Jacob* into a combination, to return the Lye back upon *Iſaac* in his old age very unhappily, in their intrigue to ſupplant *Eſau*. 'Tis like ſhe might not think ſo hainouſly of the Sin, after ſhe took notice her righteous Lord would upon occaſion have recourſe to it: Example, coming from ſuch Authority, works eaſily upon a frail and tender mind. As for *Jacob*, how well he kept his countenance and his tale the ſucceſs

ſucceſs ſhew'd; he made the Cheat, deſperate and groſs as it was, go down with the dark old Man whether he would or no: he came ſo compleatly furniſh'd for forcing the deceit upon him, that the Lye ſat rough, not only upon his tongue, but on his hands, and about his neck; the venerable *Sire* not only heard, but felt it, and how confidently and ſturdily did he ſtand it out to the laſt? *Art thou my very Son Eſau?* and he ſaid, *I am.*

And now, what effect ſuch Precedents as theſe may have upon unwary minds, it being in a Matter about which Men are prone to be miſled, is but too obvious, many think that any thing they read remarkable in the Character of a great Perſon in Sacred Story, is written for their imitation right or wrong: and who could wiſh to be more colourably juſtified in what they do, than to have the Example and Authority of the moſt holy *Patriarchs* to bear them out?

But come near, and there is little true ſhelter for Lying under the ſhadow of this pretence. I know ſome have attempted to bring off *Abraham* clear, for he gave out that *Sarai* was his Siſter, and ſo in truth ſhe was: and the *Patriarch* himſelf laid ſo much ſtreſs upon this, that he gave it to *Sarai* for her conſtant *Cue*. *This is thy kindneſs which thou ſhalt ſhew me, at every place whither*

we ſhall come, ſay of me he is my Brother, and this Artifice they plaid over again with *Abimelech*; and when he came to charge it home upon *Abraham* in theſe words, *what ſayſt thou that thou haſt done this thing?* in truth he had little to ſay, but only that there was ſome foundation for ſuch a Tale too, tho' it was far enough from being the thing which it mainly concern'd him to ſpeak out. Said he, *And yet indeed ſhe is my Siſter, ſhe is the Daughter of my Father, but not the Daughter of my Mother; and ſhe became my Wife.* Now upon this we may remark two things: Firſt, that this was a meer *mental reſervation* in *Abraham*, with the remoteſt account only expreſs'd, on purpoſe to conceal the principal thing in demand: for by ſaying ſhe was his Siſter, he deſign'd to make believe ſhe was not his Wife: which comes up cloſe to the guilt of a Lye. Next I obſerve, that *Abimelech* himſelf, tho' an Alien from the People of God, did yet from the pure reaſon of the thing, impute this prevarication to *Abraham* as evil, and that with ſome warmth and reſentment. *Abimelech call'd Abraham, and ſaid What haſt thou done unto us? and what have I offended thee, that thou haſt brought upon me and my Kingdom a great Sin? thou haſt done deeds that ought not to be done.* And if it was unqueſtionably ſinful in *Abraham*, beſure the ſame was ſo in *Iſaac*; for he had not ſo much

much as a double meaning to bring him off. Then as for the Plot of *Jacob* and *Rebekah*, there was in the management of that ſo much deliberate deceit and lying, that 'tis in vain to think of colouring or ſweetning away the guilt of it, by any favourable interpretation.

And now what is moſt natural for us to remark and infer from ſuch Caſes as theſe? ſhall we take heart from them and ſay, Surely if thoſe ancient Worthies in Religion, ſo renowned and recorded for their Piety in the word of God, did yet upon occaſion indulge themſelves to Lye, much more may we, after ſuch great Examples, and be innocent? But, I ſay, God forbid! the juſteſt and holieſt Men that ever liv'd, can give no warrantable authority from their practice, to make any thing lawful, which in it ſelf is ſinful. No, but if we have no mind to part with ſuch inſtances without ſome animadverſion, we may reflect upon them after this manner. Well, I ſee the greateſt and beſt of Men have now and then had their failings; and how wondrous ſincere has the Sacred Hiſtory been, in not diſſembling and concealing them? but ſurely it has given us their Lives juſt as they were, with no leſs intent that we ſhould avoid what was blameable in them, than that we ſhould follow them in what was praiſe worthy: for to copy after ſuch Originals right or

wrong, would be an indiſcreet and ſervile imitation. But if we are reſolv'd that Lying muſt ſometimes be allowable, becauſe of theſe inſtances, we had as good infer that it is lawful and expedient at any time, for a Man to ſave himſelf harmleſs by putting his Wife in harms way, to wink at her Converſation with other Men, rather than run a riſque in keeping up his claim to her; we ought to beware how we draw Precedents into Precept; we may be forced to bring away more Circumſtances along with them than are for our turn. Nay if *Patriarchs* are good Precedents at all adventures, we may go on farther, and infer by the ſame rule, that Adultery and Murther are now and then allowable things, becauſe we read them practiſed by *David, who was declar'd to be a Man after God's own heart.* But waving ſuch perverſe concluſions as theſe, let it ſuffice abundantly, that thoſe ſlips of the holy and good Men of old are not told for our imitation, in that the Sacred Text is far enough from recommending them by any the leaſt approbation: on the contrary, *Abimelech* ſeverely reproves *Abraham* for his unſincerity; and *Jacob* was ſarcaſtically upbraided by his Brother *Eſau*, when he thus compares the propriety of his Name aud Actions together; *Is he not rightly call'd Jacob, for he hath ſupplanted me theſe two times?*

Well,

Well, but what then ſhall we reply to the caſe of *Rahab*, and of the *Hebrew Midwives?* for ſomething is expreſly ſaid to juſtifie and commend them for what they did; inſomuch that ſome have taken notice, how warmly the *Fathers* have improv'd the hint, they applaud them with a perfect rapture; *O magnum humanitatis ingenium! O pium pro ſalute mendacium!* ſaid St. *Auſtin* of the Midwives: tho, by the by, that Father ſhould above all others have ſpar'd his extaſie, becauſe Learned Men, who have taken pains with his Works, tell us, he is moſt ſtrictly and abſolutely againſt all manner of Lying. Ὦ καλὸς ψεύδης! ὡ καλὸς δόλος ὁ προδιδόντα τὰ θεῖα! ſaid *Chryſoſtom* of *Rahab:* and this was much more pardonable in him, becauſe more conſiſtent with his principle; for they reckon him among thoſe, who in ſpecial Caſes give allowance for Lying; tho' ſtill 'tis ſomething particular, to have a Man's Practice more correct than his Doctrine; for 'tis confidently ſaid of that *Father*, that from his Baptiſm to his Death, he could not charge himſelf with the guilt of one wilful Lye.

However, I muſt own the objection ſupported by ſuch Authorities, looks troubleſome enough, there is a good appearance of weight and force in it; nevertheleſs it is not I think unanſwerable; it may drive us to a diſtinction, but not to ſilence. For upon

Examination we ſhall find, it was not ſpecially the Lye, but the Faith, and Fear, and Zeal, of thoſe good Women, which God reſpected. Thus when *Rahab* hid the *Meſſengers* of the Lord, and ſent the *Searchers* off by a falſe direction; the thing remarkable to her praiſe, was the firm belief ſhe had that God was with *Iſrael*, and her wiſhing well to the Cauſe which Heaven eſpous'd: which in a Harlot was ſomewhat extraordinary. And therefore when the Author to the *Hebrews* recognizeth her particular merit, he does not ſay, *Rahab* the Harlot was ſaved by *Lying*; but, *by Faith Rahab the Harlot periſhed not.* Nay when St. *James* undertakes to ſay, *Rahab the Harlot was juſtified by works*; he only makes mention of her receiving the Meſſengers, and how ſhe ſent them out another way; but takes no notice of the Lye, by which ſhe deluded the *Purſuers.* Surely it was not for nothing that he thought fit to let that Circumſtance alone, which if it would have born commendation, was the moſt notable part of the Story. As for the *Midwives*, herein conſiſted their peculiar praiſe: *But the Midwives feared God, and did not as the King of Egypt commanded them, but ſaved the Children alive.* They dreaded to offend God and Nature, beyond all the threats and vengeance of an Earthly Tyrant; and it is for this their recompence is expreſs'd; *Be-*

cauſe

cauſe the Midwives feared God, he made them Houſes; that is, proſper'd them in their outward State. Indeed after *Pharaoh* found them out, and began to rally them, they pretended this plauſible Excuſe; *The Hebrew Women are not like the Egyptians, for they are lively, and are deliver'd e'er the Midwives come in unto them:* and then I confeſs it immediately follows, *Therefore God dealt well with the Midwives*; but ſtill this may fairly be allow'd to relate to the integrity of their end, not ſo much to the laudableneſs of the means; not *therefore*, becauſe they put the *Egyptian* off with a *Lye*, but *therefore*, becauſe they perſevered in their reſolutions to ſave the Children, *and feared God.*

And there are ſome things peculiarly conſiderable, why God ſhould think fit to give them commendation in the main for what they did, without being ſevere with them for one indirect expedient. For firſt, It is highly probable thoſe ignorant Women might not be ſo Caſuiſtically aware of the ſimple indiſpenſible Evil of Lying; but provided they could do a world of good by it, they might be verily perſwaded in their Conſciences they ought to Lye. There is room I ſay to ſuppoſe this, for many ſenſible Men will hardly be beat out of the ſame fancy to this very day; and if that was in truth the firm perſwaſion of their Conſciences, then they

they had been to blame if they had not done juſt as they did. Beſides, the Caſe was very urgent and deſperate; they muſt either be concern'd in a conſtant courſe of pitileſs inhumane Murthers, or elſe try the chance of preventing the horrid deſolation, by prevaricating with the Tyrant; and why might not the wiſdom of Providence think fit to connive at a wholſome, well-meant error, ariſing from ignorance; and for the innocence and goodneſs of the intention, overlook a little indirectneſs in the means? if they thought it no ſin to falſifie with ſuch a bloody wretch, when they could do ſuch admirable ſervice by it, and give ſuch convincing demonſtrations of their Faith and Fear, why might not God take the whole together for well done; and for the ſake of that which was egregiouſly deſign'd, paſs over one circumſtance in it that might otherwiſe admit of ſome Cenſure? a towardly diſpoſition is of it ſelf very commendable; and God, when he obſerves ignorant People, truly upright and ſincere in their purpoſes, will, we truſt, mercifully accept them with all their failings; and paſs over many little obliquities and imperfections in their meaſures, but after all, he never intended this ſhould be drawn into Example; and the failing by being winkt at be miſtaken for a Vertue. I confeſs *Grotius* tells us of a certain Rule for expounding of Scripture, which *Irenæus* learn'd

learn'd of an ancient *Presbyter*, which if true, would keep us ſtill ravel'd and perplext. *De quibus Scripturæ non increpant, ſed ſimpliciter ſunt poſitæ, nos non debere fieri accuſatores:* i. e. "In Caſes where the word of God "reflects no blame, but gives them ſimply "related, it is none of our buſineſs to ſet up "for accuſers. But this, tho' it may often hold true, yet it is no general rule; for what expreſs blame is reflected upon *Achitophel*'s hanging himſelf? and yet who doubts whether *ſelf-murther* be a Sin or no? In ſhort, we may turn it to a general rule another way, and affirm, that it never holds true in any Caſe, let it ſtand never ſo ſimple and uncenſur'd, if the ſame ſhall be found forbidden and condemn'd in other places of Scripture; which in truth is the Caſe in hand: for we find Lying ſo frequently and abſolutely prohibited in almoſt all the Sacred Pages, that we cannot think it wholly innocent in thoſe ſpecial inſtances above, altho' for ſome peculiar Circumſtances in them, the Divine Spirit is pleas'd to paſs them over, without any poſitive cenſure or blame.

De Jur. l. 3. Annot. §. 9.

But, if I miſtake not, there is one effectual way yet behind, to demonſtrate, that it could not be the deſign of the holy Text, by being ſilent in thoſe paſſages, to juſtifie and applaud the Lye: for let us for the purpoſe ſuppoſe that the ſame Women had ſtood

ſtood reſolute and inflexible in their deſigns, without any prevarication at all; and ventur'd their Lives both for the Cauſes they eſpous'd, and for the Truth at the ſame time. Suppoſe then that *Rahab* had come out to the *Purſuers* with the *Prelate* of *Tagaſta*'s anſwer, *That ſhe could not tell a Lye to deny the Men, and that ſhe would not ſpeak out to betray them.* Likewiſe that the *Midwives* had told *Pharaoh* to his face, that they could not in pity and conſcience deſtroy the Babes; and therefore they were reſolv'd to ſave them tho' they died for it. Would not this have look'd exceeding commendable and brave? had they not been gallant *Confeſſors* and *Heroines* for the Cauſe of God? and can we think the Spirit of God would have omitted to extol them to the higheſt for ſuch a try'd integrity? ſurely then it is impoſſible that ſincerity and unſincerity, that guile and open dealing, that truth and Lying, ſhould be both laudable and meritorious at the ſame time, and about the ſame thing. God can do any thing but reconcile contradictions; we may therefore conclude he did not direct his approbation in thoſe Caſes to the Lye, but was pleas'd to connive at a little ignorance and obliquity in the means when their ends were ſo exceeding great and good.

And

And ſuch a connivance cannot be thought ſtrange, but very conſiſtent and ſuppoſeable on God's part; for if we duly reflect and compare, we may ſoon find, that as there is a vaſt difference between the purity and perfection of the Law, and of the Goſpel, ſo there is likewiſe as to the purity and perfefection they require in Mens lives; many things were tolerated and wink'd at in the old Law, not becauſe they were altogether innocent, but in compliance with the blindneſs and hardneſs of Mens hearts, as in the Caſes of *retaliation*, *divorce*, and the like: which Points are by the clearer and purer light of the Goſpel ſhewn to be directly diſallowable and ſinful; and accordingly, thoſe Men and things would paſs for extraordinary then, which under the Chriſtian Oeconomy we are taught to have quite another opinion of. And I muſt do *Grotius* the juſtice to acknowledge, that this was his remark particularly in reſpect to Lying, and eſpecially in reference to the Caſe of *Rahab*; *laudatur hoc factum ut illi tempori congruens:* " the " Stratagem was applauded, only in reſpect " to the time in which it was done. In the Goſpel days it would hardly have ſtood the teſt, for to Chriſtians our Lord has declar'd in general terms, *That unleſs your Righteouſneſs ſhall exceed the righteouſneſs of the Scribes and Phariſees, ye ſhall in no caſe enter into the Kingdom of Heaven.* That is, it will require

Annot. ad Heb. xi. 31.

quire a much ſtricter ſence and practice of vertue to be a Diſciple of Chriſt, than what was ſeemingly expected from a Diſciple of *Moſes*; and I do not know if I may not apply that, in a particular manner, to the Caſe before us; for where do we find throughout the new Teſtament, any ſuch connivances at Lying, even upon the deſperateſt emergencies? thoſe few cavils that have been made, will but advance the credit and obligation of Truth, and ſerve the more effectually to diſcourage and ſhame the Lye.

1*ſt*, In reference to *Chriſt* himſelf; the moſt officious and ſpightful ſearch could never find above one or two Caſes, wherein his words and mind could be brought to the leaſt ſuſpicion of inconſiſtency; nor is there in truth any tolerable reaſon for objecting thoſe; but when Men are reſolv'd to find what they look for, in places where it is not dropt, they muſt be content to take up any thing that comes neareſt in reſemblance, and ſay, *that's it.*

In the firſt place then it is produced, that our Lord ſhould ſay, concerning the laſt Judgment, *But of that day and that hour knoweth no Man, no not the Son.* But how could that be true, when he was *God* as well as Man? But I ſay, can any of us poſitively tell what the Son did, or did not know better than himſelf? methinks in modeſty this ſhould be ſufficient. But farther, the *Son* had

had two diſtinct Natures, he was Man as well as God, and when he ſpoke of the *Son*, he often meant with ſpecial regard to his own humane Nature; and can we be confident that he muſt needs know every thing as *Man*, which he knew diſtinctly as *God*? there is no more neceſſity to ſuppoſe that his *manhood* was advanced up to all the perfections of his *Godhead*; than that his *Godhead* underwent all the infirmities of his *Manhood*; they were no doubt as intimately united, as two ſuch remote and different natures could well be, and yet 'tis not unlikely, ſo much diſtance continued between them ſtill, that the God might know many things, which the *Man* did not. St. *Luke* tells us, *that Jeſus* as he grew up, *increaſed in wiſdom as well as Stature*: Now to encreaſe in Wiſdom, is to know more things than we underſtood before; the Son therefore as Man, might without any diſparagement to that part of his Character, be ſuppos'd ignorant of ſome things; and it was expedient that he ſhould appear ſo, the more effectually to convince us that he was Man; for that is a ſort of token by which humane Nature is too evidently known and diſtinguiſh'd from the divine; and if the Son might be ſuppos'd ignorant of any thing at all, of nothing more likely than of that, which was the profoundeſt ſecret of Heaven; which the Angels themſelves

ſelves were not ſuffer'd to know, and which *the Father kept cloſe in his own boſom.*

Another exception is taken at his *pretence* of parting from his Company at *Emmaus*, when in truth he did not: St. *Luke* ſays, *he made as tho' he would have gone further*; which the Criticks ſay is ill render'd; the words are---- προσεποιεῖτω πορρώτερω πορεύεσθαι, *he made an attempt in good earneſt to go farther*, and where was the falſehood or diſſimulation of this? why, he went in with them for all that. Well! and might not the importunities of his Company be allow'd to make him change his purpoſe? It ſhew'd that he was ſerious in his offer to paſs on, becauſe they were forced to be very preſſing with him to ſtay; *they conſtrained him, ſaying, The day is far ſpent*; they urg'd the inconvenience of venturing forward ſo late. Now our Saviour's natural temper is no where repreſented moroſe, humourſome, and inflexible; on the contrary, being a Man of a free obliging converſation, and willing to cloſe with all fair occaſions of promoting the great and weighty buſineſs he came down to do, he was prevail'd upon to accept their civil invitation; but let us take it in the worſt and croſſeſt manner, it would have look'd undecent and rude, for a ſtranger to have thruſt in with them before he was ask'd, and it does not appear they began to ask him 'till he made his offer to be gone.

I confeſ

I confeſs there is one inſtance more objected in the Character of Chriſt, which I have touch'd upon already; it is what you read toward the latter end of *John* ii. There the Jews are ſaid to demand a *Sign* of him, to which he thus reply'd, *Deſtroy this Temple, and in three days I will raiſe it up*; he ſpoke, 'tis like, in ſuch a manner, as that the Jews might apprehend he meant the *great Temple*, as appears by their aſtoniſhment at the Propoſal; *forty and ſix years was this Temple in building, and wilt thou rear it up in three days?* but St. *John* ſays, *he ſpoke of the Temple of his Body*; that is, ſay the objectors, he ſpoke of one thing, and meant another. But now I cannot ſee what neceſſity there is of any other reply than this, That take his words either way, he ſaid no more, than what he had power to make good; and in the ſence he intended, he made them good to the very letter. He was able to perform what he had undertook, let them underſtand him which way they would; but he being chiefly Prophetical in his anſwer, and pertinent and punctual too, in promiſing them anotherguess Sign than what ſurpriz'd them from the literal ſence of his words; toward which becauſe their obſtinate infidelity ſhould principally contribute, it was not therefore expedient that he ſhould at that time explain to them the full reach and end of his words; it was ſufficient that in due ſeaſon they ſhould find

them exactly verified. Now I am thinking with what an upright and ſincere Character our Lord comes repreſented to us, upon whom no more, nor greater inſtances of falſehood or diſingenuity can be charg'd, thro' the whole courſe of his Life.

But 'tis ſaid St. *Paul* lies a little obnoxious by his own confeſſion: for being reprimanded for reviling God's *High-Prieſt*, he reply'd, *That he wiſt not that he was the High-Prieſt*: which, ſay they, he could not chooſe but know, being brought before him as a Criminal. Now ſuppoſe it ſhould be granted, what nevertheleſs was the fartheſt in the World from being true, that once in his life, being hard preſs'd and daunted, he did tell a Lye; what would this avail to authorize and ſanctifie the Sin? for except while the holy Spirit was actually dictating in them, which was not always, the Apoſtles were fallible and frail like other good Men, but there are ſo many ways in which his words may be very naturally taken, clear of all unſincerity, that we muſt be rudely and barbarouſly ſevere upon him, to determine ſuch an anſwer for a Lye. For

He might continue to ſpeak by way of indignation, as he did before, at the proceedings of *Ananias*; as if he ſhould have reply'd, *I have little reaſon to take and regard a Man, who behaves himſelf as he does, for Gods High-Prieſt.* Or the Apoſtle might mean

mean in plain terms to diſown him for *High-Prieſt*, and that very juſtly, for in truth he was not the *legal* High-Prieſt, but one who by bribery and violence uſurp'd the Dignity which of right belong'd at that time to another; *Iſhmael*, or *Joſephus*; for ſo we are told in Hiſtory, and in this ſence, to ſay, *he wiſt not that he was High-Prieſt*, was true enough. Or it may be very poſſible that St. *Paul*, being at that inſtant ruminating another way, might hear the voice of ſome one from the Bench commanding him to be ſmitten, and not apprehend the right Perſon who gave the command; there being at that time ſeveral Prieſts and Elders ſitting in Court, and ſo, by miſtaking it for one of the *puny Prieſts*, he might be provok'd to return that language which it may be he would not have given to the *Chief-Prieſt* himſelf; and this way the ſence falls in exceeding pat and natural; for thus, having return'd this warm remonſtrance againſt him who order'd the blow, *God ſhall ſmite thee thou whited wall*; and ſome upon this taking him up ſhort, *revileſt thou Gods High-Prieſt*? do you know who you ſpeak to? being by this made ſenſible that he had miſtook his Man, he recollects himſelf, and anſwers thus diſcreetly and ſoberly; *why truly no, I wiſt not Brethren*, or I did not think, *that it was the High-Prieſt* that commanded me to be ſmitten; for if I had, as great as the provocation was, I ſhould not

have reply'd in such a manner; *for it is written, thou shalt not speak evil of the Ruler of thy People.* The best Criticks take him this way; and are so confident in it, that they say, to make a doubt of so clear a Case, is *to seek a knot in a Bulrush.* Or if nothing of all this will give content, [illegible] and the worst that can be made of [illegible] is this, that the Apostle might be sensible his first reflection was a little without the rules of *decorum*; and being reprehended for it, now upon cool and second thoughts, he might return to himself, and own it was unadvisedly and rashly reply'd; *I wist not Brethren that he was the High-Priest:* I was hasty, and did not duly consider the Character of the Person I spoke to. But I appeal to any Man of common sence, whether he can suppose this absurdity of St. *Paul*, or would think it probable of a much meaner Man, that he should stand a Prisoner at the Bar, and look the *Chief Judge* in the face, and both see and know who he was, and yet have the impudence to declare in open Court, that he did not imagine such a one was the Chief Judge; and without this, let us make what we will of it, we cannot turn it to a Lye.

These instances I hope I have accounted for, clear of all Lying; and then I may challenge any Man to find out one single case beside, wherein either our Lord, or any of his Apostles after him, are once taken in saying

ſaying any thing, that looks or ſounds but with the leaſt reſemblance of a Lye; and if ſo, 'tis no great ſtay to the Sin if there was over-look'd now and then a ſmall ſlip in Perſons of *old time:* We are *Chriſtians*, *Jeſus* is our Pattern, and the *Goſpel* our *Law:* both the *Guide* and *Covenant* of our Lives are infinitely more pure and correct, and therefore if we pretend to take our meaſures of living from them, we muſt reſolve our Lives ſhall be ſo too.

I do not forget how tedious I have been in clearing caſes of Scripture; but when I conſider how neceſſary it is, that unſincere Men ſhould be utterly diſpoſſeſs'd of that ſtrong hold; I cannot tell how to repent of having been ſo particular, for the word of God is in it ſelf a very fair and honourable plea, and will keep a Man in countenance who appeals to the authority of it: He may turn about and argue from thence with a good face, I had rather therefore offer a little too much, than any thing too little upon that part of the Controverſie; for then, whatſoever pretences beſides Men may have for the Sin of Lying, we are ſure that if the Bible will not ſtand by them, nothing elſe can; *if God condemn us, who is he that can juſtifie us?* after all, the Scriptures have been recurr'd to, more out of refuge, than any juſt encouragement to the Sin: Lyars fly to *Holy Writ*, as Criminals do to the *Church*; not as the pre-

tence that led them to be guilty, but as a Sanctuary to protect their guilt; and there is no making them ſurrender to conviction, 'till they are wrench'd *perforce* from the *horns of the Altar.*

3. The corrupt Maxims and Principles of *Politicians* have greatly countenanced Lying; they have taught it in the Education of Princes, recommended it as a neceſſary device for wiſe and ſubtle Ruling, and made it a ſort of *underhandle* for turning the *Helm* of Government; hence Perſons of the *Topmoſt* Rank have receiv'd it into their manners, have learnt to like and reliſh it; and from them it has been render'd faſhionable, thro' all Degrees and Profeſſions downward, for the lower People not only take the *modes* of their *dreſs*, but of their very *Speech*, from the Examples of Quality; and ſo, as the Greetings, Addreſſes, Promiſes and Apologies of Great Men are for the moſt part but a Courtly and Elegant ſort of Lying; ſo by way of imitation, all Perſons who pretend to know the World, and to make any Figure in it, affect to look accompliſh'd in the ſame courſe of Civilities; and would think their breeding more diſparag'd, by one ſingle offer of unmannerly ſincerity, than by the imputation of ten obliging Lyes.

Well, but to what purpoſe is this reflection? what expedient can reach up to the malady? are Courtiers and Stateſmen to be reaſon'd

reaſon'd and rally'd out of diſſimulation? No, they muſt firſt be reaſon'd and rally'd into a Principle; and yet methinks the ſhining Precedent of a juſt and generous, and ſincere Prince over-ruling, ſhould in time ſtrike a *Tarniſh* to all thoſe baſe *ſpangles* of Speech that come *dazling* from their *Silver* Tongues, oblige the truly *Noble* and *Illuſtrious* to rip the falſe *Tinſel* out of their Stars, cauſe every thing that is *Counterfeit* to look Childiſh and Ridiculous, and bring Honour up again to its true *Standard.*

The mean while, we have great comfort that on this ſide the Water a Man is ſafe from ſuſpicion of *leſe-majeſty* to remark, that heretofore unſincerity was not thought ſuch a neceſſary and becoming ingredient in the Character of a *Great King.* I have ſome obſcure remembrance, that when *Socrates* undertook to form the Manners of *Alcibiades* for a Wiſe and Excellent Governor, he Counſel'd him principally againſt all Lying, and Injuſtice. *Tully* after ſome inſtances of ſevere integrity in the ancient Romans, turns ſhort upon what he had ſaid with this reflection, *Quorſum hæc? ut intelligas, non placuiſſe majoribus noſtris aſtutos:* "By theſe "(ſaid he) you may underſtand that de- "ceitful and crafty Knaves were in very lit- "tle eſteem with our Anceſtors. Among the Jews *Solomon* was the *Wiſeſt Man*, and the *Greateſt King*, and beſt knew what became the *Providence* and *Grandeur* of *Majeſty*;

and yet in his Proverbs he left us this Aphoriſm; *Excellent Speech becometh not a Fool, much leſs do Lying Lips a Prince.* *Arrianus* writing of *Ptolemy* ſays, ᾧ ἀυτῷ βασιλεῖ ὄντι ἀισχρότερον ἦ τῷ ἀλλῷ ψεύσασθαι ἦν; *That conſider'd as a King, 'twas a more ſhameful thing for him to Lye than for any other Man.* And *Mamertinus* in his Character of *Julian*, harangues him handſomly upon this Topick. "What a wonderful Concord is there be-"tween our Prince's Tongue and his Heart? "he well knows that a Lye is the Vice but "of baſe and narrow minds, the ſhift of "Slaves; and ſince 'tis fear or needineſs com-"monly makes Men Lyars, a Monarch who "takes to the little trick of Lying, muſt be "ſtrangely inſenſible wherein the majeſty of
Nic. 4. 8. "his Condition conſiſts. *Ariſtotle* deſcribes it in two words, ὁ μεγαλόψυχος παῤῥησιαστικὸς ᾧ ἀληθευτικὸς, *Freedom* and *Truth* in Speech are ſigns of a great Soul. On the other hand, 'twas ſmartly ſaid of an ingenious
Mr *Collier's* Pref. to his Tranſla. of *Anton.* Author, that *Falſehood and Legerdemain ſink the Character of a Prince, and make him look like a Royal Jugler.*

Machivil's Prince. And yet there aroſe, ſome years ago, an *Italian* Stateſman *deviliſhly* Wiſe and ſubtle above all the World, who has given young Princes a quite different ſence of Honour and Majeſty, and tells them, without ceremony, that they muſt diſſemble and lye, as oft as they can ſerve an end by it, or they will be *Novices*,

Novices, and unfit to Govern. This Doctrine overſpread *Italy*; the Book at *Rome* out-ſold the beſt Divinity; the *Conclave* found nothing in it contrary to the Doctrine, Diſcipline, or good manners of their Church: but it was not long confin'd there; for the ſame as a Great Man ſaid of *Atheiſm*, was notoriouſly true of Diſſembling and Lying, *That in the laſt Age it Travel'd over the Alps, and infected France*; the fitteſt and likelieſt things to Travel in Company. there it has long dwelt, and *reign'd*, and ſent out ſuch an Epidemical infection into all the Courts of Chriſtendom, that they have been at once both taught and conſtrain'd to deal back the ſame expedient in their own defence. And Matters ſeem coming now to that paſs, that if what our Lord ſaid was in the way of Prophecy, *That when the Son of Man came, one ſhould not find Faith on the Earth*: It is probable by the preſent face of things, that he muſt be nearer than we are aware of; there is hardly any *Faith*, becauſe there is ſcarce any *Sincerity* left among Men: and I can think of but one fair Chance for Truth to come about again into Credit; and that is, that great Men will ſhortly *wear* the *habit* of Deceit and Lying ſo *threadbare*, that it ſhall no longer ſerve to *cover* the nakedneſs of their minds; and when it is become unfit for ſervice, 'tis like they will leave it off. It is long ſince the Credit of A. B. *Tillot.*

of Princes ran ſo low, that *Charles* the V*th*, when he proteſted any thing with more ſolemnity than ordinary, he would ſet aſide his Imperial Character, for that he found would paſs for nothing, and the form of his ſtricteſt aſſeverations was, *a fé de hombre de bien*, " upon the faith of an honeſt Man.

But 'till the Men *above*, who are plac'd high enough to ſhine out for Examples, ſhall reconcile Sincerity with Quality, and make Truth and Honour good Friends again, 'tis a vain thing to expect the *leſſer* People will find in their hearts to leave Lying: their way is to look up and live by imitation; 'tis a ſmall thing to ſay they are prone to take after the little Vices of great Men, for they have been known ſo ſervile, as to affect being like them, even in their natural deformities. And if Men have faulter'd their Tongues, intangled their Speech, and thruſt out their Backs, and diſtorted their Legs, and pluck'd out one of their Eyes, to reſemble and mimick their Princes, will they not diſſemble, and prevaricate, and Lye to be *like* them? for this does not conſtrain them to be *unlike* themſelves: tho' if the People would conſider like Men, there is no more reaſon we ſhould imitate our Betters in their moral, than in their natural defects. It is indeed more adviſeable of the two, that we ſhould *pull out our right Eye* to reſemble them in being *ſingle ſighted*, than that we ſhould, for

for reſemblance ſake, abandon *all ſingleneſs of heart. It is better for us to enter into life with one eye, rather than having two eyes, to be caſt into hell fire.*

4. The Sin of Lying has got no ſmall ground and credit, from the countenance ſome Learned Men have given it in their Writings: they have indulg'd it in ſome ſpecial Caſes, and that's a great Point gain'd; and when Men are, by Nature and Cuſtom diſpos'd to any Vice, a ſmall help from good Authority will keep them on with aſſurance, like a freſh puſh to a Bowl a running, it will ſpeed it forward merrily. But I have made ſome reflections upon this Conſideration already; all that I ſhall farther add is this, That *Grotius*, and *Puffendorff*, who of great Authors have made the largeſt allowances for Lying, are the leſs to be wonder'd at, or inſiſted on, if we conſider, that their Books are upon the *Laws of Nations*, and *the Rights of War and Peace*: and he who obſerves how freely the uſe of it has gain'd in the practice of *Politicians*, will the leſs wonder to find it favour'd in *Political* Syſtems: his Reaſon will lead him to ſuſpect, that the Indulgence they plead for, is not ſo much becauſe they judg'd it lawful, but only expedient, to yield a little to the iniquity of the Times; and ſo they wrote rather with regard to what Mankind were, than what they ſhould be. *Puffendorff* is ſo ingenuous L.4.p.318. and

and frank, as to make this his expreſs Apology: "But forasmuch as thoſe who are ſincere and open hearted, muſt, as the World "ſtands, lie very much at the mercy of "Knaves; and becauſe moſt Men are pleas'd "to compaſs their Ends by vain and ſly "Tricks, rather than by ſound and ſubſtan-"tial Meaſures; therefore it may not be con-"venient to proſcribe the inoffenſive arts of "ſimulation and diſſimulation out of Hu-"mane Society, 'till Men return from being "Villainous and diſtracted againſt one ano-"ther, to their right minds, to a ſenſe of "integrity, and true Wiſdom. Now you ſee the true ſecret of their Doctrine is out, and all that can be ſaid in return is this, That 'till Men are recover'd to their right minds, 'tis nonſence to contend with them about what is lawful, and what not; and when they are as they ſhould be, there will remain it ſeems no pretence at all for diſſembling and Lying.

5. I am apt to think the vaſt degrees of diſproportion in the guilt of Lying, has cheated Men to make very bold with it in ſome lighter Caſes. There is difference ſuppos'd in Lying as in all other Sins; it is ſo pernicious and hainous in ſome reſpects, and in others ſo inoffenſive and obliging, that it does not look like the ſame Vice. A Man may Lye another out of his Eſtate, his Name, his very Life, or he may Lye to *divert*, and to do him *good*:

hence

hence Men have been induc'd to diſtinguiſh between the ſpecial degrees of this Sin, with ſuitable allowances; ſome ſorts of it they make no account of at all, others they would have you believe they would not tell for a Kingdom. But, after all, there may be a greater fallacy in this notion than we are aware of; for a Lye is the ſelf ſame thing in all Caſes: but Circumſtances added to it, may ſerve to joyn more or leſs of other Sins along with it, and that is all the difference. Thus, when Men tell an *injurious* Lye, they commit two or more wickedneſſes at once, and then the iniquities they do, and the Lyes which were the means to bring them about, ought to have diſtinct conſiderations. So then, let the Lye be ſtrip'd of what other evils may attend it, and let thoſe be call'd by their proper names apart, and then there will only remain the bare untruth wilfully utter'd, which is no more than what we muſt tell in any other Caſe, to be guilty of a Lye. *Jezabel*, by ſuborning *two Sons of Belial* to teſtifie a Lye againſt *Naboth*, took away from him at once, both his Vineyard, and his Life. But muſt all that be call'd but a Lye? there was Perjury, Oppreſſion, and Murther in the Caſe too, which are all ſo many diſtinct Sins from Lying; thoſe joyn'd together with it in the ſame Fact, muſt give it infinite aggravations: but this is no more than to ſay, that the guilt of many Sins put together,

gether, muſt weigh heavier than one of them ſingly; and who ever doubted it? complicated Caſes, whether in the Mind or Body, are worſe than one ſimple Malady; but then thoſe other Evils muſt be conſider'd and dealt with diſtinctly, under their proper Names by themſelves; and if after that, we come to judge of the bare Lye remaining by it ſelf, there will be no more before us than the untruth told with intention to deceive, and ſo much muſt go in any other, tho' never ſo light a Caſe, to make it a perfect and finiſh'd Lye. As therefore the Philoſopher in deſcribing a *ſincere* Man, would have him be ſimply true in all reſpects, without conſidering how far juſtice be or be not concern'd in the Caſe, ἄλλης γὰρ ἂν εἴη ταυτ' ἀρετῆς, *becauſe this was the buſineſs of another diſtinct Virtue*; ſo when we fairly repreſent to our ſelves the guilt of a Lye, we muſt take it aſide by it ſelf, and ſtrip it naked of all other diſtinct Sins hanging about it, and then a Lye will be the ſame in one Caſe as in another; and when it is that particular Vice we pretend to declare againſt, we muſt avoid it in all reſpects with one and the ſame abſolute diſlike.

Ariſt. Eth.

6. That which has greatly contributed to bring this Sin ſo much in uſe and requeſt, has been the ſeeming *advantages* oft-times of Lying, and the *diſadvantages* now and then, of being ſtraitly laced up to our Words.

Words. A Lye pretends frequently to ſtand us in great ſtead: 'tis an apt and handy invention for Buſineſs, and may be turn'd with dexterity to very good accounts. On the contrary, to be ſtrictly ſincere at all Adventures. Ever now and then how unſeaſonable? how inconvenient? how hazardous? how many Perils and Abſurdities dog Truth about at the Hells? It is commonly ungrateful and diſobliging; it has been an old Proverb for bringing us under hatred; therefore obſerve, your wary deſigning Men, who lay out for as much good Will in the World as they can get, and with intent to make the moſt of it, don't care how little they meddle with it: He who ſticks to it ſuperſtitiouſly and inflexibly, will hardly have a Friend left to bleſs himſelf; the *Apoſtle* medled with it till he had like to have been utterly abandoned. *Am I therefore become your Enemy, becauſe I tell you the Truth*? It was obſerved by a witty Author, that there are *three* very deſirable *Nymphs*, which generally *lie in* with *three* very ugly ill-favour'd *Daughters: Familiarity* which brings *Contempt*; *Peace* which engenders *Idleneſs*; and *Truth* which begets *Ill-will*: The way to keep Friends and be well eſteemed, is to flatter and humour, and deal deceitfully; he who *propheſies* to *pleaſe, muſt not propheſie right things; he muſt propheſie ſmooth things; he muſt propheſie Deceit.* You ſee how cordial

dial and inviting the temptation to Lyi looks from this quarter; I ſhall therefore the more diſtinct in what I reply. And,

1*ſt*. To the ſeeming Advantages of Ly ing: And to this I may ſay in the firſt plac that it is not always even the pretence th leads us to it: Often Men make a trade Lying, when they have no ſuch proſpe or aim at an Advantage, but out of pu Love, and liking to the Sin; they do for Diverſion, for good Sport, their Tongu are turn'd to it, and they cannot help Here then it muſt be confeſt, the Dev comes by ſuch Lyars at a very cheap and e ſie rate, they coſt him juſt nothing. Whe God ſuffers Men to run on in this kind Lying, it may be ſaid of him as the *Pſalmi* ſpoke, *Thou ſelleſt thy People for nought, a takeſt no Money for them.*

Again; ſuppoſe we would practice it f ſubſtantial and advantageous ends; I woul then ask, whether we would make it inſtr mental to attain unrighteous and ungod Profit, or only for the more clever diſpat of Buſineſs in an honeſt way? If the firſt the caſe, and you make uſe of Lying to com paſs whatever you luſt after right or wron you are not fit to be reaſoned with upon th Subject. It is a vain prepoſterous thing think of ſtriking Men with the guilt of Ly ing, when they are not ſtruck in Conſcien at extortion and avow'd Injuſtice. But th

m

methinks this ſhould alarm and ſtagger them, if they would reflect, that they who make *unjuſt* advantages upon other Men by Lying, do not differ one jot in *guilt* from thoſe who *trade* upon the *High-way*; all the odds lies in the *ſecurity* of the *means*. Knavery is not quite ſo *Capital* as open violence; at the worſt *it* ventures but the Ears, whereas the *other* runs all in risk above the *Neck*: However, the Perſon injured may be equally a loſer in both Caſes; and I believe there is no Man of any Reſentment, but would more freely deliver to one who comes boldly up to demand it at the peril of his Life, than to him who ſhall ſteal it from him underhand by a ſmooth and wheedling Lye: The Son of *Sirach* I believe would be underſtood in this Sence; when he ſays that *a Thief is better than a Man that is accuſtomed to Lye.* Eccluſ. 20. 25. But admit a Lye may ſtand by our *unrighteous* purpoſes for once or twice, how long will it hold uſeful and practicable? And when we are once betray'd in the practice of it, another queſtion is, How long ſhall we be a gathering up our broken Credit? The *ſervice* of Deceitfulneſs is but of ſhort continuance, but the ſcandal of it is for ever. 'Tis very uſual for Lyars to be found out, but not ſo common afterward to ſee them truſted; he who depends upon falſe and lying ſhifts to get an Eſtate, muſt make

haſte to be Rich, or he makes haſte to be ruined; *that he does, he muſt do quickly*, or he muſt be undone for ever. There is this manifeſt difference between the Service of Truth and Lying; Truth will ſtand by us everlaſtingly, if it be baulkt and defeated once, it will riſe with a good Face, and take heart again, but Lying is a very ſlight and brittle Faculty, it cannot poſſibly hold long, and when once it flies abroad, it can never be made ſerviceable more, and this difference the *wiſe Man* put between them; *The Lip of Truth ſhall be eſtabliſht for ever, but a Lying Tongue is but for a moment*, and where then are the vaſt advantages of Falſhood? It may not ſerve us at all, it cannot ſerve us long; and when it is once known to be our practice, it will be our hindrance and ruin for ever: Make the moſt of it, the profit of Falſhood is flitting, unſteady, and a precarious poſſeſſion; an Eſtate without a good Title. *The getting of Treaſures by a lying Tongue, is a Vanity toſſed to and fro, of them that ſeek Death:* It is a profit too, which, tho' never ſo archly gotten, muſt needs grate upon the Mind with ſome Remorſe; which *Solomon* repreſents by a very ſenſible and lively Image, when he ſays, *Bread of Deceit is ſweet to a Man, but afterwards his Mouth ſhall be fill'd with Gravel.* In fine, Falſhood and Lying are a ſorry beggarly Trade:

Heb.' Of Lying.

Trade: *A Man full of words ſhall not proſper upon the Earth.* Such as theſe are reflections for diſhonourable dealers to chew upon.

Laſtly, To thoſe who are not abandon'd up to unrighteous deſigns, and therefore don't deſire to Lye for *Injuſtice*, but only for an honeſt diſpatch of buſineſs, I would offer upon the general, that Truth is a more ready, ſhort, compendious method for expedition than Lying; and when once we have got the reputation of it, will prove ten thouſand times more acceptable and obliging; and therefore I would only deſire ſuch Men for the preſent, to agree to this one *Preliminary*, that they would refrain from doing any buſineſs by Lying, which in reaſon might as well or better have been done without it; which is but a fair eaſie Article; and yet if they begin, and be punctual with this firſt, I am ſatisfied, there would be ſo very few Caſes occurring, where they deſign honeſtly, which may not as well be negotiated without Lying, as with it, that in a little time they muſt drop the ſcurvy habit of courſe, for want of neceſſary provocations to recurr to that expedient.

2. To the *diſadvantages* of ſtrict ſincerity, which was the latter part of the objection, I have this to ſay; that at the

worſt they are but little and momentary; and ſuch as are rather fanſied, and fear'd, than real; and which in the end never fail to make a Man ample amends: they are like the diſadvantages of parting with a little *ready* Caſh, for a mighty purchaſe in *reverſion*: Truth may now and then perhaps diſoblige upon the ſpot, but no one ever goes away confirm'd in an ill opinion of the *Plain Dealer*; if he does not *take* with us at *ſight*, beſure he will when we come again to *peruſe* him. We may loſe a Friend peradventure by a ſevere Truth, but he who being convinc'd of our good intention, will break with us on that ſcore, is better loſt than kept: and it will never loſe us one, but it ſhall put two in the place; for nothing more effectually recommends and qualifies for true *Friendſhip*, than a ſteady and try'd integrity. Truth, as *the way of the World* goes, may chance to look now and then out of ſeaſon, and unmannerly: Now I do not ſay a ſincere Man is bound to bolt out every thing he knows at all adventures; we are not always upon *Oath* to keep pouring out *the whole truth*, the ſtanding obligation is, to *nothing but the Truth*; and the Rule in general when that ought to come forth is, as often as we think we can do good by it, or avoid Lying; at ſuch ſeaſons if it will not paſs for good manners, I

am

am ſure it will for good morals: and if I were to chooſe my Character, I had rather at any time be thought *rudely* ſincere, than *obligingly* deceitful.

But the worſt is, Truth upon ſome occaſions is a treacherous tell-tale thing; and will expoſe and bring us to correction. Now I confeſs when our wickedneſs has run us into ſuch ſtreights, that we dare not own what we have done, our Caſe is evil and deſperate: But however, to think of bringing our ſelves off harmleſs by a Lye, is unadviſeable upon all accounts. It is, firſt, a very unlikely expedient to ſucceed; how eaſie is it to bewilder guilt, by a croſs and ſtern examination? and how natural and ready is it to blot out thro' our Tongues, our Eyes, our Complection, thro' the very pores of our Skin? In the next place, 'tis a very mean and daſtardly ſhift, and muſt betray a little, timorous, poor Spirit within. Then again, it ſerves to load a guilty Condition with freſh burthen; like a foul Bruſh, inſtead of ſtriking filthineſs off, it lays more on, and the fault that moſt needs it, is doubled by it. And, laſtly, it is ſuch a violent provocation and *bar* againſt forgiveneſs, that, all things conſider'd, it is rather a more dangerous and fatal expedient to Guilt than Truth; a Remedy that bids very likely to be worſe than the Diſeaſe. If thoſe before

whom we ſtand accus'd, were otherwiſe never ſo diſpos'd and bent toward clemency, a Lye muſt needs very much urge and try them; when all the reſt is forgiven, that will ſtill look unpardonable; there is ſome room for favour upon confeſſion, becauſe 'tis a ſign there is ſome grace left, which may chance to work amendment. And therefore when *Cyrus* ſate in Judgment upon *Armenius*, and being reſolv'd beforehand to be very merciful, he begins his Charge to the Priſoner of War with expreſs Admonition, That he take care to offer nothing in his defence but what was ſincerely true; (ſaid he) *you may keep your ſelf guiltleſs of that one thing, which is, out of all compariſon, the moſt hateful and deteſtible:* And he goes on warning him, that nothing was wont to prove ſuch a ſure let and obſtacle to mercy, as to be caught in an obſtinate Lye. I may be allow'd therefore to ſtrengthen and conclude all this, with the Counſel of the Son of *Syrach*, *Bind not one Sin upon another, for in one thou ſhalt not be unpuniſhed.*

Zen. *de* Cyr. *Inſt.* l. 3. ἵνα σοι ἓν γὲ ἀπῇ τὸ ἐυμισητότατον, *that ſo*

7. The free and univerſal practice of this Sin, ſerves for an effectual encouragement to it; all ſorts and ſizes of People are more or leſs addicted to it: and if there be no expreſs *Law* for Lying, yet one may plead a general

general *Cuſtom* to it, time out of mind. Now we are not apt to be very ſcrupulous or remorſeful at any thing, which we ſee every body make bold with as well as our ſelves; but whatever inducement or ſtay this may be to our Conſciences in *Fact*, yet in *Reaſon* it can be none at all: For in any caſe where our Souls lie at ſtake, 'tis not all the World that ſhould be perſwaſion enough to make us play them away for Company. That was a very juſt and wiſe Precept of *Moſes*, *Thou ſhalt not follow a multitude to do Evil.* He knew how ready and prone we were to be drawn aſide by this pretence, but gives us expreſs caution and command againſt it, for it was a pretence that would not hold: and I cannot but farther remark, that he gave that general Rule, not without ſome particular regard to Lying, and Falſehood; as if we depended more confidently upon the practice of the *many*, to bear us out in this, than in any other Sin: For in the very words foregoing he gives this Law; *Thou ſhalt not raiſe a falſe report, put not thy hand with the wicked, to be an unrighteous witneſs*, then it comes after, *Thou ſhalt not follow a multitude to do evil.*

8. And Laſtly, There's one thing more which I fear ſerves for a cauſe to keep Men on very ſmoothly and inſenſibly in the guilt of Lying; and that is, the light and indif-

ferent thoughts that are generally entertain'd as to the evil of it; we do not ſeem to look upon it ſuch an ungodly and hainous Crime; it were better, if we could, to forbear it; but it is not unpardonable if we cannot: ſome have in part defended it; others have beg'd it for a venial Sin, and few I believe apprehend it a mortal one: and therefore Men are ſcarce ſerious when they are found guilty: it paſſes off in banter, and when we upbraid one another for it, 'tis commonly but in joke and rallery: we often talk of it pleaſantly, but ſeldom with any deep concern or reflection; not as a matter of that conſequence to be laid home either to other Mens Conſciences, or our own: in effect we make nothing of it. Now this is all juſt as the Devil could wiſh; he well knows there is no fear of our forſaking any Vice, ſo long as we make a jeſt of it, and rebuke and correct one another about it, only for good ſport; he loves we ſhould go on cheerfully and jocularly in our way, and take content and comfort as we go; he never has us more ſafe, than while we think our ſelves ſecure, but when our ſecurity is plainly from *diſtemper*, and not from *reaſon*, it is very fit we ſhould be jog'd out of it: Men in a Lethargy muſt be diſturb'd and rous'd, the kindeſt office that can be done them is, to keep pricking and pinching

pinching their Conſciences awake to a due ſence of their Condition. I muſt therefore crave leave to interrupt the Lyars repoſe with this remembrance, that he lives in the habit of a known and damnable Sin, in a habit whoſe every wilful act has been proved to be ſimply and eſſentially evil in the very Nature of it, an Evil and a wickedneſs in good earneſt. He ſhould therefore conſider and lay to heart, that the Sin he makes ſo *light of*, and that does *ſo eaſily beſet him*, is a fundamental failing, a deviation from God, a taking after the Devil, a making in for adoption, to the *Father of Lyes*; a *legitimating* our ſelves for Hell: and whether a Sin of this nature will be allow'd to paſs for a *Jeſt* in the accounts of our Lives, the great and dreadful Tribunal will one day determine. The mean while, the Wiſe Man ſpeaks of it as a very fooliſh thing, to make our ſelves merry with our Failings; *Fools make a mock of Sin*, trifle and ſport with that which is, above all things, a ſubject for their ſorrow. I ſhould think Men ſhould find no true diverſion in *tickling* one another to *death*; in laughing and bantring themſelves to Damnation.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Reaſons to put away and deteſt Lying.

IV. I *Come now to offer for what good Reaſons* (over and above what I have already touch'd on) *we ought ſeriouſly to put away and deteſt, this baſe and diſingenuous habit of Lying.* And,

1*ſt.* For the difficulties, vexations, and diſappointments it brings upon our ſelves; to carry on the Trade of Lying with any ſecurity and ſucceſs, is exceeding hard; it is an *unnatural* and forc'd Character to manage; it is to ſay and ſeem one thing, and to think and to be the quite contrary: and this part muſt not only be often acted, but always conceal'd; and falſehood be conſtantly contriv'd to look like Truth, to make any thing of it; which being a conſtrain'd and affected undertaking, 'tis a hundred to one but it is over-acted, and betray'd. The way of Truth is plain, direct, and obvious, and needs no ſollicitous care, or enquiry to hit it off; we ſee it lie ſtreight before us, 'tis the neareſt and firſt that naturally preſents; ſo that if you take the Wiſe Man's direction, and *Let thine Eyes look right on, and let thine Eye lids look ſtreight*

ſtreight before thee, if thou turn not to the Right Hand, nor to the Left, thou canſt not fail of being ſecure in thy way and end; for to uſe the Mathematical image of a great Man; as in *Geometry* of all *Lines* and *Surfaces* contained within the ſame bounds; the *ſtreight* Line, and the *plain* ſurface, is always the ſhorteſt; ſo of all the *deſigns* and *attempts* within the compaſs of humane Life, the *ſhorteſt* and the *ſureſt* to their end are thoſe, which are carryed on by the Lines of *Truth* and *Sincerity.* But how crooked and intricate? How winding and obſcure? How abſtruſe, unbeaten, and hazardous, are the ways and meaſures of a Lyar? He ſteals about in dark unfrequented tracks, has a world of odd turnings to hit upon, and one falſe ſtep miſleads and ruins all; *he entereth not in at the Door, but climbeth up ſome other way,* and therefore comes always ſuſpected for *a Thief and a Robber*; and to be but ſuſpected in an indirect Courſe is to be defeated. Dr. Barrow.

A deſigning Lyar works about his *Concluſions,* and makes after his *Ends,* by the moſt precarious *means* and *premiſes* imaginable; often upon ſuppoſition of conjecturing and reading what is in other Mens minds; but always upon ſuppoſition that Men will not put about, and examine, and compare what he ſays; upon ſo many ſuppoſitions and chances,

chances, that he muſt have ſtrange kind of luck, as well as cunning, to have every thing hit right, and if but one ſingle thread of his *gueſs-work* fly out, it unravels and undoes the whole. The projects of *Lying* are like falſe *Chymiſtry*, in which ſomething is generally left out, or over done, which ſpoils all. When a Lyar has laid his scheme at beſt, he has reaſon to ſuſpect and fear how it will go, becauſe of the many Accidents that muſt be regarded, and the many proviſos that muſt be taken in to make it ſucceed; it is like a *Mechaniſm* overclog'd with work, in which the too great number and variety of Wheels and Inſtruments, that are made contributing to carry on the Movement, do but retard and perplex it, and give it ſo many the more Chances to go wrong and to ſtop; a plain Syſtem, that has the leaſt curioſity of invention, is much the likelieſt to move right, and to hold it. When the Lyar has actually built up a deſign without being interrupted, it is upon ſuch an unſound and falſe Foundation, and hangs by ſuch a deal of odd Geometry, that it will need continual Repairs and Underlayings to ſuſtain it, and leſs than the neceſſary Charge to keep it ſhored up, would have raiſed a true ſubſtantial Building from the Ground; and after all, if but one piece give way, the whole muſt tumble down into a ſcandalous Rubbiſh.

Now

Now when the part a Man has to act is so troublesome and unnatural, his measures are so difficult and precarious, and his disappointments so likely and so reproachful, how perplext aboding and ruffled must his Mind generally be? As wakeful and startling as a Bird; under constant Fear, Apprehension, and Alarm: His Life is mainly taken up in intricating himself out of the Surprizes of past Lyes, and in providing and warding against future Intanglements; and no wonder if he find himself often bewilder'd past any prospect of getting out; he is like one who chuses to clamber over Fences, and to brush through Enclosures, in order to make out a shorter way to his End; but considering how oft he must be stopt and defeated of a *Shord*, how much space is spent in searching up and down for a convenient pass, how many times he must be forc'd to come back again, and ever now and then how long he must stand musing to consider whereabouts he is, he had much better have taken the plain and the true way, which may be the fartheſt about, but will prove the neareſt and sureſt to bring us home; besides the hazard that attends the other course, either of breaking a Bone, or scratching our Flesh, or scandalously renting our Habits, with the Vexation and Anxiety that must keep raking and harrowing up the Mind all the while,

while, at our frequent and unavoidable diſappointments, to all which the wiſe Man moſt aptly and pertinently alludeth, when he ſays, *who ſo breaketh an Hedge, a Serpent ſhall bite him.* And how miſerably have I ſeen a little Lyar hung upon the hooks, ſurpriz'd and hitch'd and caught, paſt poſſibility of getting off? How have I obſerv'd him wrigling about, working up and down, skipping backward and forward, ſtriking on fore-right, and then running counter, dodging and ferretting to and fro, to make it out at a fault; ſaying, and unſaying, ſending and proving, explaining, paraphraſing, and denying what he has unadviſedly ſaid, to make it hang a little better together; involv'd, and vext, and hamper'd many times beyond all skill and endeavour of winding himſelf out clearly? He who is wont to bring about his purpoſes by Lying, will find himſelf ſo taken up, and occupied in the meaſures of his Conduct, that he muſt have little leiſure for any ſubſtantial Buſineſs; and he muſt be ſo often obliged to eat his own words, that if there were any thing in them, he could have ſtomach for nothing elſe; and yet as empty as they are, 'tis a ſort of Diet that goes againſt one exceedingly; to eat our own words, is next to eating our own Fleſh: Yet this, and a thouſand hardſhips more, a Lyar muſt rub through, beyond what an upright Man

Man can well imagine; who has therefore little reaſon to envy that ſhrewd Fellow for his cunning dexterity and management in Buſineſs. Sincerity being ſingle, has but one plain way to its end, not very troubleſome to proceed in, not many chances to be miſtook, and in which a Man may go boldly on, without being conſcious or apprehenſive at what may happen.

2. Lying ought to be abhor'd, for the Miſchief and Injury it does in all Civil Societies; and upon this it is, that when St. *Paul* exhorts, *That we put away Lying, and ſpeak every Man truth with his Neighbour*; he thus grounds the reaſon of his Doctrine; *for we are Members one of another*, and therefore to deceive a Neighbour by a Lye, was ſuch another unnatural Injuſtice and Treachery, as it would be for our own Eyes to lead our Feet wittingly over blocks and precipices. Lying adminiſters to ſo much Deceit, Miſtruſt, Selfiſhneſs, Perfidiouſneſs, and a train of ſuch like ill-natur'd Vices, as tend to looſen the cement, and ſhock the frame of civil Bodies, to diſtract the good order and face of things, to ruin all mutual Truſt, to break up Society, and bring Mankind back again to a ſtate of Natural Hoſtility. This was the Vice that aroſe and gave the firſt blow in the War which began in Heaven; for the Devil

Devil *could not abide in the Truth*, and ſo by falling off from it the combat commenced, and in the Diſpute he fell; ſince that he cannot bear that any other Creatures ſhould be truer or better than himſelf; and therefore the firſt Preſent he made to Mankind as ſoon as they had learn'd Speech, was the gift of this degenerate faculty; and for an experiment to ſhew what it was good for, he gave trial of it in the Fall of Man, and from that time, it is incredible what a world of Miſchief and *Deſtruction it has wrought upon the Earth*: This little Ball has never reſted in quiet from its curſed influences; the breath of it is peſtilent, epidemical and devouring, perpetually ſcattering about Poiſon, and Wild-fire, and Ruine. Of a little Vice to ſpeak of, no one can conceive how ſignificant and mighty it has always been in the way of Miſchief; a Lye to look to, is a meer trifle, but the effects of it often fall very heavily, like the *little Cloud* which *Elijah* ſaw in the Element: At the firſt it appeared no bigger than a *Man's Hand*; but on a ſudden, it gathered about to a ſullen over-ſpreading darkneſs, and the Storm was felt ſeverely. I have that conſiderable Opinion of a Lye, that I much queſtion, whether ever there was a compleat and finiſht Villany done without it; whatſoever is undertaken

taken of that kind, muſt be either by a Lye, or by force; now raſh and headlong force may mean it well, but it makes but *lame miſchief:* For, as one well obſerv'd, *The hand can hardly lift it ſelf up high enough to ſtrike but it muſt be ſeen, ſo that it warns while it threatens*; and the greater ſwinge it fetches, the longer notice it gives to evade the vengeance; but a Lye whiſpers defamation and ruine ſo ſoftly, that it ſeldom reaches the Ear, before it reaches the Heart: it brings on vengeance under the moſt engaging colours and pretences; and like a handy Executioner, always gives good words, while it claps over the nooſe: κήκαγ φρένες, ἀδὺ λάλημα: it Poiſons with the tendereſt endearments, it diſpatches to the *long home* in the pleaſanteſt *vehicles*; it looks us ſmilingly in the face, while it gives an underhand thruſt at the belly; it ſtrokes a Brother lovingly by the *beard*, and takes that convenient hold to ſmite him under the *fifth rib*; it cries *Hail Maſter*, and kiſſes, for the very ſignal of an helliſh treachery. To be brief, there hardly ever was an Oppreſſor, a Traytor, a Tyrant, or a Villain, but he was a Lyar; or elſe he ſet up without one very neceſſary faculty for his buſineſs. *Epanetas* is mention'd by *Plutarch*, for being wont to ſay, that Lying was more or leſs inſtrumental, in all Dr. South.

the Evils and Outrages that were done in the World. So then if we would not be thought to delight in miſchief, we muſt not delight in Lying; and if we would reſt ſecure from harm, let that be part of our Litany, *Deliver me, O Lord, from Lying Lips, and from a deceitful Tongue.*

3. Lying is a pitiful, ſorry, ſcandalous habit, and if we have any ſence of Reputation, we ſhould diſdain it: 'tis the ſign of a mean, and ſervile, and baſe diſpoſition; the ſhift of narrow, daſtardly, and degenerate Minds; the guard and weapon of a Coward, the refuge of a Slave: 'Tis the Property of Truth to be daring, to go directly to its end, and come up fairly to a Man's face; but a Lye is fearful, and skulking, ſteals round you, cannot endure to be confronted: it not only ſhews a Coward, but contributes to make him: for when once a Man gets a knack of Lying himſelf out of difficulties, he will never dare ſtand a charge, never own his words, but eat them; never take upon him what he has ſaid or done againſt any oppoſition, but deny and Lye off all: It is not therefore for the good grace and repute of a Lye, that Men of Honour ſo nicely reſent, and ſtomach to have it given them. I am loth to take a Noble Author at his word, who ſays, that upon examination he fears the reaſon

Montaign.

reaſon of it is, *becauſe 'tis moſt natural to defend the part that lies moſt expos'd.* There may be ſomething in that, but I rather think the true ſecret is, That to give a Perſon the Lye, is to impeach his Manhood, 'tis in effect to call him Coward; and then, if his Sword be of true Metal it will fly out almoſt of its own accord. A Lye is ſuch an infamous and dirty thing, that it ſtains wherever it touches: *A Lye is a foul blot in a Man*; there is ſomewhat inſufferably rude and offenſive in the very word, it ſounds obſcene and groſs, it ſhocks the ſenſes; 'tis doubtful whether it touches a Man's Honour moſt to *give* the Lye, or to *take* it: and yet I know not how it comes to paſs, but as Matters are manag'd, all the baſeneſs and turpitude ſeems to be confin'd to the word; we are commonly reconcil'd well enough to the thing; nevertheleſs this is prepoſterous and intolerable, when try'd by reaſon; that ought to be very ſcandalous to tell, which it is very ſcandalous to be told of: both the name and the thing are hateful. Lying is a wretched, ſneaking, odious Vice, and we had need be aſham'd of it; if the *Son of Syrach*'s ſence will paſs, it will ſhame us whether we will or no, for *The diſpoſition of a Lyar is diſhonourable, and his ſhame is ever with him.* But the bare ſhame is not yet Eccleſ. xx. 24.

the worſt circumſtance of the Sin; there is ſomething farther in it that ought to ſtartle us; for,

4. Lying will have by degrees a ſad effect upon our Faith and Principles; it will wean our Minds from a due regard of God, from the dread of his inviſible Preſence; from the awful ſence of his ſecret obſervation over us: for 'tis a ſort of wickedneſs that depends altogether upon being latent, and unobſerv'd; it keeps abſconding and lurking in the ſecret corners of our hearts, and fears nothing ſo much as diſcovery, and the light. Now mark this for a Rule; any Sin we make free with, under this notion, that we can be private and ſecure in it, tends to render us regardleſs of the Powers unſeen; and inſenſibly to waſt away all divine fear and impreſſion out of our Souls. If we have any thing of Principle or Conſcience in us, it muſt appear by our being apprehenſive, above all things, of being ſeen and cenſur'd by God; and the trueſt judgment we can make, how far that reflection goes with us, is to conſider what diſturbance and interruption it gives to our ſecret deeds and imaginations; for if while the Eyes of Men are ſhut we find we can make bold in the ſight of God; if it be all one between him and our Conſciences alone, what we think

think or do; our State is deplorable and deſperate: if his privity to our Minds be no hank upon our purpoſes, we muſt have but a looſe and lifeleſs apprehenſion of a future Judgment, and that I look upon is the laſt and finiſhing ſign of irreligion. Lying therefore muſt have a natural and ſure effect to unprinciple us, becauſe it uſeth us to be fearleſs and inſenſible of God, and diſciplines and hardens our hearts to this impious imagination, that ſo long as Men do not find us out, we are ſafe. Hence it was ſaid by one of the Ancients, *That Lying was a manifeſt contempt of God, and withal, a fear of Man:* upon which the honourable Writer I juſt mention'd, who is for the moſt part all fancy, made this reflection, which was full of Judgment; *What can one imagine more hateful, and contemptible, than to be a Coward toward Man, and valiant againſt ones Maker?* So then, he who would not be thought to defie God, muſt not diſſemble with Man; he who would not be ſuſpected for Atheiſtical, muſt keep from ſuſpicion of being a Lyar. This therefore, to all who are not quite out of love with good Principles, ſhould be a preſſing Argument againſt this Sin. Montaign.

5. We ſhould no leſs abandon and deteſt Lying, for the ill influence it will have upon our Morals: We muſt Lye, or be bely'd,

bely'd, in almoſt every Sin we commit. If we Sin againſt others, 'tis much but there is a Lye made inſtrumental in the wrong; and when ever any Sin prevails upon us, it is by coming in upon our weak ſide with a Lye, promiſing the Lord knows what delight and raviſhment, when upon trial we find it an errand Cheat. Lying undertakes for two things, which are of ſingular conſequence to advance and encourage Wickedneſs; it pretends to bring us on ſucceſsfully, and to bring us off ſecurely: it will provide a hundred ſhifts, and blinds and diſguiſes, to protect a Sinner, both coming and going: It is ſo apt an invention to ſtand by and befriend us in our evil ways, that it is commonly the firſt thing our degenerate Natures take a liking to: we begin with it in our Childhood, and when the Devil finds a Lad to be ready and arch in the uſe of this gift, he conceives great hopes of him. We firſt enter upon the exerciſe of it in our Play, and when Luck runs againſt us, the Lye muſt run for us: when we have got the knack of it, we Romance and Lye in our chat; when it is a little familiar in our Converſe, we begin to turn it to account, we Lye for ſomething, if it be but for a trifle; every thing muſt have a beginning: and from ſtretching for a ſmall matter, we

ſoon

ſoon take to lanch out upon a round occaſion: we will deprecate, perjure, and brazen out any thing to compaſs our Ends: Lying is the firſt eaſie in-let to all manner of Injuſtice, Theft, Oppreſſion, and Villany: it ſits brooding and gendring miſchief, juſt as it is ſaid in the Prophet's Allegory, *Out of the Serpents root ſhall come forth a Cockatrice, and his fruit ſhall be a fiery flying Serpent.* And as it brings Men on with ſucceſs and improvement in wickedneſs, ſo it is very officious and ready to bring Men off in ſecurity: what a natural, apt, and preſent thing is a Lye, to one ſurpriz'd in a fault? how thoughtfully do Men Treat and Article with it beforehand, to ſave them harmleſs? and how many bold Eſſays will it venture at, to vouch and clear our innocency? ſuch a clear and confident account! ſuch a plauſible rehearſal of the matter! with ſuch an inoffenſive look, and ſo many ſolemn proteſtations, that one would imagine no room could be left for ſuſpicion! as *God* is ſaid to aſſiſt his *Saints* in time of peril, and give them inſtant anſwers without their premeditation; ſo it is not for nothing that the Pſalmiſt, when he would have a Wicked Man's buſineſs done effectually, makes this proviſion, *Let Satan ſtand at his right hand:* no doubt to ſuggeſt and prompt all pertinent Inven-

tions and Lyes to bring him off. There is no end of the uſefulneſs of Lying, to a courſe of wickedneſs; ſo that if we have any ſort of regard for our Vertue, and our Morals, we muſt reſolve to break with this pernicious habit, and deal ſincerely.

6. We ſhould make Conſcience of Lying, as it tends to ruine us in our Credit and Truſt: what touches us here, we are apt enough to be ſenſible of: he who has loſt himſelf in this reſpect, has in a manner loſt himſelf from Civil Society: the cement that keeps us united to one another is *Faith*, and *Truſt*; this is much the ſame thing in Bodies Politick, as that Plaſtick Power which keeps the parts of Matter together, is in Bodies Natural: and when ever any particular Part or Member is found inſincere and rotten, it muſt fall off, becauſe there is no foundation remaining for any farther dependence. Now whatever a Lyar may fancy to the contrary, the World will find him out by degrees, and ſettle and ſpread his Character: and when once he has got the Name, his Condition will be ſomething ſingular; he will be a Man by himſelf, no one will venture to contract either Friendſhip, or Commerce, or even common acquaintance with him: his word will go for nothing; his breath may be

uſeful

uſeful to him in life, but not in ſpeech; and then the worſt is, 'tis a Name and Character hardly to be ſhook off again: once a Lyar, and ever ſo. It is in this, as in ſome other Caſes, a Man may be depriv'd of the benefit of his Faculty, but the *Character* of it is *indelible.* The advantage of Lying can be but ſhort, in *that* a Man will ſoon be ſuſpended, but the ſcandal of it is for life: and there are two ſufficient Reaſons for it; for firſt, it is one of the difficulteſt habits in the World to be left off: there is an unaccountable ſatisfaction and charm in running on, for which a Man can give no better reaſon to himſelf, than that he is inchanted and bewitch'd to it: he ſhall be ſenſible that he is become diſcredited, and Proverb'd for a Lyar, that all his words are receiv'd as idle Tales, that he is ever taken with diſtruſt and allowance, that the Company many times look hard at him, that they ſtrive to keep their Countenances, that they bleſs themſelves as he goes, and that in general 'tis almoſt got into a Rule, that a Story muſt needs be falſe, becauſe he is the Author: And yet all this ſhall ſignifie very little, either to change or ſilence, or abate the vain habit; or if you could ſuppoſe a Miracle, that a confirm'd and common Lyar ſhould leave off, and become conſcien-

conſcientious in what he ſays; yet you muſt ſuppoſe another Miracle, to make Men alter their Opinions of him, and give him Credit: God muſt work *ſtrong deluſions* upon a Man, to make him believe a Lyar. And what a miſerable Condition is it to be run ſo far out of Repute, that we can have no Truſt given us for one word we ſay? Sometimes it may vaſtly concern our intereſt to have our Words paſs; now and then a Lyar tells a true ſtory, and then it being ſomewhat unuſual with him, he looks that particular notice ſhould be taken of it; but all is received with the ſame allowance and regard: Truth it ſelf is ſuſpected for coming out of his Mouth, and juſtly enough, for what buſineſs had Truth to do there? Remember how it fared with the Shepherd's Boy; he had cheated the Family ſo often, with the mock and lying howl of a Wolf, that when the true Wolf came howling and ruſhing upon him, he cry'd out in vain for help; he had befool'd them ſo many times with the falſe noiſe, that they would not regard him now, when it fell out to be too true. The Lyar loſes the main end and ſatisfaction even of *Romancing*; for 'tis nonſence to Lye, if we can't make People believe it: And at this rate, he deprives himſelf in effect of the benefit and uſe of Speech; for one had as good

good be altogether dumb, as be capable of ſpeaking to no purpoſe. A Man would not ſuppoſe himſelf in ſuch a Caſe as this for the univerſe; and yet if a Lyar would but get as well acquainted with himſelf, as other People are, he cannot be perſwaded how it ſhould be otherwiſe. On the other Hand, there is a ſubſtantial ineſtimable Treaſure in the very name and ſound of Sincerity, which is not to be purchaſed by the *Indies*: It ſets a Man high in regard and privilege, above the reſt of his fellow Creatures, and carries an Authority with it, that is next to Inſpiration: And is it not a ſingularity in Eſteem worth trying for, when like *Zenocrates* among the Greeks, we may eſtabliſh ſuch a Character for our Truth and Integrity, that our bare words ſhall paſs, before the ſolemn Oaths and Aſſeverations of other Men?

7. Another thing very conſiderable in Lying, to diſcourage us from the cuſtom of it, is the bad effect it muſt have in time upon our very *Intellectuals*: By conſtant Uſe and Exerciſe our Underſtandings muſt be perplex'd and incommoded by it; 'twill mix in ſuch an odd *Medly* of *Ideas*, the falſe among the true, in the repoſitory of our Minds, that our Memories ſhall be at a perfect loſs how to ſort them, and when the Memory can't be certain which

are

are real, and which not, the reaſon cannot make any ſure work with them, nor the Judgment determine with certainty. The Imagination of a Lyar, is like an *inchanted Field*, wherein there ſeems to appear ſuch a variety of ſtrange *fantaſtical* Ideas, ſuch a confus'd diſorderly mixture of Chymeras with realities, ſuch a Chaos and huddle of notions together, right and wrong, that the Viſion ſhould be enough to turn his Brains; and the miſchief is, unleſs a Man could undertake to ſay back again, all thoſe *romantick* things he has ſaid to raiſe the *deluſion*; there is no diſpelling the *charm*, nor chaſing away the Monſters, to let the true Light ariſe, and clear up the Mind again. This Image cannot look extravagant, if you conſider how often a Lyar avers what he never heard, and quotes what he never read, and gives account of Authors which he never ſaw, and repeats over his own Inventions ſo frequently, 'till he cheats himſelf at laſt into a Belief, that *ſurely theſe things were real*; therefore how can it be otherwiſe, but that of the notions which remain upon his Mind, he ſhould in proceſs of time be utterly uncapable to recollect which of them had, and which had not, any true Foundation in Nature? Nay, I'll undertake that a confirm'd Lyar, cannot ſecure himſelf from being impos'd upon

upon by his own dreams; let the impreſſions of them be laid aſide in his mind but a few days, and if he chance to turn them over again, he ſhall not be certain what to make of them, what Truth may be in them, nor how they came there.

If *Ceſellius Baſſus* had not been often wont to impoſe upon himſelf the belief of his own falſe imaginations, he could never have doted ſo far upon an extravagant illuſion of the Night, as not only to miſtake it for a real Truth himſelf, but impudently to paſs the deception upon the Roman Emperor: the Man had a notion imprinted upon his fancy, of a prodigious Maſs of Gold hidden under ground, in a certain Eſtate he had in *Africa*; and having forgot how he came by the notion, he concluded at laſt it was a real thing, and accordingly goes and puts it into *Nero*'s head, with that ſingular confidence, and with ſo many probable Circumſtances for tale and token, that the ſilly Imperial Cully takes the Impoſture down glib; and without farther diſtruſt, diſpatches away the Informer with publick Coſt and Solemnity, to go over and fetch it all into the Roman Treaſury. The Concluſion was, all that *Baſſus* found by digging was his own grave, which he choſe to make there rather than return back to acquaint the Emperor with his diſappointment. Tacit. Ann. l. 16.

pointment. Between Dreams, and Lyes, and Realities, a Man given to Romancing muſt often find himſelf perplex'd and nonplus'd: it was for the difficulties that muſt follow of this kind, that it is become a Proverb, *That a Lyar had need have a good Memory.* Nor did this notion eſcape the *Son of Syrach*, when ſpeaking of the Law of Reaſon and Knowlege, he ſays, *Men that are Lyars cannot remember her.* And thus again what the Prophet threatned as an extraordinary Judgment, is indeed the natural conſequence of this Sin, *A Sword* (that is, *a Fate*) *is upon the Lyars, and they ſhall dote.* A Trade of Lying muſt, in long run, create a great miſunderſtanding between a Man's intellectual Faculties, and ſet the Fancy, Memory, and Judgment at variance among themſelves, each accuſing the other of being falſe and treacherous; by which means the operations and reſults of the Mind muſt often prove indeliberate, and precarious: and therefore tho' all Men are alike oblig'd to deteſt Lying, yet there are none who have greater reaſon to have it in abhorrence, than thoſe who give their Minds to Learning and Philoſophy: for that being nothing elſe but a ſincere and ardent inclination, to diſcover and admire *Truth*, it muſt imply at the ſame time, a proportionable hatred and averſion toward all

Eccluſ. 15. 8.

Jer. 50. 36.

all Falſe hood, and Lying. Accordingly, when *Plato* proteſted that he would reſpect none for Philoſophers, but ſuch as were earneſtly and paſſionately bent after *Truth*, [τὰς τῆς ἀληθείας φιλοθεάμονας] he ſignified in the ſame words, how much it concern'd wiſe and inquiſitive Men, to abominate all Lying and Deluſion. So that if we duly regard the improvement of our Souls, and affect thoſe high Privileges of Truth and Knowledge, which are the perfections of Humane Nature, we will not endure to ſcribble and blur over the Table of our Minds with ſuch falſe inſignificant Scrawls and Cyphers. De Rep. l. 5.

8. And laſtly, We ſhould utterly abandon and abhor Lying, for that juſt contempt and odium it brings upon us, in the ſight of God and Man: 'twas *Plato*'s reflection, ψεῦδος πάντες θεοίτε καὶ ἄνθρωποι μισοῦσιν; and we find it diſtinctly confirm'd in Scripture, 'tis hateful in the ſight of God: *Lying Lips are an abomination in the ſight of God*, and *all falſe ways he utterly abhors.* It is no leſs deteſted by all good Men; it is one of *Solomon*'s Aphoriſms, That *a Righteous Man hateth Lying:* and it was the reſolution of his Royal Father, *He that telleth Lyes ſhall not tarry in my ſight.* To all this let it be added for a cloſe, that the ſure end and reward of it is Damnation;

for

for we have had it reveal'd from Heaven, That *the Lyar hath his part in the Lake which burneth with Brimſtone, which is the ſecond death.* So then the ſumm is, If we have any juſt regard for our own inward eaſe and ſatisfaction; for the common rights and welfare of Mankind, for our Reputation, and Honour; for our good Principles, our Morals, our Faith and Credit; for our Underſtandings, for the love of God and Man here, and for our everlaſting Condition yet to come; let us make a firm Covenant with our hearts, that we will upon no pretence whatſoever indulge our ſelves to Lye.

CONCLU-

CONCLUSION.

Wherein ſome Means are adviſed to avoid LYING.

V. TO make a clean effectual riddance of this Sin out of Humane Society, a few things may be adviſeable at parting.

Let us take care that our Children be moſt ſtrictly and religiouſly diſciplin'd up to Truth: let us teach them to admire, affect, and love it; and whatever we ſpare them for, let us never ſpare them for an obſtinate Lye: when they would ſave themſelves from another fault by *that*, let them ſmart more ſeverely for the Lye, than the Fault they would indemnify by it.

But before we have right to proceed againſt our Children, we muſt take due care of the Example we ſet them in our own Lives. Let us firſt reſolve to be ſevere Maſters of Truth and Sincerity our ſelves; and to this end, let us never give way to a wilful Lye, be the provocation what it will; let us never tell an innocent, inoffenſive, inſignificant Lye: and for this methinks the Philoſopher's reaſoning is ex-

Ariſt. Eth. l. 4. c. 13. ceeding right and pertinent; Ὁ γὰρ φιλαλήθης ἢ ἐν οἷς μὴ διαφέρει, &c. "For "when a Man is ſuch a ſtrict admirer of "Truth, that he will uſe himſelf to keep "ſuperſtitiouſly to it, even tho' in Caſes "of no moment, how much more will he "think himſelf concern'd to ſpeak Truth, "when it is in Matters of Conſequence? "he who would refrain from Lying, ſim-"ply as Lying, will be ſure to refrain from "it, when Circumſtances ſhall render it "diſhonourable and unjuſt; and this is the "Man who deſerves a Character for his "ſincerity.

Farther, in order to keep Chaſt and unſpotted from this Sin, we ſhould be very ſcrupulous how we take the freedom to magnifie and enlarge: for he who exceeds the Truth, and he who comes ſhort of it, are both alike guilty of Lying; and it muſt betray a ſtrange propenſion to the Sin, when we cannot forbear it even in a true Relation. And if Men give their minds to it, how abundantly may they launch it out, and Lye, only in the way of circumſtance? And what an odd *Metaphyſical* thing is a *reality*, when dreſs'd out, from head to heel, with Fictions and Chimeras? 'tis no new thing to have an inconſiderable Tale lick up, and gather monſtrouſly in rolling; all one as a little Book, by that time

time it has been handed about by Criticks, and thwack'd and loaded with Scholia's, Verſions, Paraphraſes, Comments, and Annotations, ſhall ſwell up to a Volume inſupportable. And I am the rather concern'd to drop ſome expreſs caution againſt this itch of amplifying, becauſe I have obſerv'd Perſons of ſome probity are apt to be a little tardy this way. Now to be liberal in laying out our own inventions upon true Stories, is upon all accounts to be forborn, by thoſe who make any pretenſions to ſtrict and ſteady ſincerity. For firſt, 'tis a diſingenuous impoſition upon the Perſon we converſe with, by ſurpriſing his aſſent at a diſadvantage; for when he has reaſon to be confident we are upon a true relation, his belief is pre-poſſeſs'd and prejudic'd, to receive all ſuch veriſimulous inventions as we think fit to add for the better grace of the Story: by all which he is not only deceiv'd himſelf, but in a way of becoming the ridiculous inſtrument of retaling out our Lyes to other People. It is the ſame kind of Cheat as that of paſſing off corrupt and baſe goods, by the Credit of ſome ſound and ſubſtantial Samples; or rather, like that which St. *Paul*, upon a due ſuſpicion of Humane Nature was apprehenſive of; that when he had laid a true and ſolid Foundation, others ſhould come

after him and build upon it, every Man according to his own imagination, *Gold, Silver, Precious Stones, Wood, Hay, Stubble: but,* ſays he, *let them take care what they do; for the fire ſhall try every Man's work of what ſort it is.* And further, we ought to be cautious of all circumſtantial enlargements, becauſe, let there be never ſo real a foundation for what we ſpeak, yet as far as we amplifie upon it we Lye; there may not be ſo much, and ſuch groſs Lying indeed, as if we had invented the whole; and while ſome of it is true, as well as ſome falſe, there ſeems a little modeſty remaining; but unleſs we tenderly cheriſh it, a *little* of that Vertue can never laſt long. A Cuſtom of enlarging upon ſome foundation, will ſoon bring you to enlarge upon no foundation at all: if you are good at amplifying, you can never fail of becoming good at inventing; for juſt ſo young Lads come on in their Exerciſes; at firſt they muſt have ſome pertinent hints, and topicks given them, upon which they are to expatiate; and ſo in time and practiſing, they will learn to work out the intire web.

To keep from enlarging, for there the Temptation begins; we ſhould be adviſ'd to abridge our ſelves of that fond and fooliſh delight we are all ſo very apt to take, in ſtartling

ſtartling and amuſing other People with Wonders: our inventing ſo many ſurprizing, improbable Circumſtances for this purpoſe, does but quite ſpoil our intention; for inſtead of making the thing look ſomewhat more than ordinary, we make nothing of it: we have always the faireſt chance to be credited, when what we relate ſounds likely and natural; and if we could be content with what Nature produces, we ſhould be ſupply'd with Materials enough for all our interviews: we need not invent odd ſcandals to belye one another into defamation, for if we can but have patience, we are all ridiculous and ſcandalous enough to afford real Novels ſufficient for that purpoſe; there is no ſuch neceſſity for ſtraining to make one another look infamous and abſurd; if we only did one another juſtice, and drew but to the Life, there would be abuſe enough in that: we ſhould ſufficiently ſtomach to ſee our ſelves expos'd in our own true and proper Colours: he who lays it on thicker and courſer than Nature, muſt be monſtrouſly unmerciful, and at the loſs of his own Credit, he muſt undo his own Malice by over-acting it; incredible Calumny brings its own vindication: and the virulent Tongue that ſhoots out too vehemently, will inſtead of piercing, be apt to dou-

ble upon the mark, and lick it ſmooth again.

Farther, we ſhould not only take heed of enlarging and inventing our ſelves, but we ought to be a little cautious how we take things after other Perſons: ſome Men are ſo notorious at the Lying gift, that 'tis weakneſs and ſcandal to receive what they offer, but much more to paſs it off again upon their Authority. *Nigidius* was thought witty enough to be taken notice of, for nicely ſpliting the hair between *mentiri*, and *mendacium dicere*: *To Lye*, ſaid he, *is to invent a Falſehood of our own, and knowingly paſs it off*; but *to tell a Lye*, is ignorantly to paſs another's Falſehood off for Truth: and upon this *Gellius* tells us he made this Moral Reflection; *Vir bonus præſtare debet ne mentiatur, prudens ne mendacium dicat*: "It is the part of a good "Man never to Lye, and of a prudent "Man never to tell a Lye. Things gather in the relation ſo extravagantly, that we ſhould make ſome abatements even after Men of Credit: their manner of telling will magnifie of courſe: let a Painter Copy after another Piece, and be as exact as if it were for his life, and yet 'tis much but he varies, or adds ſomething out of his own fancy: and ſo 'tis in copying Characters after other Men, but commonly the altera-

L. 11. C. 11.

alterations *here* are out of all meaſure: it was a ſmart reply of old *Thales*, who being ask'd what diſtance there was between *Truth* and *Falſehood? as much*, ſaid he, *as between the Eye, and the Ear:* What a Man ſees he may be pretty certain of, but if he had it by hear-ſay, a hundred to one if there's any thing in't.

One Admonition farther, and then I think I have done. Let us give our ſelves up to ſtudy and admire *Truth* in general, not only Moral, but Logical or Natural Truth; not only as it regards the agreement of our words with our thoughts, but of our thoughts with the nature of things: for tho' to ſpeak as we think be no Lye, yet it may eaſily be falſe, if we are not careful to take things rightly: and to ſpeak what is falſe is an imperfection, even when it does not amount to a Sin: and to differ often with Nature, is the way to differ with our own Minds. God is our great Original, and we pretend to be his Image; but if we mean to keep up any true reſemblance of him in our Souls, we muſt not only let our words have a good agreement with our thoughts, but our thoughts muſt have the ſame good underſtanding and agreement with the nature of things: the Divine Perfection is, that he cannot poſſibly impoſe, or be impos'd upon; to keep him therefore in

A012
12

in our view, we muſt take all poſſible care about the rectitude of our Judgments, as well as the ſincerity of our Wills. And *let us chear up* (ſaid *Lucian*, concluding upon the Lyar) *we have an effectual Antidote againſt all deluſions, if we will but make uſe of it; let us follow right Reaſon and the Truth in all things, and we need not fear being put upon, or concern'd with any vain or Lying Imaginations.*

FINIS.

ADVERTISEMENT.

A Vindication of the Chriſtian Church in the Baptizing of Infants, drawn from the Holy Scriptures: By *Theophilus Dorrington*, Rector of *Wittreſham* in *Kent*. Printed for *John Wyat*, at the *Roſe* in St. *Paul*'s Church-yard.

309692